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DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEED CREATES EQUITABLE MORTGAGE

Dictum

Kadiri v. Olusaga (1956) 1 FSC at p. 178: “It is the case, as stated by the learned trial Judge, that the security given was not the form of a legal mortgage, that is to say by deed, transferring the legal estate to the respondent, but the deposit of title deeds as security for a loan is an equitable mortgage, and I am unable to agree that the loan was an unsecured one within the meaning of the legislation in question. As Lord Macnaghten said when delivering the judgment of the Board in Bank of New South Wales v. O’Connor (1889) 14 AC page 273. ‘It is a well established rule of equity that a deposit of a document of title without either writing or word of mouth will create in equity a charge upon the property to which the document relates to the extent of the interest of the person who makes the deposit. In the absence of consent that charge can only be displaced by actual payment of the amount secured.'”

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MORTGAGOR IS ENTITLED TO POSSESSION AS OF RIGHT

As was said by Harman J. in Alliance Perpetual Building Society v. Belrum In-vestments Ltd. And Ors. (1957) 1 W.L.R. 720, at p. 722 – possession is a remedy to which a mortgagee is entitled as of right against a mortgagor, whether the principal or interest be due or not, unless there is some special clause in the mortgage excluding it. (See also Hughes v. Waite (1957) 1 W.L.R. 713; and Four Maids Ltd. v. Dudley Marshall (properties) Ltd. (1957) Ch. 317.

— Udoma, JSC. Nig. Housing Dev. Society v. Mumuni (1997) – SC 440/1975

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ATTRIBUTES OF A LEGAL MORTGAGE

The main attributes of a legal mortgage are:- (a) a covenant to pay the principal debt and interest on a given date; (b) a covenant to pay interest in the event of default in payment of the principal on the day named; (c) the demise or sub-demise of, or the charge by way of legal mortgage on the mortgaged property; (d) the proviso for cesser; and (e) Such variations of the statutory provisions with regard to mortgages, as the arrangement between the parties requires.

– Augie JSC. Bank v. TEE (2003)

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RIGHT TO REDEEM A MORTGAGE

It is important to note that incident to every mortgage is a right of the mortgagor to redeem. This right is generally referred to as the right of redemption. The right to redeem is so inseparable an incident of a mortgage that it cannot be taken away even by an expressed agreement of the parties that the mortgage is not to be redeem or that the right is to be continued to a particular time or to a particular description of persons. The right continues unless and until the mortgagor’s title is extinguished or his interest is destroyed by sale either under the process of the court or of a power in the mortgage deed.

– Mohammed JCA. Rufukka v. Kurfi (1996)

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A MORTGAGEE IS NOT A TRUSTEE OF A POWER OF SALE FOR THE MORTGAGOR

The purchaser ought to have been made a party to this suit in view of the reliefs of the plaintiff to declare the sale null and void and consequently to set it aside. Any order made in favour of the plaintiff will adversely affect the purchaser. It is also pertinent that where there is prayer to set aside an auction sale, the court must remember that it is settled law that a mortgagee is not a trustee of a power of sale for the mortgagor except for the balance of the purchase money. It is a power given to him for his own benefit, enabling him to protect the mortgage debt. A purchaser who bought a property sold by a legal mortgage in exercise of his power of sale under a mortgage upon a default and repayment of a loan by the mortgagor is not a trespasser. All State Trust Bank v. Nsofor (2004) All FWLR Pt. 201, Pg. 7719 Union Bank of Nigeria v. Ozigi (1991) 2 NWLR Pt. 176, Pg. 677.

— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Agboola v UBA (2011) – SC.86/2003

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EQUITABLE MORTGAGE FIRST IN TIME TAKES PRIORITY

I have earlier set out the peculiar factors and circumstances not least being that the appellant has paid part of the purchase price of ₦2.3m to the tune of ₦1.8m leaving a balance of ₦500,000.00 and has been put in possession of the disputed property. There is a binding agreement of sale of the 1st respondent’s interest in the said property between the appellant and the 1st respondent. The appellant has thereby acquired an equitable interest to the extent of the 1st respondent’s interest in the equity of redemption and this is the interest which the mortgagor, the 1st respondent has had at all material times. The 1st respondent cannot give what it hasn’t got. And as I intimated earlier any attempt to pass the legal estate in the disputed property to the appellant will be of no effect and void not voidable because the 1st respondent as the mortgagor has bound itself to convey the legal estate to the mortgagee whenever it is called upon to do so until the principal, interest and costs are duly paid on the mortgage. See: Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Ashiru and Anor. (supra) per ldigbe JSC, and Jared v. Clements (1903) 1 Ch. 428. Besides, the appellant is acquainted with notice of the mortgage and so cannot take priority to the 2nd respondent’s equitable mortgage which is first in time. – Chukwuma-Eneh JSC. Yaro v. Arewa CL (2007)

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DEED: INTENTION TO BE BOUND IS GOOD AS DELIVERY

Vincent v. Premo Enterprises Ltd. (supra) at p. 619 Lord Denning, M.R.: “The law as to “delivery” of a deed is of ancient date. But it is reasonably clear. A deed is very different from a contract. On a contract for the sale of land, the contract is not binding on the parties until they have exchanged their parts. But with a deed it is different. A deed is binding on the maker of it, even though the parts have not been exchanged, as long as it has been signed, sealed and delivered. “Delivery” in this connection does not mean “handed over” to the other side. It means delivered in the old legal sense, namely an act done so as to evince an intention to be bound. Even though the deed remains in the possession of the maker, or of his solicitor, he is bound by it if he has done some act evincing an intention to be bound, as by saying “I deliver this my act and deed.” He may, however, make the “delivery” conditional: in which case the deed is called an “escrow” which becomes binding when the condition is fulfilled.”

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