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DUTY OF TRIAL COURT; PERCEPTION & EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

Dictum

There is a duty in a trial court to receive all available relevant evidence on an issue. This is perception of evidence. After that there is another duty to weigh that evidence in the context of the surrounding circumstances of the case. This is evaluation of evidence. A finding of fact will entail both perception and evaluation. But very often in actual practice it is difficult to say when perception ends and evaluation begins.

– Oputa JSC. OLUFOSOYE v. OLORUNFEMI (1989)

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EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE REMAINS EXCLUSIVE PRESERVE OF TRIAL COURT

The settled principle of law is that it is the trial court which alone has the primary function of fully considering the totality of evidence placed before it, ascribe probative value to it. Put same on the imaginary scale of justice to determine the party in whose favour the balance tilts, make the necessary findings of facts flowing therefrom, apply the relevant law to the findings and come to the logical conclusion. The evaluation of evidence remains the exclusive preserve of the trial Court because of the its singular opportunity of hearing and watching the demeanour of witnesses as they testify and thus the court best suited to assess their credibility of a witness an appellate court would not ordinarily interfere.

— F.F. Tabai, JSC. Mini Lodge v. Ngei (2009) – SC.231/2006

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WHAT APPELLANT MUST DO WHEN HE ALLEGES FAULTY EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

Evaluation of evidence entails the trial Judge examining of all evidence before him before making a finding. This is done by putting all the evidence on an imaginary scale to see which side outweigh the other by way of credible evidence. See LAFIA L. G. v. EXEC. GOV. OF NASARAWA STATE (2012) LPELR-20602 (SC). So where the Appellant complained that the judge did not evaluate evidence properly as in this case, he has the duty to show the Appellate Court how the correction of the omission will make the decision wrong and liable to be set aside. For example, the Appellant must show which admissible evidence the trial Judge rejected or inadmissible evidence he relied upon to the extent that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. In other words, it is not just enough to complain against the evaluation of evidence, but the Appellant must show that the decision of the trial Court was wrong. See PETROLEUM (SPECIAL) TRUST FUND v. WESTERN PROJECT CONSORTIUM LTD and ORS. (2006) LPELR-7719 and ODUNUKWE v. OFOMATA and ANOR. (1999) 6 NWLR (PT. 602) 416 at 425 (CA). The law has been stated and re-stated in uncountable number of decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court that the duty of evaluation of evidence and the ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary duty of the trial Court. This is especially so where the evaluation of evidence is on the conflicting oral testimonies and belief or disbelief of such evidence. The Appellate Court cannot be in a position to recapture that advantage that the trial Judge had in observing the witnesses as they testified. Therefore, unless the Appellant satisfied this Court as an Appellate Court that the decision of the trial Court was wrong vide improper evaluation of evidence, we have no business re-evaluating the evidence to substitute our own decision for that of the trial Court.

— B.B. Aliyu, JCA. Oboh v. Oboh (2021) – CA/B/372/12

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COURT OF APPEAL CAN EVALUATE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

By way of prefatory remarks, I must place on record, that documentary evidence form the corpus and integral part of the case. Interestingly, the law, in order to remedy and expel injustice from proceedings, donates concurrent jurisdiction to this Court and the lower Court in evaluation of documentary evidence, see Gonzee (Nig.) Ltd. v. NERDC (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) 634; Olagunju v. Adesoye(2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1146) 225; Ayuya v. Yonrin (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 135; Eyiboh v. Abia (2012) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1325) 51; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354); CPC v. Ombugadu (2013) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1385) 66; UTC (Nig) Plc v. Lawal (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1400) 221; Ogundalu v. Macjob (2015) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1460) 96; Onwuzuruike v. Edoziem (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1508) 215; Ezechukwu v. Onwuka (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1506) 529; C.K. & W.M.C. Ltd. v. Akingbade (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1533) 487.

— O.F. Ogbuinya, JCA. Impact Solutions v. International Breweries (2018) – CA/AK/122/2016

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FOR AN EVIDENCE TO BE RELIED UPON, IT MUST HAVE COGENCY OR PROBATIVE VALUE

The law does not permit evidence which is of no probative value to be relied upon by a party, nor to be acted upon by the court, to support a claim. It is an important aspect of civil procedure that for evidence to be considered useful and which a court can act upon, there are certain basic qualities it must possess. The first consideration is usually the double requirement of relevancy and admissibility. But in essence they can be separated. The evidence must be relevant to a fact in issue, or to any fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue, or relevant to a fact which is inconsistent to any fact in issue or to a fact which by itself or in connection with any other fact makes the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue probable or improbable. S.7 & 12 Evidence Act. It must be admissible having regard to the facts pleaded and if no law or rule precludes its admission: see Emegokwue v. Okadigbo(1973) 4 SC 113; Onobruchere v. Esegine (1986) 1 NWLR (PU9) 799. It must have credibility or cogency thereby enabling the Judge to ascribe some probative value to it having regard to its nature and what it is intended to establish: Misr (Nig.) Ltd. v.Ibrahim (1974) 5 SC 55 at 62; Aikhionbare v. Omoregie (1976) 12 SC 11 at 27. I have had to state the above because Exhibit V neither has cogency nor any probative value which can be ascribed to it.

Rockonoh v. NTP (2001) – SC.71/1995

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THE APPEAL COURT IS IN A POSITION TO EVALUATE ADMITTED EVIDENCE WHERE IT IS BASICALLY TO DRAW INFERENCES FROM DOCUMENTS

Where however the nature of the case is such that the evaluation would not entail the assessment of credibility of witnesses and would be confined to drawing inferences and making findings from admitted and proved facts and from the contents of documentary evidence, the appellate court is in as vantage a position as the trial court to evaluate or re-evaluate the evidence and make its own findings. These principles have been applied in a number of cases amongst which are WOLUCHEM v. GUDI (1981) 5 SC 291; MOGAJI v. ODOFIN (1978) 4 SC 91; DURU v. NWOSU (1989) 4 NWLR (Part 113) 24; OLADEHIN v. CONTINENTAL ILE MILLS LTD. (1978) 2 SC 28; CHUKWU v. NNEJI (1990) 6 NWLR (Part 156) 363; AKINTOLA v. BALOGUN (2000) 1 NWLR (Part 642) 532 at 546. I have gone through the evidence of the witnesses on record and the judgment of the trial Court and I am firmly of the view that there was no issue of the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. The result is that this Court, like the court below, is in as good a position as the trial court to appraise or re-appraise the evidence on record to see if the concurrent findings of the two courts below are not perverse. With respect to the evidence itself, there is a lot of oral as well as documentary evidence. I am however of the view that the issues raised would be resolved mainly by the documentary evidence. I am guided in this view by the settled principle of law that oral evidence is only to be hangars on for documentary evidence.

— F.F. Tabai, JSC. Mini Lodge v. Ngei (2009) – SC.231/2006

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IT IS THE PRIMARY DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO EVALUATE EVIDENCE

There is no doubt that the evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value thereto are the primary duties of the trial court, which had the singular opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify and an appellate court would ordinarily not interfere. It is also trite that this court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by two lower courts, unless it is shown that the findings are perverse, or not based on a proper and dispassionate appraisal of the evidence, or that there is an error, either of law or fact, which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. See Ogoala v. The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 175) 509, (1991) 3 SCNJ 61; Saleh v. BON Ltd (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 976) 316 at 329 – 330 – C; Agbaje v. Fashola (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 443) 1302, (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1082) 90 at 153- E.

— Kekere-Ekun, JSC. Nyesom v. Peterside (SC.1002/2015 (REASONS), 12 Feb 2016)

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