The court below was therefore right, in my view, in holding that this could not be so in that 2nd Respondent who derived his title from the Respondent cannot set up a root of title different from that of his Vendor. He must either sink or swim with him, it being that a Vendor can only pass to the purchasers whatever title he has. See Fasoro v. Beyioku (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 76) 263.
— Dike & Ors. V. Francis Okoloedo & Ors. (SC.116/1993, 15 Jul 1999)
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It is well settled that once a party pleads and traces his root of title in an action involving title to land to a particular person or source, and this averment, as in the present case, is disputed or challenged, that party, to succeed, as a plaintiff in the suit must not only establish his own title to such land, he must also satisfy the court on the validity of the title of that particular person or source from whom he claims to have derived his title. See Mogaji v. Cadbury Nigeria Ltd. (1985) 7 SC 59, (1985) 2 NWLR (pt.7) 393 at 431; Elias v. Omo-Bare (1982) 5 SC 25 at 37 – 38.
— Iguh, JSC. Olohunde v. Adeyoju (2000) – SC.15/1995
I need to stress here that a mortgagee’s power of sale becomes exercisable if it has arisen and once it has so arisen, the title of the subsequent purchaser will not be affected by its improper or irregular exercise and the sale will be regarded valid. See MAJEKODUNMI & ORS V. CO-OP BANK LTD (1997) 10 NWLR (prt. 524) 198. But, in exercising the power of sale, a mortgagee is under duty to take reasonable care to obtain the true value of the property. See TEMCO ENG. & CO LTD V. S.B.N. LTD (1995) 5 NWLR (prt. 397) 607. However, a mortgagee will not be restrained on the exercise of his power of sale merely because the mortgagor objects to the manner in which the sale is being arranged or because the mortgagor has commenced a redemption action in Court, but he (mortgagee) will be restrained if the mortgagor pays the amount claimed by the mortgagee into Court.
— M.L. Shuaibu, JCA. FBN v Benlion (2021) – CA/C/31/2016
The first point that must be made is the basic principle of law that in a counter-claim, just like in any other claim for declaration of title to land, the onus lies on the claimant to prove with precision and certainty and without inconsistency the identity of the land to which his claim or counter-claim relates. See Onwuka v.Ediala (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 96) 182; Ezeokeke v. Umunocha Uga (1962) 1 All NLR 477. (1962) 2 SCNLR 199; Olusanmi v. Oshasona (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 245) 22 at 36, Udeze v. Chidebe (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 141 etc. There can be no doubt that the most common and, perhaps, the easiest way of establishing the precise area of land in dispute is by the production of a survey plan of such land. It is, however, equally clear that it is not in all cases for declaration of title to land that it is necessary to survey and/or tender the survey plan of the land in dispute. There are many cases in which no survey plans are essential for a proper determination of the issue. What the court must consider is whether, in a particular case, it is necessary for the proper trial of the action for a survey plan to be produced. Where there is no difficulty in identifying the land in dispute, a declaration of title may be made without the necessity of tying it to a survey plan.
— Iguh, JSC. Kyari v Alkali (2001) – SC.224/1993
A party seeking a declaration of title to land is not bound to plead and prove more than one root of title to succeed but he is entitled to rely on more than one root of title. However, where as in this case, he relies on traditional history, and in addition acts of ownership and long possession predicated on the traditional history as pleaded, he is not entitled to a declaration of title based on the evidence of acts of ownership and long possession where the evidence of traditional history is unavailing: See Balogun v. Akanji (1988 ) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 70) 301 at 232; Eronini v. Iheuko (1989) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 101) 46 at 61. However, such evidence of acts of ownership and long possession becomes relevant where the traditional histories given by both sides though plausible are in conflict. In such a situation, it will not be open to the court simply to prefer one side to the other. To determine which of the histories is more probable, the courts have called in aid the principle enunciated in the celebrated case of Kojo II v. Bonsie (1957) 1 W.L.R. 1223 which is to the effect that the preference of one history to the other as being more probable would depend on recent acts of ownership and possession shown by the parties that the court would need to consider to make up its mind. See Ohiaeri v. Akabeze (1992) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 221) 1 at 19, Ekpo v. Ita (1932- 34) 11 N.L.R. 68, Mogaji v. Cadbury (Nig) Ltd. (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 7) 393.
— Edozie JSC. Cosm As Ezukwu v. Peter Ukachukwu Jude Ukachukwu (SC. 160/2000, 2 July 2004)
“A certificate of occupancy issued under the Land Use Act is not conclusive evidence of any interest or valid title to the land in favour of the grantee. It is only a prima facie evidence of such right, interest or title without more, and may, in appropriate cases, be challenged and rendered invalid, null and void. Consequently where it is proved, that another person, other than the grantee of a certificate of occupancy had a better title to the land, the Court may set it aside on the ground that it is invalid, defective or spurious. See also the following decided cases by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal: Dsungwe Vs Gbishe; Ogunleye Vs Oni (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 135) P. 745; Saude Vs Abdullahi; Olohunde Vs Adeyoju and Lababedi Vs Lagos Metal Ind. Ltd (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 135) P. 745.”
— I.S. Bdliya, JCA. Umar Ibrahim v Nasiru Danladi Mu’azu & 2 Ors. (2022) – CA/G/317/2019
The land in dispute herein referred to by both parties can only be the land in respect of which Plaintiff claims damages for trespass and perpetual injunction against the Defendant. it is therefore strange and absurd for learned Counsel to the 1st Defendant to contend that the identity of the land in dispute is uncertain. It has always been accepted in our courts in land cases that where the area of land in dispute is well known to the parties. the question of proof not being really in dispute does not arise. In such a situation it cannot be contended that the area claimed or can the land in dispute be described as uncertain – See Etiko v. Aroyewun (1959) 4 FSC 129; (1959) SCN LR 308; Osho v. Ape (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 562) 492. In the circumstances of this case the identity of the land in dispute cannot he described as uncertain since both parties know and have accepted it as the land in dispute.
— Karibi-Whyte JSC. Engineer Bayo Akinterinwa & Anor V. Cornelius Oladunjoye (SC.98/94, 7 April 2000)
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