It also has to be observed that an appeal is usually against a ratio not normally against an obiter except in cases where the obiter is so closely linked with the ratio as to be deemed to have radically influenced the latter. But even there, the appeal is still against the ratio.
— Oputa, JSC. Saude v. Abdullahi (1989) – SC.197/1987
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✓ It is this clear that the jurisdiction to entertain any suit which seeks to enforce the observance of a fundamental right under chapter 4 of the Constitution, including the right of any person not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment guaranteed under section 31(1)(a), of the 1979 Constitution, ties only with the High Court of a State or a Federal High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is appellate and not original. See Attorney-General of Anambra State and others v. Attorney-General of the Federation and others (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.302) 692. However, constitutional issues which pertain only to the breach of a fundamental right in the course of trial or hearing before the lower courts may be raised in an appeal to the Supreme Court. Such issues are those that relate mainly to breach of the right to fair hearing and the right to personal liberty under sections 32 and 33 of the Constitution. Other rights such as right to life and those to private and family life, peaceful assembly and association and freedom of the press can only be enforced through a substantive action in the appropriate High Court and cannot be raised in an appellate court, including the Supreme Court, as being incidental to the proceedings in the lower courts. The appellate courts, inclusive of the Supreme Court, have no original jurisdiction to entertain, determine or pronounce on questions relating to an alleged breach of fundamental rights, especially where the issue involved or the redress invoked is not directly relevant or intrinsic to the determination, on the merit, of the appeal before them. — Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996
✓ The death row phenomenon was only raised obliquely and clearly extrinsically by the appellant in this appeal. The issue raised is whether the appellant’s confinement under sentence of death for an alleged unnecessarily prolonged length of time from the date of his conviction amounts to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to section 31(1)(a) of the Constitution thereby warranting the quashing of his death sentence and substituting the same with life imprisonment. This issue, in my view, is not properly before this court. The jurisdiction of this court to entertain and determine such constitutional question will only arise on appeal after both the High Court and the Court of Appeal have considered and adjudicated on the issue. This is exactly the procedure adopted in the foreign cases that were cited before us. — Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996
While I am tempted to put an end to this petition at this stage, but realising that this Court is not the final Court on the matter, I am constrained to look at the merit of the petition. — H.S. Tsammani, JCA. APM v INEC & Ors. (2023) – CA/PEPC/04/2023
Once an appellate Court finds that the conclusion reached by a lower Court is correct, it has no duty to interfere. Thus, the duty of an appellate Court to interfere will arise only where the finding, conclusion and/or decision of the lower Court is wrong and/or perverse. In law, a finding or conclusion of a Court is said to be perverse when such finding does not flow from the proved evidence or was arrived at wrongly or was anchored on extraneous matters. In all such circumstances, an appellate Court will interfere to set it aside and make appropriate finding as justified and borne out by the evidence in the printed record of appeal.
– Abdu Aboki, JSC. Chukwu v. State (2021)
The lower court cannot hold simultaneously that the appeal is allowed in part yet proceeded to dismiss the appellant’s claims in its entirety particularly when the part of the appeal allowed has to do with the award of the sum of N70,000.00 share of profit to the appellant. To hold as the lower court did was an obvious error which ought not to be allowed to stand. – Onnoghen JSC. Alade v. Alic (2010)
In order to succeed in this appeal, the appellant must show that the decision of the lower Court affirming the judgment of the trial Court is perverse, either because the evaluation of evidence and findings of fact were not based on a proper and dispassionate appraisal of the evidence on record, or the trial Court did not make proper use of the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify, or that the findings were reached as a result of a wrong application of substantive law or procedure, or that there was a miscarriage of justice manifest on the face of the record. See: Igbi Vs The State (2000) 3 NWLR (Pt. 648) 169; Shehu Vs The State (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1195) 112; Itu Vs The State (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1506) 443.
— Kekere-Ekun, JSC. Ogunleye Tobi v The State (2019) – SC.714/2017
There was, with the greatest respect, no earthly reason for the Court of Appeal to review the pleadings and the evidence in view of the findings of fact of the trial Court at p.160 that EXS.D and E were not loan receipts but receipts for the sale of land and the conclusion of law at p.161 “that all the plaintiff got by virtue of the receipts Exhibits D and E was an equitable interest”. There was no cross-appeal by the 2nd Defendant challenging the above findings. What the Court below should have then concentrated on would have been the legal effect of the above findings on the relationship of the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant.
— Oputa, JSC. Osagie v. Oyeyinka & Anor. (1987) – SC.194/1985
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