Judiciary-Poetry-Logo
JPoetry

COMPANY WILL NOT BE USE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FRAUD

Reach more audience. Place advert here.

Dictum

It must be stated unequivocally that this court, as the last court of the land, will not allow a party to use its company as a cover to dupe, cheat and or defraud an innocent citizen who entered into lawful contract with the company, only to be confronted, with the defence of the company’s legal entity as distinct from its directors. Most companies in this country are owned and managed solely by an individual, while registering the members of his family as the share holders. Such companies are nothing more than one-man-business; hence, the tendency is there to enter into contract in such company name and later turn around to claim that he was not a party to the agreement since the company is a legal entity.

– MUNTAKA-COMASSIE JSC. Alade v. Alic (2010)

Was this dictum helpful?

SHARE ON

RATIONALE FOR PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT NOT BINDING AT COMMON LAW

At Common Law, a pre-incorporation contract was not binding on the company because there was no principal on behalf of whom an agent could have contracted. The company was not permitted to ratify or adopt it, and it could not, after incorporation, enforce the contract, nor sue, e.g. for damages for breach of contract – Natal Land etc Co. Ltd. v. Pauline Colliery Syndicate Ltd. (1904) AC 120. These common law rules were a source of considerable inconvenience for the promotion of business.

— U. Mohammed, JSC. Societe Favouriser v. Societe Generale (1997) – SC.126/1994

Was this dictum helpful?

WHERE FRAUD, COURT WOULD LIFT THE VEIL OF INCORPORATION

FDB FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. v. ADESOZA (2002) 8 NWLR (Pt. 668) 170 AT 173, the Court considering the power of a Court to lift the veil of incorporation held thus: “The consequences of recognizing the separate personality of a company is to draw a veil of incorporation over the Company. One is therefore generally not entitled to go behind or lift this veil. However, since a statute will not be allowed to be used as an excuse to justify illegality or fraud it is a quest to avoid the normal consequences of the statute which may result in grave injustice that the Court as occasion demands have to look behind or pierce the corporate veil.”

Was this dictum helpful?

CAMA ALLOWS COMPANIES TO RATIFY PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT

The intention of the legislature in enacting sections 72(i), 624(i), and 626 of CAMA is quite clear. It is relevant to re-emphasis that the rule of construction of statute is to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used according to the intent of the legislature. The provisions of sections 624(1) and 626 make it abundantly clear that existing companies who wish to ratify pre-incorporation contract agreements could do so because the Act (CAMA) applied to them. In section 650(i), the interpretation of words used in part A of CAMA, “Company or existing company means: a company formed and registered under this Act or, as the case may be, formed and registered in Nigeria before and in existence on the commencement of this Act”.

— U. Mohammed, JSC. Societe Favouriser v. Societe Generale (1997) – SC.126/1994

Was this dictum helpful?

PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT NOT BINDING IS A COMMON LAW RULE

The rule that the company is not bound by a pre-incorporation contract purportedly made by it on its behalf, even if ratified by it after incorporation, is a rule of common law and not a statutory provision.

— Ogundare, JSC. Societe Favouriser v. Societe Generale (1997) – SC.126/1994

Was this dictum helpful?

CAMA MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT TO BE RATIFIED

All that has now changed in this country for section 72(1) of CAMA makes it possible for a pre-incorporation contract to be ratified by a company after its incorporation and thereby becoming bound by it and entitled to the benefit thereof. There seems to be no dispute in this appeal about this conclusion.

— Ogundare, JSC. Societe Favouriser v. Societe Generale (1997) – SC.126/1994

Was this dictum helpful?

RATIONALE BEHIND NULLITY OF PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT

In Kelner v. Baxter (1866) L. R. 2 C.P. 174 Erie C.J. explaining the rationale of the principle [pre-incorporation contract] said: “as there was no company in existence at the time, the agreement would be wholly inoperative unless it were held to be binding on the defendant personally…where a contract is signed by one who professes to be signing as agent, but who has no principal existing at the time, and the contract would be altogether inoperative unless binding upon the person who signed it, he is bound thereby; and a stranger cannot by a subsequent ratification relieve him from the responsibility”.

Was this dictum helpful?

Load More
No more related dictum to show.

Click the icons to like, follow, and join JPoetry

Facebook Twitter Whatsapp Telegram

Humongouz Empire

© 2025

designed by Humongouz Ztudio. 

TO – 2129 | UO – 0 | GO – 1979 | BO – 150

External link(s)

BOOK: First 2-years as a Law Student: Experiences and Lessons.