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A THIRTEEN YEARS OLD BOY/GIRL CONSIDERED A CHILD

Dictum

We entertain some doubt as to whether or not the definition of child in the Criminal Procedure Act does not necessarily carry the same connotation in the context of Section 182 of the Evidence Act, but the point is immaterial to our present decision since it must be generally accepted that a boy or girl of the age of 13 years must be considered a child. There are on the statute books a large number of statutes concerning children and many of them, if not most, do carry relevant definitions of the word “child” or cognate expression like “children”, “childish” or indeed “young persons” and in those circumstances except there be a general definition provided by a statute of interpretation, it might be imprudent to lay down any hard and fast rule.

– Coker JSC. Okoye v. State (1972)

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RECORDED NOTE ON A CHILD-WITNESS CAPABLE OF UNDERSTANDING AN OATH

We think it appropriate to observe however that where a judge thinks that the case of a child-witness should be taken away from the provisions of Section 182(1), there should be recorded a note to that effect stating that in his opinion the child is capable of understanding the nature of an oath.

– Coker JSC. Okoye v. State (1972)

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CHILD-WITNESS UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF AN OATH

A child is a young person in the formative period of life and whilst it is easy to see that a person of the age of 6 or 7 years does not understand the nature of an oath, it is impossible to be categorical on the capability or otherwise of a child of the age of 13 years or more to understand the nature of an oath. A great deal depends on the opinion of the judge who sees and hears the witness. Where the child is incapable of understanding the nature of an oath, the procedure in Section 182(1) must be followed so as to justify the necessary departure from the provisions of Section 179. On the other hand, where the child is capable of understanding the nature of an oath, he must comply with Section 179 as is the case in the present proceedings.

– Coker JSC. Okoye v. State (1972)

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NO DEFINITE DEFINITION OF A CHILD

As Willes, J., observed in Reg. v. Cockerton (1901) 1 KB 322 at pp.340/341, when dealing with the provisions of the Elementary Education Act, 1870 – “Except for the purposes of one Act, dealing with compulsory attendance, no definition has been given of a “child”. It is impossible to lay down any definite boundary as separating “children” from “young men” or “young women”, or any other description by which an advance beyond childhood may be indicated. Practically, I suppose that at somewhere between sixteen and seventeen at the highest an age has been arrived at which no one would ordinarily call childhood.”

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