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FINAL VS INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS: DISTINCTION

Dictum

In Clement C. Ebokam vs. Ekwenibe & Sons Trading Company Ltd. (1999) 7 SCNJ 77, Kalgo, JSC held at page 87 that: “…Where the decisions of the Court under consideration clearly and wholly disposes of all the rights of the parties in the case, that decision is final. But where the decision only disposes of an issue or issues in the case, leaving the parties to go back to claim other rights in the Court, then that decision is interlocutory. And in order to determine whether the decision is final or interlocutory, the decision must relate to the subject matter in dispute between the parties and not the function of the Court making the order.”

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A COURT HAS INHERENT POWERS TO SET ASIDE ITS OWN ORDER MADE WITHOUT

In sum, I hold firmly that where a judgment of this court or an order thereof is adjudged a nullity, a party affected thereby is entitled to have it set aside ex debito justitiae. The court has inherent jurisdiction or power to set aside its own order or decision made without jurisdiction if such order or decision is in fact a nullity or was obtained by fraud or if the court was misled into granting same by concealing some vital information or facts. See Igwe v. Kalu (supra), Vulcan Gases Ltd v. G.F. Ind. AC (2001) 9 NWLR (pt.719) 610 at 644 – 645 paras H – A.

— J.I. Okoro JSC. Citec v. Francis (SC.116/2011, 21 February 2014)

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TEST FOR WHETHER A DECISION IS FINAL OR INTERLOCUTORY

However, I believe that, but for what looked like a brief inter regnum under the decision in W.A. Omonuwa v. Napoleon Oshodin & Anor. (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. 924, at p. 938 – but which has now been explained away in the decision in A.M.O. Akinsanya v. United Bank for Africa Limited (1986) 4 N.W.L.R. 273, at pp. 289 – 291, the test as to whether a decision is final or interlocutory which has been preferred by authoritative decisions in this country has been consistently one which looks at the result, id est, which asks the question: “does the judgment or order, as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties” See on this: Blay & Ors. v. Solomon (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 117; William Ude & Ors. v. Josiah Agu & Ors. (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 65; A.M.O. Akinsanya v. U B.A. Ltd. (supra).

— Nnaemeka-Agu JSC. Bennett Ifediorah & Ors. V. Ben Ume & Ors. (1988)

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IT IS PRINCIPLE OF A DECISION THAT APPLIES

I shall now consider what really was decided in these two cases and see if the principles of those decisions (not the dicta) apply to the facts and circumstances of the case now on appeal.

– Oputa, JSC. Green v. Green (1987)

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SUPREME COURT IS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DECISION, THAN REASON OF COURT OF APPEAL

Again for emphasis is that an appellate Court such as this Apex one, will not reverse the decision of the Court below simply because the conclusion and decision were reached from a wrong reason. This is so because once the decision is correct the wrong channel or route through which that decision was made would not scuttle the said conclusion. See The State v John Ogbubunjo (2001) 1 SCNJ 86 at 106 per Onu JSC. — M.U. Peter-Odili, JSC. Kwara Judicial Commission v Tolani (2019) – SC.63/2010

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DECISION OF A COURT OF LAW OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IS TO BE OBEYED

The true position of the law is that an order of a court whether it is to preserve the status quo or an executory order as such as the instant interim order to restore the name of the 1st respondent in the list of candidates for the aforesaid election clearly being an interim order with a mandatory character cannot be determined simply by looking at the form of the application or cause (from which it is generated) in order conclusively to say whether it is final or interlocutory but has further to be scrutinized from the view point of its intrinsic nature that is to say the nature of the order itself vis-a-vis the rights of the parties in the suit. It is furthermore my view that whether or not the instant order is final or interlocutory does not affect it being all the same a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction to be obeyed.

— C.M. Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC. Kubor v. Dickson (2012) – SC.369/2012

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ONLY MATTERS DECIDED IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CAN BE ENTERTAINED BY THE SUPREME COURT

By canvassing in this court matters decided in the trial Court and not adverted to in the Court of Appeal, without leave having been obtained to argue matters not argued in the Court of Appeal, such matters or issues are incompetently before this court and will be discountenanced. This Court is only competent to entertain appeals from the Court of Appeal and not from any court below the Court of Appeal. Ogoyi v. Umagba (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt.419) 283, 293; Oduntan v. General Oil Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 387) 1, 101. Similarly the appellate court will deal only with matters duly canvassed at the trial court and appealed against. The issues of fair-hearing or breach of Sections 20,21 and 22(6) of the Chiefs Law never came into argument at the trial Court nor at the Court of Appeal, and no leave having been obtained to argue them as novel issues not raised in the courts below, are not competent for argument in this court. There was no pronouncement on these issues at the trial court, and no appeal was lodged on this failure in the Court of Appeal, it is therefore incompetent in this court for the appellants to start raising issues of lack of fair hearing, or breach of natural justice in the conduct of investigation into the selection of Baale of Isundunrin. In the absence of a decision on a point, and that point has been canvassed at the trial court, the course open to the party aggrieved is to appeal against that non-decision. Saude v. Abdullahi (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 116) 387, 433, 434; Adesokan v. Adetunji (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.346) 540, 575, 576.

— Belgore, JSC. Ogundare v Ogunlowo (1997) – SC.25/1994

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