The Respondent’s Brief of Argument dated and filed on 3rd November, 2020, which was settled by Adedotun Ishola Osobu Esq, was deemed adopted pursuant to Order 19 Rule 9(4) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016.
— A.B. Mohammed, JCA. ITDRLI v NIMC (2021) – CA/IB/291/2020
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However, learned Counsel for the Respondent failed to draw the attention of the Court to this previous decision. Clearly, he had a duty in law to do so; see Global Trans. S.A. v. Free Enter. (Nig.) Ltd. (2001) 5 NWLR (Pt.706) 426 where it was stated that it is the duty of Counsel to draw the Court’s attention to previous decision of the Court on the same subject matter.
— I.E. Ekwo, J. Daudu v FIRS (2023) – FHC/ABJ/TA/1/2021
The general principle of the law is that at the trial of an action the authority of Counsel extends, when it is not expressly limited, to the whole of the court action and all matters incidental to it and to the conduct of the trial. See Sourendra Nath Mitra v. Srimati Tarubala Dasi (1930) 46 T.L.R. 191 PC. This general principle, however, does not and has not fettered the discretion of the court where it deems it fit so to exercise the same. See Adewunmi v. Plastex Ltd (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 32) 767 at 785. In this regard, it cannot be disputed that where Counsel by the authority of his client and with full knowledge of the facts consents to an order, there being no mistake or surprise in the case, the client cannot arbitrarily withdraw such consent, and the court may proceed to perfect the order but without prejudice to any application which the other side might make to the court to be relieved from his consent all the ground of fraud, mistake, misrepresentation or surprise or for other cogent and sufficient reason. See Harvey v. Croydon Union Rural Sanitary Authority (1884) 26 ChD. 249, CA, Holt v. Jesse (1876) 3 Ch. D. 177. But if it is established that Counsel agreed to the consent order being made under some misapprehension, the court will not hold him or his client to the agreement. See Shepherd v. Robinson (1919) 1 K.B. 474, C.A. Where the authority of Counsel has been expressly limited by the client and Counsel has in defiance consented to an order or judgment contrary to his client’s clear instructions, various considerations would appear to arise. If the limitation of authority is known or communicated to the other side, consent of Counsel outside the limits of his authority and in breach of the express instruction of his client will be inconsequential and of no effect. See Strauss v. Francis (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 379 at 382. Where, however, the limitation of authority is unknown to the other side who enters into the compromise in the belief that the opponent’s Counsel has the ordinary unlimited authority of his client, the position would appear, to some extent, to be fluid and uncertain. In such situation the learned authors of Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 3, paragraph 1182 have formulated the applicable true rule under the circumstance as follows:- “But the true rule seems to be that in such case the court has power to interfere; that it is not prevented by the agreement of Counsel from setting aside or refusing to enforce a compromise; that it is a matter for the discretion of the court; and that when, in the particular circumstances of the case, grave injustice would be done by allowing the compromise to stand, the compromise may be set aside, even although the limitation of Counsel’s authority was unknown to the other side, or where clear and unequivocal instructions of limitations have been given.” I confess that I have given the above passage a most careful consideration and must fully and most respectfully endorse the same as the correct position of the present law. It is my view, therefore, that the court possesses the discretionary jurisdiction to examine the entire circumstances of a particular case, in order to determine whether or not the compromise entered into by Counsel should be sanctioned by the court. The remedy, being discretionary, must be exercised with the utmost care and with regard to the injustice or otherwise of allowing an order to stand. It is this jurisdiction that both courts below invoked and exercised in favour of the respondent as plaintiff in the originating summon.
— Iguh JSC. Vulcan Gases Limited V. Gesellschaft Fur Industries Gasverwertung A.G.(G.I.V.) ( SC.67/1995, 4th May 2001)
In SC. 663/2015 Mega Progressive Peoples Party v. INEC and 3 Ors. Decided by this Court on the 12th of October, 2015, on the issue of affixing seal, stamp to legal documents etc, this Court said that: “Failure to affix the Nigerian Bar Association stamp cannot invalidate processes filed in court.” The clear interpretation of the above is that processes without the Nigerian Bar Association stamp, etc are valid. Is there a conflict with the decision in this appeal? In this appeal this Court says that legal processes without stamp or seal are voidable. That is to say such documents are deemed not to have been properly signed and not that they are invalid. Such documents are redeemed and made valid by a simple directive by the Judge or the relevant authority at the time of filing the voidable document for erring counsel to affix stamp and seal as provided for in Rule 10 of the Legal Practitioners Act … Failure to affix stamp, seal to a legal process, renders such a process voidable. A voidable legal process is made valid when counsel affixes the stamp and seal to the said legal process.
— Rhodes-Vivour JSC. Yaki (Rtd) & Anor. V. Senator Bagudu & Ors. (SC.722/2015, 13 Nov 2015)
‘The right of audience in court is governed by the Legal Practitioners Act. It is clear from the provisions of sections 2 and 8 of the Legal Practitioners Act that as long as the name of a legal practitioner remains on the roll, it is wrong to deny him right of audience in court. The procedure for removal of names of legal practitioners from the roll or to deny a legal practitioner right of audience in court is clearly set out under the Legal Practitioners Act. It is only for non-payment of the yearly practising fee that a court can deny a legal practitioner whose name is on the roll the right of audience in Court. The Legal Practitioners Act, does not provide for any other circumstances for denying a Legal Practitioner the right of audience in court apart from the direction of the disciplinary committee or by implication from the constitution, as a result of an Order by the Code of Conduct Tribunal. Support for this view can be found in the decision of Benin High Court Presided by Justice Ogbonine, in the case of OLOYO V ALEGBE (1981) 2 NCLR 680, where his Lordship Ogbobine, J. rejected an objection against the appearance of Mr. Alegbe in court (and while leading other lawyers) for himself as the speaker of the Bendel State House of Assembly. Hear his Lordship. “I do not think it is right for any court to disqualify a Legal Practitioner from practicing his profession, except on very sound grounds set out under the Legal Practitioner’s Act and other enabling law and regulations made to that effect”. It is beyond reproach that the primary legislation that disqualifies any person whose name is on the roll from acting as Barrister and or Solicitor officially or in private is sections 8 (2) of the Legal Practitioner’s Act, which deals with payment of practicing fee.’
— S. Kado J. Akazor Gladys & Ors. V. Council of legal education (NICN/ABJ/346/2017, 20th day of March 2019)
The above quoted obiter of the learned trial judge did not form part of the ratio decidendi of the judgment and is a good example of the less said, the better by way of obiter in a judgment. In any event, the current penchant of counsel to allege bias against judicial officers under every imagined pretext must be highly deprecated, condemned and discouraged. It does not enhance the confidence of the public in the judicial process and only serves to erode the rule of law. Justice is rooted in confidence. If the parties felt strongly that there was a fiduciary relationship between the Bench and any lawyer or party, it was their duty to draw attention to it BEFORE the case was heard and determined by the judge. It is obviously the antics of a bad loser to cry foul after the case had been lost.
— H.M. Ogunwumiju, JCA. Godwin Ukah & Ors. V. Christopher A. Onyia & Ors. (CA/E/295/2008, 21 Jan 2016)
It is settled that a statement by a counsel from the Bar has the character of an oath and the court is bound to take this into consideration. See Tika Tore Press Ltd. v. Umar (1968) 2 ALL NLR 107.
— Opene JCA. United Bank for Africa (UBA) v. Samuel Igelle Ujor (CA/C/134/99, 20 FEB 2001)
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