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POWER TO TRANSFER CASE TO ANOTHER DIVISION IS DISCRETIONARY – FHC

Dictum

There is no doubt that the starting point with regards to the territorial jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is the statutorily codified and judicially noticed principle that the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is one and nationwide. It is also however settled that same has been divided into Judicial Divisions and where a crime has been committed, such crime ought to be prosecuted in the Judicial Division of the Federal High Court in the State or States where any of the elements of the crime was allegedly committed, or one that is close to it, subject to the power of transfer, by which a matter may be tried outside the State of commission upon compelling reasons to so do. The foregoing is in my view the import of the Provisions of Sections, Section 45 of the Federal high Court Act; and Sections 93, 98, 385, 386 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, relied on by both parties. — J.Y. Tukur, JCA. Fani-Kayode v. FRN & Ors. (2019) – CA/L/722C/2018

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THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IS BASED ON FACTS

In ADIGWE v. FRN (2015) 18 NWLR (pt. 1490) 105 this Court reiterated the point that “the exercise of discretion is not based on mere judgment of the person doing so but upon facts on circumstances necessary for the proper exercise of that discretion”. See also OYEGUN v. NZERIBE (2010) 41 NSCQR 127 at 147.

— E. Eko, JSC. Francis v. FRN (2020) – SC.810/2014

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WHERE A PARTY HAS SEVERAL OPTIONS, HE COULD USE ANYONE HE WANTS

It is now trite law that where a party is by law given the option or discretion to exercise his right in different ways it is not for an opponent to prescribe the particular form the other party should utilize and where the form adopted by the other party is not what the opponent feels is the right course, then automatically an abuse of court process would be said to have taken place. There were options open to the respondent to tackle the scenario before him and he cannot be confined to the only choice of a counter claim to the appellant’s counter claim to ventilate his own grouse or grievance even though at the base is the same contract or facts since he had the alternative of bringing a fresh action so that all that he needs say would be brought to the fore. He had that right and he was at liberty to take it and did so. I have therefore no difficulty in flowing along with what the court of Appeal did as I see no error in their decision in upholding that the fresh action filed by the respondent was in order and the integrity of the court was not jeopardized. I refer to the case of Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156 at 170.

— M. Peter-Odili JSC. R-Benkay Nigeria Limited. V. Cadbury Nigeria Limited (SC.29/2006, 23 Mar 2012)

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COURTS WILL NOT BE SILENT EVEN WHERE THERE IS DISCRETION ON EXECUTIVE

The decision of the House of Lords in Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Limited (1920) A.C. 508 – dealing with the issue of payment of compensation by the Crown to a subject in respect of property requisitioned for the prosecution of the war – established the principle that in the protection of the property of the subject, the Crown was liable to pay compensation to the subject for the acquisition of the property, the exigencies of the war notwithstanding. Even amidst the clash of arms, they said, the courts would not be silent.

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DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURT WILL ONLY BE INTERFERED WITH WHERE IT IS ABSURD

In ANYAH v. AFRICAN NEWSPAPER OF NIG. LTD. [1992] NWLR (Pt. 247) Pg.319; (1992) LPELR-511 (SC) Pg.20-21, Paras. G – A the Supreme Court of Nigeria pertinently stated that: “It is not in all cases that an appeal Court will interfere with the exercise of discretion by a trial judge, simply because it did not favour one of the parties litigating before him. The Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion in the absence of proof that it was wrongly exercised. You cannot lay down hard and fast rules as to the exercise of judicial discretion by a Court, for the moment you do that, the discretion is fettered.” See also the decision of the Supreme Court in OLATUBOSUN v. TEXACO NIG. PLC (2012) LPELR-7805 (SC) Pg. 18, Paras. C – D where it was held that “…an appellate Court like ours will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court below merely because this Court would have acted differently…This Court will only interfere where the discretion exercised is manifestly wrong, arbitrary, reckless and injudicious.” Also, in FALEYE and ORS v. DADA and ORS (2016) LPELR- 40297 (SC) Pg.33-34, Paras. E – C, the Supreme Court of Nigeria per MUHAMMAD JSC held as follows: “…This Court has stated it times without number that it is none of its functions or indeed that of an appellate Court to substitute its own views of the evidence for those of the trial Court that is better placed to deal with those matters. The appellate High Court could only have interfered with findings of facts of the trial Customary Court when the findings are perverse and/or consequent upon improper exercise of judicial discretion further resulting in miscarriage of justice…”

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DISCRETIONARY POWERS JUDICIALLY EXERCISED

Discretionary powers judicially and judiciously exercised cannot be interfered with. One must let the decision of the lower court be. – M.D. Muhammad, J.C.A. Shona-Jason v Omega Air (2005) – CA/L/418/2000

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APPELLATE COURT INTERFERENCE WITH TRIAL COURTS DISCRETION

It needs to be emphasised here that an appellate Court will usually not interfere with an exercise of discretion in its quest to obtain substantial justice except where it is satisfied that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or illegally or without due regard to all necessary consideration having regard to the circumstances of the particular case. – Nweze JSC. Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2019)

Even then, it is well – established that an appellate Court will not, in principle, interfere with the exercise of discretion by the trial Court unless that discretion is shown to have been exercised upon wrong principles or that the exercise was tainted with some illegality or substantial irregularity. – Nweze JSC. Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2019)

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