A RESPONDENT IS TO DEFEND THE JUDGEMENT ON APPEAL

PARTY CANNOT RAISE NEW ARGUMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL WITHOUT LEAVE

A counsel cannot make out a case not pleaded by a litigant in his address before the court. Where the appellant did not predicate her case on customary law before the lower court, she cannot raise same here afresh before this court. The simple answer is that an appeal is not a new action but a continuation of the matter which is the subject – mater of the appeal. Hence an appellant cannot be allowed to set up a case different to that which was made out at the court below. This is because the appellate court would not have had the benefit of the opinion of the lower court on the issue. Eze V. A- G Rivers State (2001) 18 NWLR pt, 746, pg. 524 Ejiofodomi V. Okonkwo (1982) II SC 74 Dwege V. Iyamahan (1983) 8 SC 76 A-G Oyo State V. Fairlakes Hotels Limited (1988) 5 NWLR pt. 92, pg. 1 FRN V. Zebra Energy Limited (2002) 3 NWLR pt. 754, pg. 471.

— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Agboola v UBA (2011) – SC.86/2003

APPEAL AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE

Mogaji and Ors. v. Odofin and Ors. (1978) 4 S.C. 91 at 93, Fatayi-Williams J.S.C. (as he then was) said: “When an appellant complains that a judgment is against the weight of evidence, all he means is that when the evidence adduced by him is balanced against that adduced by the respondent, the judgment given in favour of the respondent is against the weight which should have been given to the totality of the evidence before him. In other words, the totality of the evidence should be considered in order to determine which has weight and which has no weight at all.”

ONLY FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WHICH ARE INCIDENTAL TO THE MAIN CLAIM CAN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE SUPREME COURT

✓ It is this clear that the jurisdiction to entertain any suit which seeks to enforce the observance of a fundamental right under chapter 4 of the Constitution, including the right of any person not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment guaranteed under section 31(1)(a), of the 1979 Constitution, ties only with the High Court of a State or a Federal High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is appellate and not original. See Attorney-General of Anambra State and others v. Attorney-General of the Federation and others (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.302) 692. However, constitutional issues which pertain only to the breach of a fundamental right in the course of trial or hearing before the lower courts may be raised in an appeal to the Supreme Court. Such issues are those that relate mainly to breach of the right to fair hearing and the right to personal liberty under sections 32 and 33 of the Constitution. Other rights such as right to life and those to private and family life, peaceful assembly and association and freedom of the press can only be enforced through a substantive action in the appropriate High Court and cannot be raised in an appellate court, including the Supreme Court, as being incidental to the proceedings in the lower courts. The appellate courts, inclusive of the Supreme Court, have no original jurisdiction to entertain, determine or pronounce on questions relating to an alleged breach of fundamental rights, especially where the issue involved or the redress invoked is not directly relevant or intrinsic to the determination, on the merit, of the appeal before them. — Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996

✓ The death row phenomenon was only raised obliquely and clearly extrinsically by the appellant in this appeal. The issue raised is whether the appellant’s confinement under sentence of death for an alleged unnecessarily prolonged length of time from the date of his conviction amounts to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to section 31(1)(a) of the Constitution thereby warranting the quashing of his death sentence and substituting the same with life imprisonment. This issue, in my view, is not properly before this court. The jurisdiction of this court to entertain and determine such constitutional question will only arise on appeal after both the High Court and the Court of Appeal have considered and adjudicated on the issue. This is exactly the procedure adopted in the foreign cases that were cited before us. — Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996

AN APPEAL IS AGAINST A RATIO, NOT OBITER

It also has to be observed that an appeal is usually against a ratio not normally against an obiter except in cases where the obiter is so closely linked with the ratio as to be deemed to have radically influenced the latter. But even there, the appeal is still against the ratio.

— Oputa, JSC. Saude v. Abdullahi (1989) – SC.197/1987

AN APPEAL DOES NOT ACT AS AN AUTOMATIC STAY OF EXECUTION

In Agba v. Okogbue (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.91) 747, I observed at page 753 G-H as follows:- “It must be clearly borne in mind that a stay of execution is never granted as a matter of course because section 18 of the Court of Appeal Act, 1976, enacts that an appeal under part 2 of the Act shall not operate as a stay of execution. The grounds of appeal filed against the judgment must therefore be tested under a microscopic mirror if the application is not a ruse to delay the enjoyment of the fruits of the judgment by the respondent. In so doing, it is wrong to suggest that a court is acting as if it is hearing an appeal because it has pointed out the absurdity of a ground of appeal in considering whether it is prima facie an arguable ground”.