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FACTS ACCEPTED AND NOT CONTROVERTED WILL LEAD TO CONVICTION

Dictum

In Peter Igho v. The State (1978) 3 SC 87 the facts as set out in the judgment were that the deceased, lfoto Oboluke, left her house on Sunday 20th August, 1972 for a religious service but never returned alive. When the mother did not see her return in the evening she made a report and a search party was organised by the villagers. Those who saw her last said she was riding at the back of a bicycle. The corpse of the deceased was later found that night. This Court per Eso JSC upholding the verdict of the trial court on the conviction of the appellant said: “The only irresistible inference from the circumstances presented by the evidence in this case is that the appellant killed the deceased. We can find no other reasonable inference from the circumstances of the case. The facts which were accepted by the learned trial Judge amply supported by the evidence before him, called for an explanation and beyond the untrue denials of the appellant (as found by the learned trial Judge) none was forthcoming. See R. v. Mary Ann Nash (1911) 6 C.A.R. 225 at page 228. Though this constitutes circumstantial evidence, it is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant.”

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WHEN FINDING OF FACT IS SAID TO BE PERVERSE

A finding of fact is said to be perverse – (a) Where it runs counter to the evidence and pleadings. (b) Where it has been shown that the trial court took into account matters which it ought not to have taken into account. (c) Where the trial court shuts its eyes to the obvious. (d) When the decision has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. State v. Agie (2000) 11 NWLR pt. 678 pg. 434 Atolagbe v. Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR pt.2 pg. 360 Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR pt. 80 pg.1. Akinloye v. Eyiyola (1968) NWLR 92.

— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Mini Lodge v. Ngei (2009) – SC.231/2006

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FINDING OF FACT WILL BE DISTURBED WHEN PERVERSE

It is elementary law that needs no citation of any authority that an appellate court shall not disturb any finding of fact unless the finding is found to be perverse or cannot be justified having regard to the pleadings and the evidence led.

– Musdapher, JSC. Atta v. Ezeanah (2000)

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DISTURBED FINDING OF FACT

The trite position of the law is that where the Court of Appeal wrongly disturbed any finding of fact of a trial court, the Supreme Court will not hesitate in restoring that finding, See: Board of Customs and Excise v. Barau (1987) 10 SC 48.

— T. Muhammad, JSC. VAB Petroleum v. Momah (2013) – SC.99/2004

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APPEAL ON FINDING OF FACT REQUIRES LEAVE OF COURT

The above finding complained of being a finding of fact, it is settled law that for the appellants to successfully appeal against the finding, they must first of all obtain the leave of either the lower court or of this court. It would have been otherwise if the complaint was purely a complaint of error in law. It is clear from the record that appellants never obtained the leave of either the lower court or of this court to appeal on the facts so ground 1 of the grounds of appeal in so far as it is a complaint against the findings of facts is incompetent and is consequently liable to be struck out.

– WS Onnoghen, JSC. Calabar CC v. Ekpo (2008)

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HOW COURT SHOULD EVALUATE EVIDENCE – CONCEPT OF FACT FINDING

The law has saddled a trial Court, like the lower Court herein, with the primary duty to evaluate relevant and material evidence, both oral and documentary, after hearing and watching the demeanour of witnesses called by the parties in any proceedings having regard to their pleadings. To discharge that bounden duty, a trial Court must show how and why it arrived at its findings of fact and final determination of the issues before it. It has to be cautious and understand the distinction between summary or restatement of evidence and evaluation of evidence which means assessment of evidence and giving them probative value. It appraises evidence by constructing an imaginary scale of justice and putting the evidence of the parties on the two different pans of the scale. Then, it weighs them to determine which is heavier, not in terms of quantity, but quality of the testimonies, see Mogaji v. Odofin (supra); Olagunju v. Adesoye (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1146) 225; Oyewole v. Akande (supra); Ayuya v. Yonrin (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 135; Adusei v. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 534; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 522; Ndulue v. Ojiakor (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 311.

— O.F. Ogbuinya, JCA. Impact Solutions v. International Breweries (2018) – CA/AK/122/2016

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RATIONALE FOR UPHOLDING CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT

The attitude of this Court to concurrent findings of fact, is that it would not usually interfere with such findings unless they are shown to be perverse, not based on the evidence before the Court or where there has been an error of law or error in procedure which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The rationale for this position was eloquently stated by His Lordship, Belgore, JSC (as he then was) in Bamgboye v. Olarewaju (1991) LPELR 745 SC as follows: “Once a Court of trial has made a finding of fact, it is no more within the competence of the appellate Court to interfere with those findings except in certain circumstances. The real reason behind this attitude of appellate Courts is that the Court hearing the appeal is at a disadvantage as to the demeanour of witnesses in the lower Court as they were not seen and heard by the appellate Court. It is not right for the appellate Court to substitute its own eyes and ears for those of the trial Court which physically saw the witnesses and heard them and thus able to form an opinion as to what weight he place on their evidence…”

– Abdu Aboki JSC. Junaidu v. State (2021)

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