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BETTER FOR TEN GUILTY PERSONS TO GO FREE THAN ONE INNOCENT SHOULD SUFFER

Dictum

As we indicated in Stephen Ukorah v. The State (1977) 4S. C. 167 there is great need for a trial court to tread cautiously in the application of circumstantial evidence for the conviction of an accused for any offence with which he is charged. The Romans we pointed out, with approval, in Ukorah (Supra at p .177) had a maxim that it is better for a guilty person to go unpunished than for an innocent one to be condemned: and Sir Edward Seymour speaking on a Bill of Attainder in 1696 laid greater emphasis on this maxim when he stated that he would rather “that ten guilty persons should escape than one innocent should suffer.” That also was our view in Ukorah (Supra).

— Idigbe, JSC. Adie v. State (1980) – SC24/1978

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PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DENOTES PROOF TO MORAL CERTAINTY

Invariably, the term proof beyond reasonably as implored in Section 135 of the Evidence Act, denotes proof to moral certainty or standard. Thus, such proof as accords to the conscience of the trial judge as a reasonable Judge, that the crime so charged has indeed been committed by the defendant, thereby leaving no other reasonable conclusion possible.

– I.M.M. Saulawa JSC. Balogun v. FRN (2021)

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PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DEPENDS ON THE QUALITY OF WITNESSES

It is a settled principle of law that in criminal proceedings the prosecution must establish the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. It is also well settled that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt or beyond any iota of doubt. If the prosecution has led evidence that is cogent, credible and compelling, which points irresistibly to the guilt of the accused, it would have discharged the burden. Proof beyond reasonable doubt depends not on the quantity of witnesses for the prosecution but upon the quality of the evidence given.

— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun, JSC. State v Sani Ibrahim (2019) – SC.1097/2016

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ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY IS NOT REQUIRED FOR CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES

It can be discerned from these cases that though certainty is an essential element of proof in criminal liability or guilt, absolute certainly is not required because it is “impossible in any human adventure including the administration of criminal justice.” That’s one reason why the requirement of standard of proof placed on the prosecution is to prove beyond reasonable doubt and not beyond all or any shadow of doubt. The standard of proof and the burden placed on the prosecution are by the endless judicial authorities on the issue, now common place.

– M.L. Garba JCA. Odogwu v. Vivian (2009) – CA/PH/345/05

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GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IS THE BASIC

The basic necessity before a verdict of guilty in a criminal charge can be pronounced is that the jury are satisfied of the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt.

– Nnamani JSC. Lori v. State (1980)

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PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

Dibie v. The State (2007) LPELR 941 (SC) said thus: “Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond every shadow of doubt. Once the proof drowns the presumption of innocence of the accused, the Court is entitled to convict him, although there exist shadows of doubt. The moment the proof by prosecution renders the presumption of innocence on the part of the accused useless and pins him down as the owner of the mens rea or actus rea or both, the prosecution has discharged the burden placed on it by Section 138(3) of the Evidence Act”.

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LORD DENNING’S COMMENT ON REASONABLE DOUBT – ‘FANCIFUL POSSIBILITIES’

Denning , J., (as he then was) stated in Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372, 373: “does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted of fanciful possibilities to defect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence ‘of course it is possible, but not in the least probable’ the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt but nothing short of that will suffice.”

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