We think that this direction has only a dubious application to the facts of this case. First of all it should be realized that the agent need not be authorized in writing. See Heard v. Pilley (1869) L.R. 4 Ch. App. 548 (esp. per Selwyn L.J. at pp. 551, 552); and indeed the name and the identity of the principal on whose behalf the agent acts need not be disclosed; It is the duty of the court in all cases to study the memorandum referred to and then to draw the correct inferences from its contents. In the case of Davies v. Sweet (1962) 2 Q.B. 300, Danckwerts L.J. (delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal) observed concerning this same point as follows at pp. 305. “But such an authority may be conferred upon an estate agent expressly or may be inferred from the circumstances of the case. It seems to me that authority to enter into a contract on behalf of the defendant should be inferred from the circumstances of this case. The way in which Phillips (the elder) dealt with the plaintiff suggests that he had authority to enter into a contract for the sale of the property and to fix the price, and the letters written by the defendant seem to me to confirm this position.”
– Coker, JSC. Rosenje v. Bakare (1973)