Admission of an offence by an accused person to other persons may amount to sufficient corroboration in law. So in R. v. Francis Kufi (1960) WNLR 1, the accused was charged with indecent assault against a young girl of 10 years. It was held, and rightly in my view, that the admission of the offence by the accused to the father of the girl was sufficient corroboration in law.
— Iguh, JSC. Okon Iko v State (2001) – SC.177/2001
SHARE ON
There is no need to establish the truth of a fact already admitted. See Ajikawo v. Ansaido (Nig) Ltd (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 173) 359.
— N.S. Ngwuta, JSC. Henry Nwokearu V. The State (SC.227/2011, 24 MAY 2013)
Thus, where such evidence is by error or otherwise admitted, then it is the duly of the trial court to expunge it in giving its judgment. If it fails to do so, the appeal court will reject such evidence and consider the case in the light of the legally admitted evidence See Owoniyi v. Omotoso (1961) 2 SCNLR 57, (1961) All NLR 304; Alase v. Ilu (1964) 1 All NLR 390. In any event, it is trite that wrongful admission of inadmissible evidence is not of itself a ground for the reversal of any decision. Similarly, the wrongful exclusion of admissible evidence is not of itself a ground for the reversal of any decision. All these are however dependent on the view held by the appeal court on whether the evidence wrongly admitted or wrongly excluded would have the effect of changing the decision even if admitted or excluded.
— I.T. Muhammad JSC. Musa Abubakar v. E.I. Chuks (SC.184/2003, 14 DEC 2007)
In HABIBU MUSA VS THE STATE (2013) 8 NCC 464 this Court held that: “Generally, it is not a rule of law that an accused person in a charge of rape cannot be convicted on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecution. It has however been clearly established in the rule of practice that the proper direction is that not being safe, the Court is expected to warn itself. After the due warning and the Court is satisfied with the truth of evidence of the prosecution the accused can be convicted without looking for any other corroboration.”
“Corroboration” in my understanding simply means “confirming or giving support to” either a person, statement or faith. What then constitute corroboration in law In R. v. Baskerville (1916-17) All ER Reprint 38 at 43, Lord Reading CJ defined what evidence constitutes corroborative evidence for the purpose of the statutory and common law rules when he said:- “We hold that evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime. In other words, it must be evidence which implicates him, that is, which confirms in some material particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed but also that the prisoner committed it. The test applicable to determine the nature and extent of the corroboration is thus the same whether the case falls within the rule of practice at common law or within that class of offence for which corroboration is required by statute”.
— Kalgo, J.S.C. Okon Iko v State (2001) – SC.177/2001
ACTION CONGRESS v INEC (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 220 at 259 – 260, as follows: “The disqualification in Section 137(1) clearly involves a deprivation of right and a presumption of guilt for embezzlement or fraud in derogation of the safeguards in Section 36(1) and (5) of the Constitution. The trial and conviction by a Court is the only constitutionally permitted way to prove guilt and therefore the only ground for the imposition of criminal punishment or penalty for the criminal offences of embezzlement or fraud. Clearly, imposition of the penalty of disqualification for embezzlement or fraud solely on the basis of an indictment for those offences by an Administrative Panel of Enquiry implies a presumption of guilt, contrary to Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria, 1999, whereas, conviction for offences and imposition of penalties and punishments are matters appertaining exclusively to judicial power.” See also on this: AMAECHI v INEC & ORS (2008) LPELR-446(SC) at pages 49-51, paras. E F; OMOWAIYE v A.G. OF EKITI STATE & ANOR (2010) LPELR-4779(CA) at pages 28 – 28, paras. A F, per Nweze, JCA (as he then was); and ABDULKARIM & ORS v SHINKAFI & ORS (2008) LPELR 3555(CA) at pages 24 32, paras. A C.
In the two separate counter-affidavits filed by the appellant in response to the affidavits in support of the Notices of intention to rely upon Preliminary Objection by the respondents there is no averments which countered the facts deposed to by the respondents in their respective affidavits in support as summarised above. The law is well settled that any fact which has not been categorically countered or denied by a party, that fact is deemed admitted in law by the other party. See: Nzeribe v. Dave Eng, Co. Ltd (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt.361) 124; Omoregbe v. Lawani (1980) 3-4 SC 108. See also section 75 of the Evidence Act, LFN, Cap.112, 1990.
— I.T. Muhammad, JSC. EFET v INEC (SC.207/2009, 28 January 2011)
Click the icons to like, follow, and join JPoetry