At the hearing of this appeal on 19 October 2015, the learned senior counsel to the 1st and 2nd respondents urged us to discountenance it as it was in contrast with what a reply brief is supposed to contain and he therefore A urged us to discountenance it. In his response, the learned senior counsel for the appellant felt otherwise and had explained that his reply brief is competent and should not be discountenanced. I have closely studied the appellant’s reply brief. I share the view of the learned silk for the 1st and 2nd respondents that large portion of the appellant’s reply brief contains repetition of submissions and arguments earlier advanced by the appellant in his main brief. The learned silk for the appellant merely succeeded in amplifying or fine-tuning them. It therefore does not qualify as what a reply brief should contain. It is trite law that the purpose of filing a reply brief to a respondent’s brief by an appellant is simply to reply to new points which were raised or canvassed in the respondent’s brief of argument. It is therefore not meant to be used to put right or fill any lacunae or error in the appellant’s brief or to fine-tune, repeat or amplify arguments proffered by the respondent in the respondent’s brief of argument. The instant appellant’s reply brief is therefore unnecessary, since it is largely a repetition of the arguments or submissions earlier made or provided in the appellant’s main brief of argument. I therefore for that reason, hereby discountenance the repetitive portions of the appellant’s reply brief and shall refuse to consider them. See Popoola v. Adeyemo (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt. 257) 1; Shuaibu v. Maihodu (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 284) 784; Chukwuogor v. Attorney-General of Cross Rivers State (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt. 534) 375; Ojiogu v. Ojiogu and Anor. (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 538) 840, (2010) 1 SC 13.
— Sanusi, JSC. Wike Nyesom v. Peterside, APC, INEC, PDP (SC. 718/2015, 27 Oct 2015)
