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FAIR HEARING IS TO BE JUDGED BY THE NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

Dictum

The question of fair hearing is not just an issue of dogma. Whether or not a party has been denied of his right to fair hearing is to be judged by the nature and circumstances surrounding a particular case; the crucial determinant is the necessity to afford the parties equal opportunity to put their case to the court before the court gives its judgment. In the instant case, there has been no complaint that the respondents were granted advantages or special favours in the presentation of their case which were denied to the appellants. A complaint founded on a denial of fair hearing is an invitation to the court hearing the appeal to consider whether or not the court against which a complaint is made has been generally fair on the basis of equality to all the parties before it.

— A. Oguntade, JSC. Pam & Anor. V Mohammed (2008) – SC.238/2007

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FAIR TRIAL – RECOURSE TO SUPRA NATIONAL COURT

In the Case Concerning Bryan v. United Kingdom, 22 November 1995, paragraph 44, the European Court held that “A fair trial is a right which does no more than enable an aggrieved person to have recourse to a supra national court, so that the one who governs him may be condemned if the proof of a violation of his rights is established; the court must have jurisdiction to examine the points of fact and of law in the case which has come before it, in order that it may reform it…”

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COUNSEL MUST SHOW HOW FAIR HEARING WAS BREACHED

A complaint founded on a denial of fair hearing is an invitation to the Court hearing the Appeal to consider whether or not the Court against which the complaint is made, has been generally fair on the basis of equality to all the parties before it. Counsel has not indicated or shown in what circumstances the Appellant was denied fair hearing. It is not enough for Counsel to say that the right to fair hearing was breached in a matter; he must show such by the evidence available and the circumstances of such breach. And the evidence must be that the party was not given an opportunity to state his case which he wanted to state in his own way. As was rightly submitted by learned Counsel for the Respondent, fair hearing is not a technical doctrine, but a rule of substance.

– Sankey JCA. Abdul v. State (2021)

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NATURE OF FAIR HEARING

Pam v. Mohammed (2008) LPELR-2895(SC), 26-27, per Oguntade, J.S.C., held as follows – “The question of fair hearing is not just an issue of dogma. Whether or not a party has been denied of his right to fair hearing is to be Judged by the nature and circumstances surrounding a particular case; the crucial determinant is the necessity to afford the parties equal opportunity to put their case to the Court before the Court gives its judgment … It is wrong and improper to approach the meaning of fair hearing by placing reliance on any a priori assumptions as to its technical requirements. The simple approach is to look at the totality of the proceedings before the Court and then form an opinion on objective standards whether or not an equal opportunity has been afforded to parties to fully ventilate their grievances before a Court. The principle of fair hearing cannot be applied as if it were a technical rule based on prescribed prerequisites. It seems a sufficient satisfaction of the principle if parties were afforded an equal opportunity without any inhibition to put across their case.”

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DECISION VOID WHERE NATURAL JUSTICE IS ABSENT

Adigun v. Attorney- General of Oyo State (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 56) 197 where the Supreme Court stated: “If the principles of natural justice are violated in respect of any decision, it is indeed immaterial, whether the same decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the departure from the essential principles of justice. The decision must be declared as no decision.”

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FAIR HEARING IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL – STATE MUST ASSIGN COUNSEL TO ACCUSED IN CAPITAL OFFENCE

A fair hearing presupposes first and foremost a hearing. We operate the “Adversary System”. The major feature of this system is the passive and inactive role of the judge in the presentation of cases in court. The judge under our system is at best an attentive listener to all that is said on both sides. He is not an investigator. He speaks mainly to deliver judgments. This passive role of the judge emphasises the active role of counsel for the prosecution and for the defence. What is a “hearing” worth to an accused person who does not understand the language of the court, who does not know the rules of procedure, and who cannot properly present his case The right to counsel is thus at the very root of, and is the necessary foundation for a fair hearing. The ordinary layman, even the intelligent and educated layman is not skilled in the science of law and he therefore needs the aid and advice of counsel. It is because of this need that, in capital offences, attracting the death penalty, the accused is not left undefended. If he cannot afford the services of counsel the State assigns one to him. It is surprising that none was assigned to the appellant in the court of first instance.

— Oputa, JSC. G. Josiah v. The State (1985) – SC.59/1984

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FAIR HEARING BEING SO FUNDAMENTAL MUST BE RAISED IN GOOD FAITH

My lords, so fundamental and crucial is the right to fair hearing of the citizen before all Courts of the land that a failure by a Court to observe it in the litigation processes would invariably vitiate both the proceedings and judgment of such a Court, notwithstanding the merit or otherwise of the cases of the parties or indeed how meticulous the proceedings were conducted or even how sound the resultant judgment was on the merit, they are all a nullity. However, it must be pointed out at once that the issue of fair hearing must be raised with all seriousness and in good faith. It must never be raised in bad faith or merely intended as a red herring to raise a storm in a teacup without any factual basis. See Agbogu V. Adiche (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 509@ p. 531. See also Agbapuonwu V. Agbapuonwu (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 165) 33 @p.40; Adegbesin V. The State (2014) 9 NWLR (pt. 1413) 609 @pp. 641 – 642.

— B.A. Georgewill, JCA. UBA v. Ashimina (2018) – CA/L/1033/2014

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