Admission of an offence by an accused person to other persons may amount to sufficient corroboration in law. So in R. v. Francis Kufi (1960) WNLR 1, the accused was charged with indecent assault against a young girl of 10 years. It was held, and rightly in my view, that the admission of the offence by the accused to the father of the girl was sufficient corroboration in law.
— Iguh, JSC. Okon Iko v State (2001) – SC.177/2001
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The law is that a plaintiff’s averment of facts must be met by the defendant frontally and categorically. Once a traverse is not met directly, the defendant is taken to have admitted it. See Owosho v. Adebowale v. Dada (1984) 7 SC pg.149. Such traverse to be valid must be related to the proceeding and subsequent paragraphs of the statement of defence.
– Ogunwumiju JCA. NBC v. Olarewaju (2006) – CA/IL/43/2004
In the two separate counter-affidavits filed by the appellant in response to the affidavits in support of the Notices of intention to rely upon Preliminary Objection by the respondents there is no averments which countered the facts deposed to by the respondents in their respective affidavits in support as summarised above. The law is well settled that any fact which has not been categorically countered or denied by a party, that fact is deemed admitted in law by the other party. See: Nzeribe v. Dave Eng, Co. Ltd (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt.361) 124; Omoregbe v. Lawani (1980) 3-4 SC 108. See also section 75 of the Evidence Act, LFN, Cap.112, 1990.
— I.T. Muhammad, JSC. EFET v INEC (SC.207/2009, 28 January 2011)
Now an admission is a statement, oral or written (expressed or implied) which is made by a party to civil proceedings and which statement is adverse to his case. It is admissible as evidence against the maker as the truth of the fact asserted in the statement.
– Kawu, JSC. Ogunnaike v. Ojayemi (1987)
Thus, where both parties have agreed on a fact in issue, no further proof of such fact was necessary as it ceases to be an issue between them:-See Chief Okparaeke of Ndrakaeme & Ors. V. Egbuonu & Ors. (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 53. In Chief Nwizuk & Ors. v,. Eneyok & Ors. (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 354, it was held that admissions under this section are not confined to written nor documentary admissions. They include oral admissions if made clearly in open court during the proceedings. Admissions may also be by implication where there is a failure positively to deny an allegation. In Hill V Hogg (1854) 4 Allen (New Brunswick) R 108 it was held that an admission and a confession to the commission may be given in evidence in proof of an imputation.
— Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Din v. African Newspapers (1990)
“Corroboration” in my understanding simply means “confirming or giving support to” either a person, statement or faith. What then constitute corroboration in law In R. v. Baskerville (1916-17) All ER Reprint 38 at 43, Lord Reading CJ defined what evidence constitutes corroborative evidence for the purpose of the statutory and common law rules when he said:- “We hold that evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime. In other words, it must be evidence which implicates him, that is, which confirms in some material particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed but also that the prisoner committed it. The test applicable to determine the nature and extent of the corroboration is thus the same whether the case falls within the rule of practice at common law or within that class of offence for which corroboration is required by statute”.
— Kalgo, J.S.C. Okon Iko v State (2001) – SC.177/2001
More recently in Oteki v. Attorney-General of Bendel State (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 24) 648 at 664 this court laid it down as follows:- “I think the learned trial Judge applied the correct principles in determining whether or not to rely on the evidence of P.W.1 for the conviction of the appellant. It is now established that a court can convict upon the evidence of one witness without more, if the witness is not an accomplice in the commission of the offence, and his evidence is sufficiently probative of the offence with which the accused has been charged.” See too Sunday Emiator v. The State (1975) 9-11 SC 107 at 112; Anthony Igbo v. The State (1975)9-11 SC 129 at 134: Joshua Alonge v. inspector-General of Police (1959) SCNLR 516;(1959)4 FSC 203.
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