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WHEN A JUDGE SITS BOTH AS A JUDGE AND JURY

Dictum

It is quite another thing when a Judge sits both as trial – Judge and jury. In this connection we draw attention, with approval, to the observations of the West African Court of Appeal in R. v. Adebanjo & ors. (1935) 2 WACA 315: “…..We think it (is) going altogether too far to demand that a Judge, sitting as both judge and jury, should commence his judgment by directing himself as to the burden of proof, the doctrine of reasonable doubt, and the elements which constitute the offences with which the accused is, or are, charged. To our minds it must be presumed that a learned Judge, sitting as both Judge jury, has directed himself aright in matters of law unless the contrary appears from the judgment……..” (Underlining supplied by this court) – See (1935) 2 WACA at P. 321 per Atkin, J.

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NIGERIAN JUDGES AND POLITICIANS MUST NOT BE FOUND MINGLING

I see from Exhibit EP2/34 the need for Nigerian Judges to maintain a very big distance from politics and politicians. Our Constitution forbids any mingling. As Judges, we must obey the Constitution. The two professions do not meet and will never meet at all in our democracy in the discharge of their functions. While politics...

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THE JUDGE MUST BE OBEDIENT TO THE WILL OF PARLIAMENT

Lord Denning, M.R., in DUPORT STEELS LTD v. SIRS (1980) 1 ALL E.R. 529, where it was said by Lord Scarman in his Speech at p. 551 (on an appeal from Lord Denning’s Lead judgment in that case) that: “But in the field of statute law the Judge must be obedient to the will of Parliament as expressed in its enactments. In this field Parliament makes and unmakes the law, the judge’s duty is to interpret and to apply the law, not to change it to meet the judge’s idea of what justice requires. Interpretation does, of course, imply in the interpreter a power of choice where differing constructions is possible. But our law requires that the judge choose the construction which in his judgment best meets the legislative purpose of the enactment. If the result is unjust but inevitable, the judge may say so and invite Parliament to reconsider the provision. But he must not deny the statute. Unpalatable statute may not be disregarded or rejected, merely because it is unpalatable. Only if a just result can be achieved without violating the legislative purpose of the statute may the judge select the construction which best suits his idea of what justice requires.”

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DUTY OF JUDGE TO INTERPRETE THE LAW

I agree that a judge should be firm and pungent in the interpretation of the law but such should be short of a judge being a legislator. This is because it is the duty of the legislature to make the law and it is the assigned duty of the judge to interpret the law as...

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DUE PROCESS FOR REMOVAL OF A STATE JUDGE

This is because any exercise of power to remove a Chief Judge must be based on his: 1. Inability to discharge the functions of office or appointment; 2. The inability to perform the functions of his office could arise from infirmity of the mind or of body; 3. For misconduct or 4. The contravention of...

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SIGNING OF ORIGINATING SUMMONS BY A JUDGE – FORM 2

It is clear from the provisions of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 that nowhere in the body of the Rules is it provided that whenever an originating summons is being taken out it must be signed by a Judge of the High Court to which the originating summons relates. The Rules are silent...

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APPELLATE COURT INTERFERENCE WITH TRIAL COURTS DISCRETION

It needs to be emphasised here that an appellate Court will usually not interfere with an exercise of discretion in its quest to obtain substantial justice except where it is satisfied that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or illegally or without due regard to all necessary consideration having regard to the circumstances of the particular...

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