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THERE MUST BE A SPECIFIC DENIAL PLEADINGS BY THE OTHER PARTY

Dictum

In the case of Messrs. Lewis & Peat (N.R.I.) Ltd. v. Akhimien ( 1976) 7 S.C. 157 at page 163-4 where he stated: “We must observe, however, that in order to raise an issue of fact in these circumstances there must be a proper traverse: and traverse must be made either by a denial or non-admission either expressly or by necessary implication. So that if a defendant refuses to admit a particular allegation in the statement of claim, he must state so specifically; and he does not do this satisfactorily by pleading thus: ‘defendant is trot in a position to admit or deny (the particular allegation on the statement of claim) and will at the trial put plaintiff to proof.” … We are, of course, not unmindful of the first paragraph of the statement of defence. Nowadays almost every statement of defence contains such a general denial. (See Warner v. Sampson (1959) 1 Q.B. 287 at 310-311. However, in respect of essential and material allegations such a general denial ought not be adopted; essential allegations should be specifically traversed. (See Wallersteins v. Moir (1974) 1 W.L.R. 991 at 1002 per Lord Denning, M.R.; also Bullen & Leake & Jacobs, Precedents of Pleadings 12th Edition 83).

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PLEADINGS ARE TO CONTAIN THE MATERIAL FACTS, NOT THE LEGAL RESULT

Lord Denning in Re Vandervell s Trusts (No.2) (supra): “Mr. Balcanbe for the executors stressed that the point taken by Mr. Mills was ‘not covered by the pleadings. He said time and again: This way of putting the case was not pleaded. No such trust was pleaded.” And so forth. The more he argued, the more technical he became. I began to think we were back in the bad old days before the Common Law Procedure Acts 1852 and 1854, when pleadings had to state the legal result; and a case could be lost by the omission of a single averment. See Bullen and Leake’s precedent of pleadings, 3rd ed. (1868), P. 147. All that has been long swept away. It is sufficient for the pleader to state the material facts. He need not state the legal result. If, for convenience, he does so, he is not bound by, or limited to, what he has stated. He can present in argument any legal consequence of which the facts permit. The pleadings in this case contained all material facts. It does not appear that Mr. Mills put the case before the Judge; but this does not entail any difference in the facts only a difference in stating the legal consequences. So it was quite open to him.”

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PLEADING, IS PLEADING FACTS UPON WHICH A LAW CAN STAND ON

While I come to the conclusion that the appellants did not plead co-ownership, I should not be taken as making the point that they should have included in their pleadings, the legal word of co-ownership or its synonym joint-ownership. That is not what I mean. As a matter of law, a party cannot plead law...

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LAW IS NOT NECESSARY TO BE PLEADED IN PLEADINGS

I concede that it is not necessary to plead law before reliance can be placed on it. It is sufficient to plead material facts which will lead to a certain legal result, and once sufficient material facts have been pleaded, the inference to be drawn from such pleaded facts and the particulars of the law...

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