RELATIONSHIP OF WITNESS TO VICTIM IS IRRELEVANT

NOT CALLING VITAL WITNESSES VS NOT CALLING A PARTICULAR WITNESS

The first point that needs be emphasised is that the presumption under section 149(d) of the Evidence Act will only apply against whom it is sought that it should operate where that party has infact withheld the particular piece of evidence in issue and if he did not call any evidence on the point. It only applies when the party does not call any evidence on the issue in controversy and not because he fails to call a particular witness. See: Bello v. Kassim (1969) NSCC 228 at 233; Okunzua v. Amosu (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 248) 416 at 435. The section deals with the failure to call evidence on the issue in controversy and not because he fails to call a particular witness. See: Bello v. Kassim (1969) NSCC 228 at 233; Okunzua v. Amosu (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 248) 416 at 435. The section deals with the failure to call evidence and not the failure to call a particular witness as a party is not bound to call a particular witness if he thinks he can prove his case otherwise. See: Francis Odili v. The State (1977) 4 SC 1 at 8; Alonge v. inspector-General of Police (1959) SCNLR 516; (1959) 4 FSC 203 etc. Mere failure to produce the evidence in issue would not necessarily amount to withholding such evidence. See: Ganiyu Tewogbade v. Arasi Akande (1968) (Pt. 2) NMLR 404 at 408. So, in Francis Odili v. The State supra, learned defence counsel’s submission was that only one of the two Rev. Sisters robbed with violence was called to identify and to testify against the appellant and that the second Rev. Sister and the two night guards who were present during the robbery should have been called as witnesses particularly as the appellant’s defence was that of alibi. This court as already pointed out dismissed this contention as misconceived as the prosecution was not required to call a host of witnesses to prove a particular issue.

— Iguh, JSC. Oguonzee v State (1998) – SC.131/97

WHERE PROSECUTION WITNESS CONTRADICTS ONE ANOTHER

Onubogu and Anor v. The State (1974) 9 S.C. 1, 20: the Supreme Court opined that where in a criminal case, one witness called by the prosecution’ contradicts another prosecution witness on a material point, the prosecution ought to lay some foundation, such as showing that a witness was hostile, before they can ask the court to reject the testimony of one witness in preference for the evidence of the discredited witness. It is not competent for the prosecution to discredit one and accredit the other.

IT IS WITNESS WHO IS TO EXPLAIN INCONSISTENCY, NOT COUNSEL

A line of decisions of this court, including Onubogu v. The State (1974) 9 SC.1 at p.20; Ateji v. The State (1976) 2 SC 79 at pp. 83 – 84; Boy Muka v. The State (1976) 9-10 SC 193 at p.205, has held that in such a situation there is a failure to prove the criminal allegation beyond reasonable doubt. The person to explain the inconsistency is a witness(es) called by the party in whose case there are inconsistencies or contradictions, and not the counsel from the Bar. Afterall, a bare statement from the Bar has no force of legal evidence. The law is settled that the courts do not accept argument of counsel as substitute for evidence.

— Eko, JSC. Anyanwu v. PDP (2020) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1710) 134

HOST OF WITNESSES IS NOT NEEDED FOR SUCCEEDING

In OCHIBA v. THE STATE (2011) LPELR 8245 (SC) where it was held as follows: “I need to say it that it is settled Law that the prosecution was not obliged to call a host of witnesses in order to discharge the burden placed on it to prove the charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as dictated by section 138(1) of the Evidence Act. A sole witness like P.w.1, who has given credible and clear evidence which was believed by the trial Judge, will suffice. See OBUE V THE STATE (1976) 2 SC 141; SADAM v THE STATE [2010] 12 SC (PT.1) 73 at 87-88; AKPAN v THE STATE [1991] 3 NWLR (PT 182) 695”.

DEMEANOUR OF WITNESSES IN THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

The trial Judge should take into consideration the demeanour of witnesses in the evaluation of evidence. Demeanour, which is outward or overt behaviour or manner of a witness, is the exclusive domain of the trial Judge. It includes all open habits and mannerisms of the witness. These ooze out from the body of the witness spontaneously and not tutored. Some of such body movements include a spontaneous positive or negative reaction to a question; shouting at a particular moment or the opposite action of a pretentious mum conduct; movement of part of the body, particularly the hands and the sudden change in the face arising either from anger or happiness, the latter resulting in either a smile or laughter. Another is a sudden remorse on the part of the witness, usually exhibited by refusal to look at the Judge or Counsel, or others in the court, but a sudden drop of the face in the witness box. There are quite a number of behaviours in the determination of demeanour which cannot be exhausted. I can stop with the above as the major conducts of witnesses. I should complete the picture by saying that as appellate judges are deprived of watching the demeanour of witnesses, trial Judges owe the administration of justice a big duty to arrive at the correct conclusion. Of course appellate Judges are not completely hopeless or helpless. They can watch the evaluation of demeanour by the Judge in the cold records.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008