Contracts are made by parties and the Court interprets same. Repudiation of contract cannot be done by one party, see ADENIYI VS GOVERNING COUNCIL OF YABA TECH (1993) LPELR-128(SC) held thus; “But repudiation by one party standing alone does not terminate the contract. It takes two to end it, by repudiation on the one side, and acceptance of the repudiation on the other.”
— Nimpar, JCA. Ekpo v GTB (2018) – CA/C/324/2013
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An offer must be unconditionally and unqualified by accepted. Any addition to or subtraction from the terms of the offer is an alteration to the terms and amounts to a total rejection of the offer by the offeree. The terms embedded in the rejection may form the basis for the formation of a new agreement. This is what amounts to a counter-offer. An offer is impliedly rejected if the offeree instead of accepting the original offer makes a counter-offer which varies the terms proposed by the offeror. Hyde v. Wrench (1840) 3 Kear. 334.
— Adekeye, JSC. Best Ltd. v. Blackwood Hodge (2011) – SC
The nature of the plaintiffs/appellants’ claim, as averred in their amended Statement of Claim, which of course they failed to prove, was that there was a subsisting contract between the parties. Whether or not there is a semblance of a legally binding agreement between the parties, that is, a situation where the parties to the contract confer rights and impose liabilities on themselves, will largely depend on whether there exists a mutual assent between them. Where there is doubt on whether the parties have concluded a legally binding agreement, the court has the responsibility to analyse the circumstances surrounding the alleged agreement and determine whether the traditional notion of ‘offer’ and “acceptance” can be distilled from the purported agreement. The mutual assent must be outwardly manifested. The test of the existence of such mutuality is objective. See Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society v Price (1943) AC 455 at 463. When there is mutual assent, the parties are said to be ad idem. Now the two items, “offer” and “acceptance”, earlier referred to, call for some explanation in order to recognise whether or not the parties are ad idem. An ‘offer’ is an expression of readiness to contract on the terms specified by the offeror (i.e. the person making the offer) which if accepted by the offeree (i.e. the person to whom the offer is made) will give rise to a binding contract. In other words, it is by acceptance that the offer is converted into a contract.
— Achike, JSC. Sparkling Breweries v Union Bank (SC 113/1996, 13 July 2001)
This is because it is a recognized principle of law that a contract will rarely be totally illegal or void: certain parts may be entirely lawful in themselves, while others are valid. Where the illegal or void parts can be “severed” from the rest of the contract on the well-known principles of severance such will be done and the rest of the contract enforced without the void part. It is permissible for courts to adopt this course where the objectionable part of the contract involves merely a void step or promise and is not fundamental, and it is possible to simply strike down the offending part without re-writing or remaking the contract for the parties and without altering the scope and intention of the agreement; and lastly, the contract, shorn of the offending parts, retains the characteristics of a valid contract. See on these Vol. 9 Hals. Laws of England (4th Edn.) p.297 in paragraph 430. See also Commercial Plastics Ltd. v. Vincent (1964) 3 All E.R. 546, C.A.
— Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC. Adesanya v Otuewu (1993) – SC.217/1989
It is trite that a valid contract can exist only when there is a “consensus ad idem” i.e., when there is a meeting of mind of the parties showing that the parties are bound by a specific term. This meeting of mind is, expressed in the form of “an offer” and “an acceptance” of that offer. It is only where they exist that there is a valid contract.
– Amaizu, J.C.A. Adeniran v. Olagunju (2001)
A divisible contract is separable into parts, so that separate parts of the agreed consideration may be assigned to severable parts of the performance. Such divisible agreements admit of pro rata payments for each portion that was performed, and is independent of performance of other parts of the contract.
— J.A. Fabiyi, JSC. BFI v. Bureau PE (2012) – SC.12/2008
In the construction of a contract, the meaning to be placed on it is that which is the plain, clear and obvious result of the terms used. A contract or document is to be construed in its ordinary meaning, When the language of a contract is not only plain but admits of one meaning, the task of interpretation is negligible. See: Union Bank of Nig. Ltd & Anr Vs Nwaokolo (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 400) 127: Aouad & Anor Vs Kessrawani (1956) 1 FSC 35: Nwanowu Vs Nzekwu & Anor (19571 3 FSC 36: Orient Bank (Nig) Plc Vs Bilante Int. Ltd (19971 8 NWLR (Pt. 515) 37 @ 78 B-D.
— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun JSC. B.O. Lewis v. United Bank for Africa Plc. (SC.143/2006, 14 January 2016)
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