“Finally, on the issue of long possession, the law is settled that long possession alone cannot imbue title on a claimant where he is unable to prove his root of title and more so, in the face of a person who is in possession and asserts ownership of the land.”
— J.H. Sankey, JCA. Ibrahim Muli v Sali Akwai (2021) – CA/G/423/2019
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As observed by the Privy Council in Gibbs v. Messer (1891) A.C. 248 at 254, per Lord Watson delivering the judgment of the Board in regard to a similar law as to registration of title: “The object is to save persons dealing with registered proprietors from the trouble and expense of going behind the register, in order to investigate the history of their author’s [i.e. vendor’s] title, and to satisfy themselves of its validity. That end is accomplished by providing that everyone who purchases in bona fide and for value, from a registered proprietor, and enters his deed of transfer or mortgage on the register, shall thereby acquire an indefeasible right, notwithstanding the infirmity of his author’s title.”
Also in Duru v. Onwumelu (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 746) 672 at 696—697, H—D per Uwaifo JSC: ‘Now, by relying on acts of possession in proof of title to the land in question, the plaintiffs as a community inevitably put in issue the totality of the numerous acts of possession and ownership they claim to have been enjoyed by them, the positive nature of those acts and the long period over which the said acts have spanned so that the circumstance as a whole will be seen to have come within the principle long laid down in Ekpo v. Ita (1932) 11 N.L.R. 68. Simply put in relation to this case where, as already said, the plaintiffs base their right to a declaration of title to the land on the fact of long possession, the principle is that they must prove acts of ownership and possession of the land in dispute over a sufficient length of time, numerous and positive enough to warrant the inference that they are exclusive owners. In my view, it will not do if merely there are numerous acts, since these might qualify, on the part of an intrusive party, as acts of trespass. There is the requirement that the acts ought to extend over a sufficient or appreciable period of time and must be positive. To be positive, the acts ought to be such that can be verified upon strong evidence, such as, old structures and settlements, well-beaten roads or paths, economic crops or trees tending visibly to be long-lived, old farms and huts, community shrines which have long been in existence, and to which the plaintiffs as a community can satisfactorily lay claim etc.’
In Uzochukwu v. Eri (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt. 514) 535 at 546, E—G per Iguh JSC: ‘The law appears well settled that there exists five recognized methods by which ownership of land may be established. Briefly put, they comprise as follows:- (i) Proof by traditional evidence. (ii) Proof by production of document of title. (iii) Proof by acts of ownership extending over a sufficient length of time, numerous and positive enough as to warrant the inference that the persons exercising such acts are the true owners of the land. (iv) Proof by acts of long possession and (v) Proof by possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of such land would in addition be the owner of the land in dispute. See: Idundun & Ors. v. Okumagha (1976) 9 and 10 SC 277 at 246-250; Atanda v. Ajani (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.111) 511; Myanwu v. Mhara (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt.242) 386; Sunday Piaro v. Chief Tenalo & Ors. (1976) 12 SC 31 at 41-43 etc’
In an action for declaration of title to land, as in the instant case, a plaintiff need not prove all the five ways. Where the plaintiff’s case is based on traditional evidence of ownership as the legal basis of his claim, his duty is limited to proving such traditional title and no more. On the other hand, if a plaintiff’s claim relies on conveyance as the legal basisof ownership , his duty is simply to produce the documents of title or the title deeds. The same thing applies where he claims through any of the other remaining three ways.
— Onnoghen JSC. Aigbobahi & Ors. v. Aifuwa, Osabuohien & Ors. (SC. 194/2001, 3 Feb 2006)
The land in dispute herein referred to by both parties can only be the land in respect of which Plaintiff claims damages for trespass and perpetual injunction against the Defendant. it is therefore strange and absurd for learned Counsel to the 1st Defendant to contend that the identity of the land in dispute is uncertain. It has always been accepted in our courts in land cases that where the area of land in dispute is well known to the parties. the question of proof not being really in dispute does not arise. In such a situation it cannot be contended that the area claimed or can the land in dispute be described as uncertain – See Etiko v. Aroyewun (1959) 4 FSC 129; (1959) SCN LR 308; Osho v. Ape (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 562) 492. In the circumstances of this case the identity of the land in dispute cannot he described as uncertain since both parties know and have accepted it as the land in dispute.
— Karibi-Whyte JSC. Engineer Bayo Akinterinwa & Anor V. Cornelius Oladunjoye (SC.98/94, 7 April 2000)
“The Appellant and the 3rd Respondent in this appeal were all claiming title to the subject property to wit: Right of Occupancy No. GM/14660 on plot E-43 on GDP/4 Layout situate at the City Center behind Federal Medical Center, Gombe. Both parties were claiming title to the land in dispute relying on the allocation made to them by the 1st and 2nd Respondents. Their title is therefore from the same source. The law in such a situation is settled, which is that, when the equities are equal the first in time will prevail and consequently be awarded title to the land. See Achilihu vs Anyatonwu (2013) 12 NWLR (pt 1368) 256.”
— E. Tobi, JCA. Umar Ibrahim v Nasiru Danladi Mu’azu & 2 Ors. (2022) – CA/G/317/2019
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