The duty of every appellant is to show and or establish that the decision he has appealed was wrong or unreasonable. Every decision of a Court of law, a judicial act, done in a manner substantially regular is presumed to be correct and that formal requisites for its validity were complied with. The presumption of regularity under Section 167(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 is all about this.
— E. Eko, JSC. Kassim v. State (2017) – SC.361/2015
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In Ebba vs. Ogodo (1984) 4 SC 372. The apex court had this to say:- “Unless the Court of Appeal finds that the decision is perverse, the Court of Appeal, whose opportunity is confined to printed record, is obliged to, and must accord to the finding of fact, by the trial court, the greatest weight and due respect.”
Since the conflicting decisions of the two courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction are persuasive only and not binding, the High Courts of the Northern States are at liberty to follow either until the matter is settled by the Court of Appeal or this Court.
– M. Bello, JSC. AG Kaduna State v. Hassan (1985) – SC.149/1984
Omonuwa v. Oshodin & Anor (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 10) 924: “There is clearly no doubt that the principle established in all the above cited cases is that where the decision of the court does not finally determine the issue or issues between the parties or does not at once affect the status of the parties for whichever side the decisions is given, it is interlocutory.”
In sum, I hold firmly that where a judgment of this court or an order thereof is adjudged a nullity, a party affected thereby is entitled to have it set aside ex debito justitiae. The court has inherent jurisdiction or power to set aside its own order or decision made without jurisdiction if such order or decision is in fact a nullity or was obtained by fraud or if the court was misled into granting same by concealing some vital information or facts. See Igwe v. Kalu (supra), Vulcan Gases Ltd v. G.F. Ind. AC (2001) 9 NWLR (pt.719) 610 at 644 – 645 paras H – A.
— J.I. Okoro JSC. Citec v. Francis (SC.116/2011, 21 February 2014)
The Supreme Court, and any other superior court of record, possesses inherent power to set aside its judgment in appropriate cases. Such circumstances include: a. When the judgment is obtained by fraud or deceit b. When the judgment is a nullity and a person affected by the order is entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside. c. When the court was misled into giving judgment under the mistaken belief that the parties had consented to it. d. Where judgment was given in the absence of jurisdiction. e. Where the procedure adopted was such as to deprive the decision or judgment of the character of a legitimate adjudication. See: Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.109) 250; A.D.H. Ltd. v. Amalgamated Trustees Ltd, (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt.392) 1781 @ 1840 C – F; Alao v. A.C.B. Ltd. (2000) FWLR (Pt. 11) 1858; (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt.672) 264; Igwe v. Kalu (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt.787) 435; Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) SCNLR 341; Obimonure v. Erinosho (1966) All NLR 245.
— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun JSC. Citec v. Francis (SC.116/2011, 21 February 2014)
However, I believe that, but for what looked like a brief inter regnum under the decision in W.A. Omonuwa v. Napoleon Oshodin & Anor. (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. 924, at p. 938 – but which has now been explained away in the decision in A.M.O. Akinsanya v. United Bank for Africa Limited (1986) 4 N.W.L.R. 273, at pp. 289 – 291, the test as to whether a decision is final or interlocutory which has been preferred by authoritative decisions in this country has been consistently one which looks at the result, id est, which asks the question: “does the judgment or order, as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties” See on this: Blay & Ors. v. Solomon (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 117; William Ude & Ors. v. Josiah Agu & Ors. (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 65; A.M.O. Akinsanya v. U B.A. Ltd. (supra).
— Nnaemeka-Agu JSC. Bennett Ifediorah & Ors. V. Ben Ume & Ors. (1988)
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