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EXCEPT DECLARED, STATUTES DOES NOT MAKE ALTERATION IN THE COMMON LAW

Dictum

Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 14 paragraphs 904 and 906, which read: “Except insofar as they are clearly and unambiguously intended to do so, statutes should not be construed so as to make any alteration in the common law or to change any established principle of law, or to alter completely the character of the principle of law contained in statutes which they merely amend. There is no presumption that by legislating Parliament intended to change the law. ” “Unless it is clearly and unambiguously intended to do so, a statute should not be construed so as to interfere with or prejudice established private rights under contracts or the title to property, or so as to deprive a man of his property without his having an opportunity of being heard.”

– Cited in Abioye v. Yakubu (1991) – SC.169/1987

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DEFINITION OF THE WORD “FEDERATION”

In Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Imo State (1993) 4 NCLR 178 where Bello, JSC (as he then was of blessed memory) defined the word “Federation” in his judgment at pages 193-194 where he said:- “It now remains to consider the crucial question, which has never been decided by this Court, as to what is ‘Federation’ and ‘State’ within the ambit of section 212 of the Constitution . . . ‘State’ when used otherwise than in relation to one of the component parts of the Federation includes government . . . ‘government’ includes the Government of the Federation, or of any State or of a Local Government Council or any person who exercises power or authority on its behalf . . . The meaning of the word ‘Federation’ presents no difficulty. It is clear from the provisions of section 2 of the Constitution that the words ‘Nigeria’, ‘Sovereign State’, ‘Federal Republic of Nigeria’ and ‘Federation’ are synonymous. I hold that ‘Federation’ in section 212(1) of the Constitution bears the same meaning as the Federal Republic of Nigeria.” (Relied on in AG Kano State v AG Federation (2007) – SC 26/2006)

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INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 82 CFRN 1999

In my view their power under the section is further circumscribed and limited by sub-section (2) of section 82. They can only invite members of the public when they want to gather facts for the purpose of enabling them make law or amend existing laws in respect of any matter within their legislative competence or as witnesses in a properly constituted inquiry under section 82(1)(b). Their power to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste is also limited to government departments, authorities, and functionaries.

– Oguntade, JCA. El-Rufai v. House of Representatives (2003)

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INTERPRETATION: WHERE AMBIGUITY EXIST

On the other hand where the literal interpretation of the provision of a Statute will result in some ambiguity or injustice, the Court may seek internal aid within the body of the statute itself or external aid from statutes which are in pari materia in order to resolve the ambiguity or to avoid doing injustice in the matter.

– Nwaoma Uwa, JCA. NOGA v. NICON (2007)

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STATUTES SHOULD BE READ IN WHOLESOMENESS

Furthermore, it is the law that in construing any provision of a statute, a court ought, and is indeed bound, to consider any other parts of the statute which throw light upon the intention of the legislature and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would if considered alone without reference to such other parts of the statute.

– Katsina-Alu, JSC. Dantsoho v. Mohammed (2003)

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WHERE PROVISION OF STATUTE ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, LITERAL RULE IS APPLIED

The primary function of the court is to search for the intention of the lawmaker in the interpretation of a statute. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, as it is in this case, the court in the exercise of its interpretative jurisdiction, must stop where the statute stops. In other words, a court of law has no jurisdiction to rewrite a statute to suit the purpose of one of the parties or both parties. The moment a court of law intends to rewrite a statute or really rewrites a statute, the intention of the lawmaker is thrown overboard and the court changes place with the lawmaker. In view of the fact that that will be against the doctrine of separation of powers entrenched in the Constitution, a court of law will not embark on such an unconstitutional act. Courts of law follow the literal rule of interpretation where the provision of the statute is clear and no more. And that is the position in this appeal.

– Tobi JSC. Araka v. Egbue (2003) – SC.167/1999

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DATE OF COMMENCEMENT: IF STATUTE IS TO HAVE AN EARLIER APPLICATION, IT IS TO BE STATED EXPLICITLY

The date of commencement of the Decree, as stated in the marginal note in it, was 20th June, 1991. The date of commencement of a statute is the date that it comes into operation. In the circumstance, the date on which the Decree itself, which included section 11 thereof, came into operation was the 20th June, 1991. There was nothing in the Decree to the effect that the Decree or any part or section thereof shall be deemed to have come into operation on a date earlier than the date of commencement stated in the Decree. Also, there was no provision in the Decree that actions or proceedings on matters to which the provision of section 11 of the Decree applied, which were pending in courts on the date of commencement of the decree, should abate or be discontinued. If it is intended by the lawmaker that any part or section of a statute should come into operation on a date earlier than the date of commencement of the statute itself provision to that effect will be made in clear term.

— Y.O. Adio. Kotoye v. Saraki (1994) – S.C. 147/1993

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