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APPELLATE COURT INTERFERENCE WITH TRIAL COURTS DISCRETION

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It needs to be emphasised here that an appellate Court will usually not interfere with an exercise of discretion in its quest to obtain substantial justice except where it is satisfied that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or illegally or without due regard to all necessary consideration having regard to the circumstances of the particular case. – Nweze JSC. Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2019)

Even then, it is well – established that an appellate Court will not, in principle, interfere with the exercise of discretion by the trial Court unless that discretion is shown to have been exercised upon wrong principles or that the exercise was tainted with some illegality or substantial irregularity. – Nweze JSC. Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2019)

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appeal, discretion, judge

A JUDGE SHOULD BE SOBER

It has always been my considered view that sobriety should be the first watch-word for anyone who, per chance, finds himself in the exalted position of a judge. A judicial officer should not be talkative or loquacious. Indeed, he should not be boisterous. He should be polite to witnesses and lawyers who appear before him. Above all, a judge should not be biased under any guise. It needs no further gain-saying that Auta J. should watch his steps in the discharge of his judicial functions. My Learned brother has said it all. I also allow the appeal and abide by all consequential orders including that relating to costs in the lead judgment.

— John Afolabi Fabiyi, JSC. Nnamdi Eriobuna & Ors. V. Ikechukwu Obiorah (CA/E/77/99, 24 May 1999)

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COUNSEL SHOULD NOT MISQUOTE JUDGE

I will pause here to advise that learned counsel when referring to statements made by trial Judges should not impute words not said by them, or misquote their statements and present statements which were not actually uttered or remarked by them (the Judges). A close look at the passage quoted above leaves one in no doubt that the Judge did not say that the depositions were of no assistance to him . Rather, what he said was that they were of little assistance to him . He is therefore misunderstood or quoted out of context.

– Sanusi JCA. Enejo v. Nasir (2006)

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WHERE A PARTY HAS SEVERAL OPTIONS, HE COULD USE ANYONE HE WANTS

It is now trite law that where a party is by law given the option or discretion to exercise his right in different ways it is not for an opponent to prescribe the particular form the other party should utilize and where the form adopted by the other party is not what the opponent feels is the right course, then automatically an abuse of court process would be said to have taken place. There were options open to the respondent to tackle the scenario before him and he cannot be confined to the only choice of a counter claim to the appellant’s counter claim to ventilate his own grouse or grievance even though at the base is the same contract or facts since he had the alternative of bringing a fresh action so that all that he needs say would be brought to the fore. He had that right and he was at liberty to take it and did so. I have therefore no difficulty in flowing along with what the court of Appeal did as I see no error in their decision in upholding that the fresh action filed by the respondent was in order and the integrity of the court was not jeopardized. I refer to the case of Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156 at 170.

— M. Peter-Odili JSC. R-Benkay Nigeria Limited. V. Cadbury Nigeria Limited (SC.29/2006, 23 Mar 2012)

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POWER TO TRANSFER CASE TO ANOTHER DIVISION IS DISCRETIONARY – FHC

There is no doubt that the starting point with regards to the territorial jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is the statutorily codified and judicially noticed principle that the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is one and nationwide. It is also however settled that same has been divided into Judicial Divisions and where a crime has been committed, such crime ought to be prosecuted in the Judicial Division of the Federal High Court in the State or States where any of the elements of the crime was allegedly committed, or one that is close to it, subject to the power of transfer, by which a matter may be tried outside the State of commission upon compelling reasons to so do. The foregoing is in my view the import of the Provisions of Sections, Section 45 of the Federal high Court Act; and Sections 93, 98, 385, 386 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, relied on by both parties. — J.Y. Tukur, JCA. Fani-Kayode v. FRN & Ors. (2019) – CA/L/722C/2018

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APPEAL IS THE CONTINUATION OF THE ORIGINAL ACTION

It is also trite that an appeal is a continuation of the original action. The parties are therefore confined to their case as pleaded and presented at the Court of first instance. See: Ngige Vs Obi (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt.999) 1 @ 225; Adegoke Motors Vs Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 @ 266; Alhassan Vs Ishaku (2016) LPELR – 40083 (SC) @ 680.

— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun, JSC. MTN v. Corporate (2019) – SC.674/2014

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A JUDGE’S DISCRETION: WHAT IS FAIR AND JUST ACCORDING TO THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE CASE

I shall, in treating this issue, begin by saying that the line between a proper exercise of judicial discretion and an abuse of that discretion is not readily definable and it may be, that the term “abuse of discretion” means no more than that the decision below fell outside the permissible limits as viewed by the appellate court or that the Court of Appeal is of the opinion that the trial court should have decided otherwise. The resort of “discretion” at all times could turn to be an unruly horse. As Justice William Douglas in State of New York v. United States (1951) 342 US 822, opined at page 884 and I quote: “Absolute discretion, like corruption marks the beginning of the end of liberty.” Lord Simon of Glaisdale expressing the traditional view on the exercise of judicial discretion by a Judge said in D. v. NSPCC (1978) A.C 171 at page 239 and I quote:-. “And if it comes to the forensic crunch … it must be law, but discretion, which is in command.” Summing up the above dicta, in my words of definition, I will say an issue falls within a Judge’s discretion if, being governed by no rule of law, its resolution depends on the individual Judge’s assessment of what is fair and just to do in the particular case. A Judge has no discretion in making his findings of fact, he has no discretion in his rulings of the law. If a Judge, having made any necessary finding of fact and any necessary ruling on law, it seems to me clear that he has to choose between different causes of action, orders, penalties or remedies he then exercises a discretion. Let me reiterate that it is only when a trial Judge reaches a stage at which he asks himself, what is the fair and just thing to do or order in the instant case that he embarks on the exercise of a discretion. However, where the situation is governed by the rule of law, as in the instant case, which touches on admissibility of a document where the provisions of the Evidence Act come into play, although the court may have its own discretion, such discretion must be exercised according to the ordinary principles laid down in the Evidence Act as set out above. Its judicial discretion is founded upon those principles. And if a trial Judge refuses to do so, then the appellate court will set the matter right. See R. v. Stafford Justices (1940) 2 K.B. 33 at 43.

— P.O. Aderemi JSC. Musa Abubakar v. E.I. Chuks (SC.184/2003, 14 DEC 2007)

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