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PROPER EVALUATION OF FACT NEEDS NO INTERFERENCE FROM APPELLATE COURT

Dictum

The law is also common knowledge that where a trial Court fails to properly discharge that primary duty or the evaluation value ascribed to and inference/findings made thereon cannot be supported by the evidence adduced before that Court, then an appellate Court is entitled to intervene and interfere with such decisions of the trial Court … However where a trial Court has unquestionably and properly evaluated the evidence adduced before it, an appellate Court has no business to and is usually slow in interfering with decisions arising from such an exercise.

– M.L. Garba JCA. Odogwu v. Vivian (2009) – CA/PH/345/05

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EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE; INTERFERENCE BY APPELLATE COURT

It has long been established that the function of the evaluation of evidence is essentially that of the trial Court, Igago v State (1999) LPELR – 1442 (SC) 27; Onuoha V. The State [1998] 5 NWLR (pt. 548) 118. Where the trial Court has unquestionably, evaluated evidence and, justifiably, appraised the facts, it is not the business of an appellate Court to interfere, and to substitute its own views for the view of the trial Court. – Nweze JSC. Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2019)

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CASES SHOULD BE DECIDED ON ITS OWN FACTS

It is also of paramount importance to always have it as a central theme that each case must be examined and decided on its own facts and circumstances as no two cases are alike in all particulars.

– Gumel, JCA. Ehanire v. Erhunmwuse (2007)

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WHERE FACTS PROPERLY APPRAISED, COURT OF APPEAL SHOULD NOT SUBSTITUTE VIEWS FOR TRIAL COURT

It is settled that where a court of trial unquestionably evaluates the evidence and appraises the facts it is not the business of a Court of Appeal to substitute its own views for the trial court. It is equally settled that a Court of Appeal should not easily disturb the findings of fact of a trial Judge who had the singular opportunity of listening to the witnesses and watching their performance although such findings of fact or the inferences drawn from them may be questioned in certain circumstances (See for example Akinola v. Fatoyimbo Oluwo & 0rs ( 1962) 1 SCNLR 352: (1962) 1 All NLR 244: Fabumiyi & 0rs. V. Obaje & Anor (1968) NMLR 242; Fatoyinbo Williams (1956) SCNLR 274: (1956) 1 FSC 87.

— Kutigi, JSC. Awaogbo & Ors. v. Eze (1995) – SC.69/1991

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WHEN FINDING OF FACT IS SAID TO BE PERVERSE

A finding of fact is said to be perverse – (a) Where it runs counter to the evidence and pleadings. (b) Where it has been shown that the trial court took into account matters which it ought not to have taken into account. (c) Where the trial court shuts its eyes to the obvious. (d) When the decision has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. State v. Agie (2000) 11 NWLR pt. 678 pg. 434 Atolagbe v. Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR pt.2 pg. 360 Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR pt. 80 pg.1. Akinloye v. Eyiyola (1968) NWLR 92.

— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Mini Lodge v. Ngei (2009) – SC.231/2006

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A COMPLAINT IS CHARACTERISED BY THE CASE FACTS SUBMITTED – (African Court)

The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on what qualifies as a complaint is defined as the purpose or legal basis of the claim, The complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on.

– CHACHA v. THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (003/2012) [2014] AFCHPR 48 para 120

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APPELLATE COURT WILL NOT UPSET FINDING OF FACT MADE BY TRIAL COURT UNLESS

The law remains that an Appellate Court is reluctant to upset a finding of fact made by a trial court which had the opportunity of listening to witnesses testify and observing their demeanour and that evaluation of evidence and the ascription of probative value thereto are the primary functions of a trial court which saw, heard and assessed the witnesses. Where a trial court clearly evaluated the evidence of the parties and justifiably appraised the facts, it is not the business of an Appellate Court to substitute its own views of the facts for those of the trial court. It is only where the trial court is proved to have abdicated this function or in carrying out the function makes an unsound finding that an Appellate Court can justifiably step in to do so or set aside such unsound finding for being perverse. (See Oduwole v Aina (2001) 17 NWLR (Part 741) 1 at 47 and Udengwu v Uzuegbu (2003) 13 NWLR (Part 836) 36 at 156).

— Onnoghen JSC. Ndukwe v LPDC [2007] – SC 48/2003

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