A perverse finding is when it runs against and counter to the evidence led and the pleadings of the parties or where it has been shown that the trial judge took into consideration or account of matters which he ought not to have taken into account or shuts his eyes to the obvious. See: Akinloye v. Eyiola (1968) NWLR 92; Isah Onu and Ors v. Ibrahim Idu and Ors (2006) 6 SCNJ 23 at Pg. 45-46.
— T.S. YAKUBU, JCA. Fayose v ICN (2012) – CA/AE/58/2010
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A finding of fact is said to be perverse – (a) Where it runs counter to the evidence and pleadings. (b) Where it has been shown that the trial court took into account matters which it ought not to have taken into account. (c) Where the trial court shuts its eyes to the obvious. (d) When the decision has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. State v. Agie (2000) 11 NWLR pt. 678 pg. 434 Atolagbe v. Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR pt.2 pg. 360 Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR pt. 80 pg.1. Akinloye v. Eyiyola (1968) NWLR 92.
— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Mini Lodge v. Ngei (2009) – SC.231/2006
I agree with the law that an appellate court should not interfere with the findings of fact by a trial court once the findings are based on the evidence upon the pleading of the parties. The appellate court can however interfere where the trial court failed to inter alia make findings or arrived at inconsistent findings on a crucial issue raised by the parties.
– Onnoghen JCA. Union Bank v. Akinrinmade (1999)
The law remains that an Appellate Court is reluctant to upset a finding of fact made by a trial court which had the opportunity of listening to witnesses testify and observing their demeanour and that evaluation of evidence and the ascription of probative value thereto are the primary functions of a trial court which saw, heard and assessed the witnesses. Where a trial court clearly evaluated the evidence of the parties and justifiably appraised the facts, it is not the business of an Appellate Court to substitute its own views of the facts for those of the trial court. It is only where the trial court is proved to have abdicated this function or in carrying out the function makes an unsound finding that an Appellate Court can justifiably step in to do so or set aside such unsound finding for being perverse. (See Oduwole v Aina (2001) 17 NWLR (Part 741) 1 at 47 and Udengwu v Uzuegbu (2003) 13 NWLR (Part 836) 36 at 156).
— Onnoghen JSC. Ndukwe v LPDC [2007] – SC 48/2003
It is also of paramount importance to always have it as a central theme that each case must be examined and decided on its own facts and circumstances as no two cases are alike in all particulars.
– Gumel, JCA. Ehanire v. Erhunmwuse (2007)
It is trite law that where the findings of trial court and indeed the concurrent findings of the Judge and the Court of Appeal are perverse, this court can interfere and give the correct findings as the evidence in the record show. See Ajeigbe vs. Odedina (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 72) 584; Okonkwo vs. Okolo (1988) 2 NWLR (pt. 79) 632; lbhafidon vs. 1gbinosun (2001) FWLR (pt. 49) 1426, (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 716) 653.
— N. Tobi, JSC. Ezennah v Atta (2004) – SC.226/2000
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on what qualifies as a complaint is defined as the purpose or legal basis of the claim, The complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on.
– CHACHA v. THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (003/2012) [2014] AFCHPR 48 para 120
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