The Respondent’s Brief of Argument dated and filed on 3rd November, 2020, which was settled by Adedotun Ishola Osobu Esq, was deemed adopted pursuant to Order 19 Rule 9(4) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016.
— A.B. Mohammed, JCA. ITDRLI v NIMC (2021) – CA/IB/291/2020
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Learned counsel should refrain from manufacturing facts to suit the interest of his client. As a minister in the Temple of Justice, counsel should always be guided by raw facts as disclosed by the evidence before the Court. To be forewarned is to be forearmed, learned counsel should heed to this advice against the future.
– Adamu Jauro, JSC. Enabeli v. State (2021)
While the point is conceded that an advocate should be sensitive and loyal to his client’s case, such sensitivity and loyalty should not exceed required boundaries, particularly the duty the advocate owes the court to present the law correctly, even if it is against his client. – Niki Tobi JSC. Okonkwo v. Cooperative Bank (2003)
The said section 573(1) of Companies and Allied Matters Act Provides as follows:- ‘Every individual firm or corporation having a place of business in Nigeria and carrying on business under a business name shall be registered in the manner provided in this part of this Act The above is not an authority that can be relied upon to uphold the view that a process signed and filed by a firm of legal practitioners which has no live is valid in law. The general provision of the law as in section 573(1) of Companies and Allied Matters Act is subject to the specific provisions of section 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act. See: FMBN v. Olloh (2002) 4 SC (Pt. 11) 177 at 122-123; Kraps Thompson Org.v. NIPSS (2004) 5 SC (Pt.1) 16 at 20-21.
— J.A. Fabiyi, JSC. FBN v. Maiwada (2012) – SC.269/2005
The general principle of the law is that at the trial of an action the authority of Counsel extends, when it is not expressly limited, to the whole of the court action and all matters incidental to it and to the conduct of the trial. See Sourendra Nath Mitra v. Srimati Tarubala Dasi (1930) 46 T.L.R. 191 PC. This general principle, however, does not and has not fettered the discretion of the court where it deems it fit so to exercise the same. See Adewunmi v. Plastex Ltd (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 32) 767 at 785. In this regard, it cannot be disputed that where Counsel by the authority of his client and with full knowledge of the facts consents to an order, there being no mistake or surprise in the case, the client cannot arbitrarily withdraw such consent, and the court may proceed to perfect the order but without prejudice to any application which the other side might make to the court to be relieved from his consent all the ground of fraud, mistake, misrepresentation or surprise or for other cogent and sufficient reason. See Harvey v. Croydon Union Rural Sanitary Authority (1884) 26 ChD. 249, CA, Holt v. Jesse (1876) 3 Ch. D. 177. But if it is established that Counsel agreed to the consent order being made under some misapprehension, the court will not hold him or his client to the agreement. See Shepherd v. Robinson (1919) 1 K.B. 474, C.A. Where the authority of Counsel has been expressly limited by the client and Counsel has in defiance consented to an order or judgment contrary to his client’s clear instructions, various considerations would appear to arise. If the limitation of authority is known or communicated to the other side, consent of Counsel outside the limits of his authority and in breach of the express instruction of his client will be inconsequential and of no effect. See Strauss v. Francis (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 379 at 382. Where, however, the limitation of authority is unknown to the other side who enters into the compromise in the belief that the opponent’s Counsel has the ordinary unlimited authority of his client, the position would appear, to some extent, to be fluid and uncertain. In such situation the learned authors of Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 3, paragraph 1182 have formulated the applicable true rule under the circumstance as follows:- “But the true rule seems to be that in such case the court has power to interfere; that it is not prevented by the agreement of Counsel from setting aside or refusing to enforce a compromise; that it is a matter for the discretion of the court; and that when, in the particular circumstances of the case, grave injustice would be done by allowing the compromise to stand, the compromise may be set aside, even although the limitation of Counsel’s authority was unknown to the other side, or where clear and unequivocal instructions of limitations have been given.” I confess that I have given the above passage a most careful consideration and must fully and most respectfully endorse the same as the correct position of the present law. It is my view, therefore, that the court possesses the discretionary jurisdiction to examine the entire circumstances of a particular case, in order to determine whether or not the compromise entered into by Counsel should be sanctioned by the court. The remedy, being discretionary, must be exercised with the utmost care and with regard to the injustice or otherwise of allowing an order to stand. It is this jurisdiction that both courts below invoked and exercised in favour of the respondent as plaintiff in the originating summon.
— Iguh JSC. Vulcan Gases Limited V. Gesellschaft Fur Industries Gasverwertung A.G.(G.I.V.) ( SC.67/1995, 4th May 2001)
Learned counsel, as officers in the temple of justice have a sacred duty to assist the court to do substantial justice in any matter before it. His first duty is to the court. The second to his client. It is almost five years to the day since the ruling complained of was delivered. Precious judicial time and resources have been wasted pursuing technicalities.
– Kekere-Ekun JCA. Adewoyin v. Executive Governor (2011)
In Kotoye v Saraki 1995 NWLR (Pt.395) 256, in circumstances where the party (who is also a legal practitioner) took a decision not to appeal. Uwais J.S.C (as he then was) at Pages 7 and 8 said: “Any act of gambling involves risk taking and no gambler can claim not to be aware of that. When a counsel makes a mistake, such mistake or its consequence should not, in general, be visited on his client who, in most cases is a layman. Can the defendant/applicant who has been or is a legal practitioner be such a client? I certainly think not. There is therefore, no good reason given for the delay bringing this application.”
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