STOP SEEING INTRUSIVE ADS, & HAVE PREMIUM FEATURES? Stop seeing intrusive ads and have a smoother reading experience, once you sign up on Judicial Poetry. Sign up now!

DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEED CREATES EQUITABLE MORTGAGE

Reach more audience. Place advert here.

Kadiri v. Olusaga (1956) 1 FSC at p. 178: “It is the case, as stated by the learned trial Judge, that the security given was not the form of a legal mortgage, that is to say by deed, transferring the legal estate to the respondent, but the deposit of title deeds as security for a loan is an equitable mortgage, and I am unable to agree that the loan was an unsecured one within the meaning of the legislation in question. As Lord Macnaghten said when delivering the judgment of the Board in Bank of New South Wales v. O’Connor (1889) 14 AC page 273. ‘It is a well established rule of equity that a deposit of a document of title without either writing or word of mouth will create in equity a charge upon the property to which the document relates to the extent of the interest of the person who makes the deposit. In the absence of consent that charge can only be displaced by actual payment of the amount secured.'”

Was this dictum helpful?

SHARE ON

deed, mortgage

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE CANNOT VARY A DEED

It was common ground that the relationship between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant is contractual and governed by exhibit B, the Deed of Legal Mortgage. That being so, extrinsic evidence will generally not be acceptable to vary the terms agreed upon (see for example U.B.N. v. Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385). – Kutigi JSC. Okonkwo v. Cooperative Bank (2003)

Was this dictum helpful?

FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING IS FOR EQUITABLE MORTGAGE – MORTGAGOR HOLDS LEGAL ESTATE IN TRUST

In considering the scope of the rights of an equitable mortgagee (not by way of charge) it should be borne in mind that the general rule is that foreclosure (and not sale) is the proper remedy of an equitable mortgagee (See James vs James (1873) L.R. 16 E. 153 citing with approval Pryce vs Bury at 154); and when an equitable mortgagee by deposit of title deeds and agreement to give a legal mortgage if called upon to do so takes foreclosure proceedings to enforce his security, the court usually decrees that the deposit operates as a mortgage and that in default of payments due under the mortgage the mortgagor is trustee of the legal estate for the mortgagee and that he must convey that estate to him.

– Idigbe JSC. Ogundiani v. Araba (1978)

Was this dictum helpful?

EQUITABLE MORTGAGE FIRST IN TIME TAKES PRIORITY

I have earlier set out the peculiar factors and circumstances not least being that the appellant has paid part of the purchase price of ₦2.3m to the tune of ₦1.8m leaving a balance of ₦500,000.00 and has been put in possession of the disputed property. There is a binding agreement of sale of the 1st respondent’s interest in the said property between the appellant and the 1st respondent. The appellant has thereby acquired an equitable interest to the extent of the 1st respondent’s interest in the equity of redemption and this is the interest which the mortgagor, the 1st respondent has had at all material times. The 1st respondent cannot give what it hasn’t got. And as I intimated earlier any attempt to pass the legal estate in the disputed property to the appellant will be of no effect and void not voidable because the 1st respondent as the mortgagor has bound itself to convey the legal estate to the mortgagee whenever it is called upon to do so until the principal, interest and costs are duly paid on the mortgage. See: Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Ashiru and Anor. (supra) per ldigbe JSC, and Jared v. Clements (1903) 1 Ch. 428. Besides, the appellant is acquainted with notice of the mortgage and so cannot take priority to the 2nd respondent’s equitable mortgage which is first in time. – Chukwuma-Eneh JSC. Yaro v. Arewa CL (2007)

Was this dictum helpful?

MORTGAGEE’S RIGHT OF PROPERTY SALE

Intercity Bank Plc. v. F and F F (Nig.) Ltd. (2001) 17 NWLR (Pt.742) 347, wherein Omage, J.C.A. stated as follows on page 365 “In my respectful opinion, the complaint of the mortgagor notwithstanding, about the actual sum owing on the mortgage, the court will not interfere or restrain the mortgagee from exercising his right of sale of the mortgaged property. To intervene is to seek to vary the terms of the mortgage agreement and the court will not rewrite the mortgage agreement for the parties. The right of sale of the mortgagee is the only certain shield of recovery of the mortgagee’s investment … and he should be allowed to sell, ceteris paribus (all things being equal)”.

Was this dictum helpful?

MORTGAGEE WILL ENTER POSSESSION ONCE MORTGAGOR’s PAYMENT OF INSTALLMENT IS IN ARREARS

In Robertson v. Cilia, (1956) 1 W.L.R. 1502, there a mortgagee applied by summons to the court for an order for pos-session of the mortgaged property on the ground that payment of instalments was in arrear. The mortgagor applied for the case to stand over generally. After certain interlocutory proceedings, the summons was adjourned into court in order that it might be determined to what extent the court had power to stand over generally a summon of that nature. At the time of the hearing, all arrears of instalments due under the mortgage had been paid up, but the right to repay by instalments had lapsed; and it was admitted that owing to general credit restrictions the mortgagor would not be in a position to redeem within any foreseen time. It was held that, an order for possession should be made as the mortgagee was entitled to possession, and in those circumstance, there was no power to stand the matter over generally without the consent of the mortgagee nor would it be a reasonable exercise of power to stand it over for a period when there was no prospect that the mortgagee would be in a position to make an acceptable offer. (See also Hinkley and South Leicester Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Freeman, (1941) Ch.32).

Was this dictum helpful?

DEED: INTENTION TO BE BOUND IS GOOD AS DELIVERY

Vincent v. Premo Enterprises Ltd. (supra) at p. 619 Lord Denning, M.R.: “The law as to “delivery” of a deed is of ancient date. But it is reasonably clear. A deed is very different from a contract. On a contract for the sale of land, the contract is not binding on the parties until they have exchanged their parts. But with a deed it is different. A deed is binding on the maker of it, even though the parts have not been exchanged, as long as it has been signed, sealed and delivered. “Delivery” in this connection does not mean “handed over” to the other side. It means delivered in the old legal sense, namely an act done so as to evince an intention to be bound. Even though the deed remains in the possession of the maker, or of his solicitor, he is bound by it if he has done some act evincing an intention to be bound, as by saying “I deliver this my act and deed.” He may, however, make the “delivery” conditional: in which case the deed is called an “escrow” which becomes binding when the condition is fulfilled.”

Was this dictum helpful?

No more related dictum to show.