The right to foreclosure is very powerful remedy in the hands of the equitable mortgagee and the vendor who takes a legal estate with notice of an equitable mortgage and therefore subject to this class of equitable interest should bear this in mind since, in certain circumstances, he may find in the end that he has bought a worthless legal estate.
– Idigbe JSC. Ogundiani v. Araba (1978)
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I will have to state clearly that the statutory corporations, with authority to build houses and sell on terms to people who otherwise would be unable to build on their own, are in someway mortgages to the buyers. But instead of outright loan to the buyer they provide ready built houses to be paid for on certain terms. The terms range according to the laid down policy of each corporation. Some require a certain percentage of the full price to be paid as first deposit and the remainder to be paid in certain instalments. They are in some cases flexible as to time but in most cases spell out when and how to liquidate the full price. All these terms are without prejudice to mortgagor’s right to pay the full price outright; or if he defaults for just a few days or even weeks in a reasonable way he still retains his equity of redemption, i.e. even if the contractual date had passed. Howard V Harris (1683) 1 Vern 190; Spurgeon V Collier (1578) 1 Eden 55; Jennings V Ward (1705) 5 Vern 520. What found its way into our statutes is no more than the historical Common Law Practice of protecting the weak borrowing from the overbearing lender. Once the lender (mortgagee) was adequately protected to recover his money in full plus interest at reasonable time even if somewhat outside the contracted period the mortgagor’s equity of redemption should not be vitiated. What is essentially a mortgage in this case is dressed up as a conveyance with the right to withhold possession from the mortgagor until he liquidated the debt; but should he fail to liquidate by unreasonably defaulting in payment and was in arrears for long the mortgagee’s right of foreclosure should also not be vitiated.
— Belgore, JSC. A.S.H.D.C. v Emekwue (1996) – SC. 282/1989
It is a well established principle of law that a mortgagee will not be restrained on the exercise of his power of sale merely because the mortgagor objects to the manner in which the sale is being arranged or because the mortgagor has commenced a redemption action in court. (See Adams v. Scott (1859) 7 WR 213). But the mortgagee will be restrained if the mortgagor pays the amount claimed by the mortgagee into court. (See Hickson v. Darlow (1883) 23 Ch.D. 690).
— Udoma, JSC. Nig. Housing Dev. Society v. Mumuni (1997) – SC 440/1975
In Robertson v. Cilia, (1956) 1 W.L.R. 1502, there a mortgagee applied by summons to the court for an order for pos-session of the mortgaged property on the ground that payment of instalments was in arrear. The mortgagor applied for the case to stand over generally. After certain interlocutory proceedings, the summons was adjourned into court in order that it might be determined to what extent the court had power to stand over generally a summon of that nature. At the time of the hearing, all arrears of instalments due under the mortgage had been paid up, but the right to repay by instalments had lapsed; and it was admitted that owing to general credit restrictions the mortgagor would not be in a position to redeem within any foreseen time. It was held that, an order for possession should be made as the mortgagee was entitled to possession, and in those circumstance, there was no power to stand the matter over generally without the consent of the mortgagee nor would it be a reasonable exercise of power to stand it over for a period when there was no prospect that the mortgagee would be in a position to make an acceptable offer. (See also Hinkley and South Leicester Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Freeman, (1941) Ch.32).
There is no doubt, and as earlier stated, the rights of a Mortgagee as the Appellant herein against the Mortgagor, the 3rd Respondents, is cumulative in the sense that it may decide either way, whether to enforce the security against the property or sue upon the personal covenant to the Mortgagor, for payment or go for both. Yet, it must be clearly stated in the pleadings which form the creditor has chosen, to recover its money. See Megany’s Manual of the Law of Real Property, 67th Edition page 484.
— O. Ariwoola, JSC. African Intl. Bank Ltd. v Integrated Dimensional System (2012) – SC.278/2002
In a legal mortgage, title to the property is therefore transferred to the mortgagee subject to the proviso that the mortgage property would be reconveyed by the mortgagee to the mortgagor upon the performance of the conditions stipulated in the mortgage deed and upon payment of the debt at the time stipulated therein. In other words, the mortgagor is liable to repay the loan as stipulated; otherwise the mortgaged property is foreclosed. See BANK OF NORTH V. BELLO (2000) 7 NWLR (prt 664) 244, ADETONA V. ZENITH INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC (2011) 18 NWLR (prt 1278) 627 and ATIBA IYALAMU SAVINGS & LOANS LTD V. SUBERU (2018) 13 NWLR (prt 1637) 387 at 414.
— M.L. Shuaibu, JCA. FBN v Benlion (2021) – CA/C/31/2016
The 2nd respondent’s argument is also misplaced in another respect: It assumes that upon breach of a covenant in a lease, the forfeiture of the lease is automatic. It is, however, trite that a breach of a covenant is merely a ground for forfeiture. The lessee may, however, apply for relief.
– Nnaemeka-agu, JSC. Ude v. Nwara (1993)
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