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WRITING OF JUDGEMENT IS A MATTER OF STYLE OF THE JUDGE

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One major and central complaint of counsel is in respect of the way the learned trial Judge wrote his judgment vis-à-vis his evaluation of the totality of the evidence before him. While I agree that a judgment should have certain vital features and characteristics, I do not believe that a trial Judge must be regimented to a strictly laid down pattern beyond which he can only go on pain of punishment by way of setting his judgment aside on appeal. A trial Judge is not a child in a kindergarten class who must be led by the nose and the hands to write or recite a rhyme in unison or in union to the strictest details of the words and the letters and the punctuation marks. It should not be so. A trial Judge, the highly respected professional that he is should be given some freedom in the method of writing his own judgment. After all, writing of judgment is a matter of the personal style of the individual Judge. A Judge can develop his own “house” style and as long as that style is not outrageous, an appellate court cannot raise its eyebrows. Although it is neater to follow some generally set down pattern and methodology in the judgment writing process, an appellate court, in my humble view, is not competent to throw out a judgment of a trial Judge merely because it failed to follow the set down procedure. What an appellate court should be interested in, is whether from the entire judgment, justice has been done to the parties and in considering this package of justice, an appellate court should not be myopically interested in pockets of irregularities in the judgment but the totality of it all. I should perhaps go further to make the point that once the trial Judge has been able to bring out clearly the issues for determination, the case of the parties adequately summarised without any detestable embellishments, the argument of counsel and a careful and unbiased evaluation of the evidence, a judgment should not be subjected to an appellate attack to the extent that it must be thrown out.

— Tobi, JCA. Abraham v Olorunfunmi (1990) – CA/L/83/89

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ONLY WHEN ERROR IN JUDGEMENT OF COURT BELOW IS SUBSTANTIAL THAT APPEAL WILL BE ALLOWED

At all events, it is not every mistake or error in a judgment that will result in the appeal being allowed. It is only when the error is substantial in that it has occasioned a miscarriage of Justice that the appellate court is bound to interfere. See Onajobi v. Olanipekun (1985) 4 S.C. (Pt.2) 156 at 163; Oje v. Babalola (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt.185) 267 at 282; Ukejianya v. Uchendu (1950) 13WACA 45 at 46; Azuetonma Ike v. Ugboaja (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.30 1)539 at 556; Ahiodun Famuroti v. Madam Agbeke (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt.189) 1; (1991) 6 S.CN.J. 54 at 64 etc. No miscarriage 1 of justice has been occasioned by the observation of the court below that the return of the title deeds to the 1st appellant during the pendency of the appeal had put an end to the dispute.

— Iguh, JSC. Onamade v ACB (1997) – SC.199/1990

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ONCE A COURT DELIVERS JUDGEMENT IT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO; EXCEPTIONS THAT EXISTS

It is settled law that once a Court has delivered its decision on a matter, it becomes functus officio with regard to that matter. What this means is that a Court cannot sit as an appellate Court over its decision; once it has decided a matter, it ceases to be seized of it, and it cannot re-open it for any purpose whatsoever – see Ogboru V. Ibori (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 942) 319 Sun Insurance V. LMBS Ltd. (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt 940) 608, Ukachukwu V. Uba (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt 956) 1, Ubeng V. Usua (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt 994) 244 and Onyekweli V. INEC (2009) 6 NWLR (Pt 1136) 13. But the law also says that Courts of record have the inherent jurisdiction to set aside their Judgments/decision/order, in appropriate cases. When a. The Judgment is obtained by fraud or deceit either in the Court or of one or more of the Parties; b The Judgment is a nullity; c. It is obvious that the Court was misled into giving Judgment under a mistaken belief that the parties consented to it; d. The Judgment was given in the absence of jurisdiction; e. The proceedings adopted was such as to deprive the decision or Judgment of the character of a legitimate adjudication; or f. Where there is fundamental irregularity. See Alao V. ACB (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt 672) 264, Tomtec (Nig.) Ltd. V. FHA. (2009) 16 NWLR (Pt 1173) 358 SC, and Jev V. lyortom (supra).

— A.A. Augie, JCA. Elias v Ecobank (2016) – CA/L/873/2013

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COURT CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A NULLIFIED JUDGEMENT NOT PRODUCED BEFORE IT

Whether the record and contents of a nullified judgment ought formally be produced in court or extract thereof be placed before the court before the opinions expressed therein could be countenanced; or whether the Court of Appeal could have taken notice of their existence and contents by the mere fact that the nullified judgment was probably in the archives of the court. In Attorney-General v. Silem L.R. 10 H.L. Cas. 704, it was held that S.26 of the Queens Remembrance Act, 1859, which empowered the Barons of Exchequer to frame rules for making “the process, practice and mode of pleading” on the revenue side of the court uniform with that of the plea side, did not give the Judges the power of entertaining appeals on revenue cases, as they assumed. It is always necessary to exercise powers conferred by an enabling statute within the four comers of the statute: see Australian cases of Tavcar v. Tavcar (1950) A.L.R. 260; White v. White (1947) A.L.R. 342. It therefore appears to me that the power, conferred by S.73(1) of the Evidence Act, for a court to take judicial notice of its course of proceedings and rules of practice cannot rightly be invoked to take judicial notice of the contents of a nullified judgment, which the members had not earlier had an opportunity of seeing. For, true, it existed as a fact, being devoid of any legal consequences, it was then like any other opinion, say, in a textbook. I do not think that anybody can suggest that such a textbook opinion should be judicially noticed.

