Where a party, be it an Appellant or Respondent does not appeal against a finding or an order of Court, by way of a ground of appeal, a cross-appeal or a Respondent’s notice, that order or finding is binding and acceptable to it. The Respondent herein has not appealed against the order made to introduce and argue the two grounds of appeal. Therefore, the order is binding on it.
– Yahaya, JCA. Petroleum Resources v. SPDC (2021)
SHARE ON
In all then, a decision is said to be perverse: (a) When it runs counter to the evidence; or (b) Where it has been shown that the trial Court took into account matters which it ought not to have taken into account or shut its eyes to the obvious; or (c) When it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
– Chima Centus, JSC Dondos v. State (2021) – SC.905/2014
Now, it is abecedarian law that the decision of a Court is not to be read in convenient instalments. The decision must be read as a whole in order to appreciate the ratio decidendi in the case.
– Ogakwu, J.C.A Fijabi v. FBN (2021)
In law, a decision or finding or conclusion reached is perverse amongst other grounds if it does not flow from the established facts from the evidence before the Court or it takes into consideration matters extraneous to the issues placed before the Court in evidence by the parties.
– B.A. Georgewill, JCA. Ganiyu v. Oshoakpemhe & Ors. (2021) – CA/B/12A/2021
Once an appellate Court finds that the conclusion reached by a lower Court is correct, it has no duty to interfere. Thus, the duty of an appellate Court to interfere will arise only where the finding, conclusion and/or decision of the lower Court is wrong and/or perverse. In law, a finding or conclusion of a Court is said to be perverse when such finding does not flow from the proved evidence or was arrived at wrongly or was anchored on extraneous matters. In all such circumstances, an appellate Court will interfere to set it aside and make appropriate finding as justified and borne out by the evidence in the printed record of appeal.
– Abdu Aboki, JSC. Chukwu v. State (2021)
However, I believe that, but for what looked like a brief inter regnum under the decision in W.A. Omonuwa v. Napoleon Oshodin & Anor. (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. 924, at p. 938 – but which has now been explained away in the decision in A.M.O. Akinsanya v. United Bank for Africa Limited (1986) 4 N.W.L.R. 273, at pp. 289 – 291, the test as to whether a decision is final or interlocutory which has been preferred by authoritative decisions in this country has been consistently one which looks at the result, id est, which asks the question: “does the judgment or order, as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties” See on this: Blay & Ors. v. Solomon (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 117; William Ude & Ors. v. Josiah Agu & Ors. (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 65; A.M.O. Akinsanya v. U B.A. Ltd. (supra).
— Nnaemeka-Agu JSC. Bennett Ifediorah & Ors. V. Ben Ume & Ors. (1988)
Supreme Court made this very clear in Akanbi v Alao (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.108) 143, Per Eso JSC as follows: – “I think it would be extending Ibodo v Enarofia case beyond reason if every considered or assumed considered professional decision of a counsel which has gone wrong should qualify as ground of appeal. We did say once, and I am still of the firm view that the conduct of a case lies wholly with counsel. The rule really should be “caveat client”. If you choose a counsel, you should permit him, once seised of the case to conduct the case in the manner of his professional ability. Indeed that is part of the independence of the Bar. If there is lapse in his office, his clerk forgetting to file some papers, he forgetting the date of hearing or such like procedural errors, of course the client should not be made to suffer. If however, he takes a deliberate decision and loses thereby, then, it is his privilege to lose and that will constitute a right for the client for utilization as a ground of appeal. For, if it were not so, the profession would be in jeopardy”.
Click the icons to like, follow, and join JPoetry