Where, however, purported consent judgment is vitiated by fraud, mistake, misconception or by any other vice which would afford a ground for setting aside the compromise agreement on which the order was based, no true consent judgment binding on the parties would have emerged. The result, in such a case is that the so called consent judgment can be set aside but by a fresh action. See Talabi v. Adeseye (1972) 8-9 SC 20. The court, therefore, has discretionary jurisdiction to examine the entire circumstances of a case in order to determine whether the alleged compromise agreement entered into by the parties should be sanctioned and made an order of court. It is this jurisdiction that the respondent in the present application invited the trial court to exercise, alleging that the consent judgment in issue was vitiated by mistake and misconception and that there was, in fact, no concensus ad idem between the parties in the terms of the compromise agreement which were the basis of the consent judgment. I will now briefly dispose of the right of a party to repudiate the action of his solicitor.
— Iguh JSC. Vulcan Gases Limited V. Gesellschaft Fur Industries Gasverwertung A.G.(G.I.V.) ( SC.67/1995, 4th May 2001)