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ADMISSIBILITY OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

Dictum

Olalekan v. State (2001) LPELR-2561(SC) 4, 50-51, F-A, where Onu, J.S.C. held as follows: “This Court has held times without number that the statement of an accused is not inadmissible merely because it is taken down in a different language from the language of the person making it. See Queen v. Baba Haske (1961) 1 All NLR 330 at 333.” (Emphasis supplied).

At page 37, A-C of the same Report, Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. also stated as follows: “The general proposition is well settled that where an interpreter has been used in the recording of a statement, the statement is inadmissible unless the person who interpreted it is called as a witness as well as the person who wrote it down.”

Again, at pages 55-57 of the same Report, Uwaifo, J.S.C. made his findings in extension as follows: “I have read the reasons given by my learned brother Ogundare, J.S.C. for dismissing this appeal on 20 September, 2001. I wish however, to express my views briefly on whether Exhibit A was properly admitted at the trial. Sgt Linus Patricks (PW6) was the officer who recorded the statement of the appellant. The appellant spoke in Yoruba language and PW6, acting through an interpreter, Aremu Adeosun (PE3), recorded the statement in English language. That was how Exhibit A, the said statement, came into existence. Now, PW3 testified that he interpreted between PW6 and the Appellant. Thereafter, he read the statement as written in English language by interpreting it to the Appellant who agreed that it was correctly recorded. He said the Appellant thumb-printed Exhibit A and he, the interpreter, signed it, as did PW6, the recorder of the statement… At the trial Court, no objection was taken to the voluntariness of the statement, or any other objection at all… The objection now taken in this Court is that the statement (Exhibit A) is hearsay evidence… With the greatest respect, what I understand the authorities in this country to establish is that where an interpreter has been used in taking down a statement, both the person who wrote down the statement and the person who interpreted it must be called as witnesses. In the case of the person who recorded the statement, he would, of course, state in evidence the procedure he took in the process. That was done in the present case. As for the person who interpreted, he would need to be presented as a witness to testify that he interpreted. It is then open to the defence to cross-examine them… I am therefore satisfied that the prosecution called the necessary witnesses who gave sufficient evidence in the present case to make Exhibit A admissible… The objection that it was hearsay is not well founded and I overrule it.”

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CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT SHOULD BE OBJECTED TO WHEN SOUGHT TO BE TENDERED

It must also be stated that the time to object to the voluntariness of a confessional statement is when it is sought to be tendered and not after it has been admitted in evidence. See: Godsgift Vs The State (2016) LPELR-40540 (SC) 5 31 B C; Olalekan Vs The State (2002) 2 SCNJ 104; Muhammad Vs The State (2017) LPELR-42098 ISC) g 17 18 C B.

— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun, JSC. State v Sani Ibrahim (2019) – SC.1097/2016

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TYPES OF INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE (BY LAW OR BY FULFILLMENT OF CERTAIN CONDITIONS)

In a trial by a Judge alone, as in the case in hand, a distinction must be drawn between those cases where the evidence complained of is in no circumstances admissible in law and where the evidence complained of is admissible under certain conditions. In the former class of cases the evidence cannot be acted upon even if parties admitted it by consent and the court of appeal will entertain complaint on the admissibility of such evidence by the lower court (although the evidence was admitted in the lower court without objection); in the latter class of case, if the evidence was admitted in the lower court without objection or by consent of parties or was used by the opposite party (e.g. for the purpose of cross-examination) then it would be within the competence of the trial court to act on it and the court of appeal will not entertain any complaint on the admissibility of such evidence.

— Ogundare, JSC. Kossen v Savannah Bank (1995) – SC.209/89

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ADMISSIBILITY VERSUS FROM PROBATIVE VALUE

There is a clear dichotomy between admissibility of document and placing probative value on it. While admissibility is based on relevance, probative value depends not only on relevance but on proof. An evidence has probative value if it tends to prove an issue.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

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CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT: VOLUNTARINESS VS DISOWNING

Where it is alleged that a confessional statement was obtained under duress or as a result of threat or inducement, the Courts have developed the practice of conducting a trial within trial 18 (TWT) or mini trial to ascertain the voluntariness of the statement. The onus is on the prosecution to prove that it was freely and voluntarily made … On the other hand, where the accused outrightly disowns the confession and asserts that he did not make the statement at all, it would be admitted in evidence and considered alongside other evidence led at the trial to determine its probative value.

– Kekere-Ekun JSC. Berende v. FRN (2021)

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INGREDIENTS BEFORE INDUCEMENT/PROMISE/THREAT WILL NULLIFY A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

INGREDIENTS BEFORE INDUCEMENT/PROMISE/THREAT WILL NULLIFY A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

Ngorka v. A.-G., Imo State (2026) 13 NWLR (Pt. 2056) 1 at 36—37, H—C: ‘In the first instance, the law is that a confession is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if the making of the confession was caused by inducement, threat promise or torture, having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it, he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature. In other words, for an inducement, threat or promise to make a confessional statement irrelevant and therefore inadmissible, three conditions must be present it must have reference to the charge against the (i) defendant; (ii) it must proceed from a person in authority (iii) and the defendant should believe that by making the statement, he would gain advantage and avoid evil even if temporarily – Dondos v. State (2021) 9 NWLR (Pt.1780) 24. The act of showing to the appellant the confessional statement of the second accused person, containing assertions implicating him in the robbery, and on the basis of which the appellant chose to ‘open up’ and confess his role in the robbery, did not come within the above definition and/or meet the requirements of what amounts to inducement. The second respondent who made the confessional statement shown to the appellant was not a person in authority over the appellant and there was nothing to suggest that the appellant believed that by ‘opening up’ and making his confessional statement he stood to gain any gain advantage and avoid evil, even if temporarily. The showing of the confessional of the second respondent to the appellant could thus not nullify the confession of the appellant.’

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THE TEST FOR ADMISSIBILITY IS RELEVANCE – WEIGHT COMES AFTER ADMISSION OF THE DOCUMENT

The test for admissibility therefore is relevance, the source by which the document has been obtained is immaterial. A document is admissible in evidence if it is relevant to the facts in issue and admissible in law. It has to be noted also that admissibility of a document is one thing, and the weight that court will attach to it is another. Relevancy and weight are in quite distinct apartments in the law of evidence. Relevancy which propels admissibility is invoked by the trial court immediately a document is tendered to determine the relevancy or otherwise of the document tendered. If the document is relevant the court admits it. Weight on the other hand, comes after admission of a document at the stage of writing the judgment. The two therefore ought not to be confused. See Dunniya v. Jomoh (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 334) 609 @ 617. Sadan v. State (1968) 1 All NLR 124. Dalek (Nig) Ltd v. OMPADEC (2007) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1033) 402. Abubakar v. Chuks (2001 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066) 386. Torti v. Uknabi (1984) 1 SC 370. Avong v. KRPC Ltd (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 788) 508. ACB Ltd v. Gwaswada (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 342) 25.

— A. Jauro, JCA. Chevron v. Aderibigbe (2011) – CA/L/76/04

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