— P. Nnaemeka-Agu JSC. Gbaniyi Osafile v. Paul Odi (SC 149/1987, 4th day of May 1990)

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RATIONALE BEHIND JUDGEMENTS BEING DELIVERED WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL THREE MONTHS

There is no doubt, that if a Court of Appeal fails to deliver its judgment within three months, such failure contravenes this provision. Therefore, any judgment becomes null and void if delivered outside the time limit. The question is, who should be blamed since the appellants or the respondents as the case may be, are not responsible for the lateness of the Court of Appeal in delivering its judgment. Where, therefore, should the blame lie, in what appears to be the wrong doing of a panel of judges There is no provision in the law as to who will bear the responsibility for the cost of re-hearing. It therefore appears, that parties to a suit are being punished for the wrong doing which they are not responsible for. It is in this sense that counsel argued forcibly that the construction of the relevant section should not be mandatory but directory. If one accepts the argument that the provision of section 258(1) of the 1979 Constitution is directory, then the question is as to what happens to the judgment delivered in breach of it. Definitely, the judgment violates the provision of the Constitution, because it was delivered out of time. The judgment, therefore, is null and void. The next question is as to what happens to the parties and the judges Except that the judgment becomes null and void, the judges do not suffer any liability. It is quite clear that there is no provision for damnifying judges for such a breach. This section of the Constitution has been specially promulgated to prevent rather undue delayed judgment, which, being capable of being set aside, does not benefit either party to the case or on appeal. When any judgment is unnecessarily delayed, it is not possible for the court of trial to retain observations of the witnesses, and the freshness of the demeanour of a witness is lost. It is, therefore, to save such undue delay that this particular provision has been made. Often in the past, a judgment is set aside and the case is remitted for retrial or re-hearing, because the delay is so long that a trial judge would have lost advantage of observation of a witness and sometimes forgets the sequence. It is the duty of all judges to apply the laws strictly, but it will not be right of them to attempt to wriggle out of such application and defeat its object. It is, therefore, essential that all courts should see to the proper compliance with section 258 (1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1979. Learned counsel for the appellant emphasised that directory construction should be preferred, because of the helplessness of parties. In a judgment given in violation of section 258(1), one party gains and the other loses. It is only fair that parties be restored to their original status when ordering re-hearing. The purpose of section 258(1) is to give some certainty as to the law determining rights of parties. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to either the appellant or the respondent that a court, which determines an appeal, does so within the required period. That will lead to the enhancement of the court and the judiciary.

— Sowemimo, JSC. Odi v Osafile (1985) – SC.144/1983

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THE JUDGEMENT OF A COURT REMAINS BINDING UNTIL SET ASIDE BY AN APPELLATE COURT

It is the law that a ruling or judgment of the court remains valid until it is set aside by an appellate court. The Ruling of Taiwo, J. of the Federal High Court, Ado Ekiti of 13/12/16 defroze the account of Ayodele Fayose from which the sum of N75,000,000.00 (Seventy Five Million Naira) being the professional fees paid to the Respondent for services rendered remains the extant decision. The said decision which the Appellant alleged to be perverse has not been set aside, it therefore remains the law, valid and binding, vacating an earlier order made by Idris, J. of the Lagos Division was the extant law as at the time the payment of N75,000,000.00 was made to the Respondent for services rendered. As rightly argued by the learned counsel to the Respondent, at the time the order was made by the lower court defreezing the account of the Respondent’s Chambers, the decision of Taiwo, J. was valid and subsisting until set aside by an appeal court or by the lower court itself if it acted without jurisdiction or in the absence of an aggrieved party. See, ROSSEK & ORS VS. ACB LTD & ORS (1993) LPELR – 2955 (SC) P. 104, PARAS. A – D, OKEZIE VICTOR IKPEAZU VS. ALEX OTTI & ORS (2016) LPELR – 40055 (SC) P. 20, PARAS. A – C, FIDELITY BANK VS. THE M.T. TABORA & ORS (2018) LPELR – 44504 (SC) PP. 6 – 14, PARAS. B – D. In OJIAKO & ORS VS. OGUEZE & ORS (1962) LPELR – 25 116 (SC) P. 31 PARAS. D – E, his lordship Brett, JSC on the validity of a subsisting judgment held that: “Where no question of nullity arises, once the judgment of any competent court is perfected it is valid until set aside by competent authority, and there can be no presumption against the validity of such a judgment.” See, also BEMDOO MINDI VS. THE STATE (2020) LPELR – 52897 (SC) P. 53, PARAS. B – E.

— C.N. Uwa, JCA.FRN v Ozekhome (2021) – CA/L/174/19

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PARTY NOT BOUND BY JUDGMENT ON VENDOR AFTER LAND PURCHASE

In Mercantile Investment & General Trust Co. v. River Plate Trust, Loan & Agency Co. (1894)1 Ch 578 at 595 said the learned Judge: “Moreover, if the claim of the plaintiff company could be regarded as one affecting land, notwithstanding that no registration of that claim had been made in Mexico, which alone could validly bind the land there, then the English Company would be entitled to say that they were purchasers of the land prior to that action, notwithstanding that their title may also not have been perfected by registration. A prior purchaser of land cannot be estopped as being privy in estate by a judgment obtained in an action against the vendor commenced after the purchase.”

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