Clearly, it seems to me that the discretionary power of the court to punish for contempt is reviewable. Any reviewing authority is undoubtedly invited to make an objective assessment of a matter under consideration. To, therefore, hold as the lower court did, that the test regarding the power of the court to punish for contempt is subjective, is with respect, unacceptable.
– Achike JCA. Adeyemi v. Edigin (1990)
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✓ In the case of IZUORA V. QUEEN 13 WACA 313 the Appellant who was a legal practitioner had concluded arguments in a divorce matter and he sought for permission to be absent on the day judgment was to be delivered. The permission was granted by the Judge but it was withdrawn when Counsel on the other side also sought to be excused. For reasons that are not quite clear, the Appellant failed to appear before the Court on the day judgment was to be delivered. The learned Trial Judge convicted him and sentenced him for contempt of Court. In allowing his appeal and setting aside the conviction and sentence, the Court decided that not every act of discourtesy or breach of Counsel’s duty to clients would amount to contempt capable of being summarily punished, without much ado or brevi manu.
✓ In AGBACHOM V. THE STATE (1970) 1 ALL NLR 71 AT 80, the learned Trial Judge punished for contempt a party to an action before him and who had deposed to a fact in an affidavit in support of an application seeking for the transfer of the matter to another Judge. That paragraph of the affidavit stated that the learned Judge had accepted a part payment of a debt which was owed to him when he was a legal practitioner by one of the parties in the instant matter. After referring to Lord Denning in R. V. METROPOLITAN POLICE COMMISSIONER (1968) 2 ALL ER 319 at 320 Lord Goddard in SHAMDASANI V. KING EMPEROR (1945) AC 264 the Supreme emphasized that a Court must be careful in the exercise of its powers to punish for contempt. The Court emphasized that the power must be used sparingly and only in serious cases.
✓ In BOYO V. A.G. MID-WEST STATE (1971) 1 ALL NLR 343 AT 352, the Supreme Court per Ademola, CJN of 354 held that generally, contempt in the face of the Court cannot be dealt with efficiently except immediately by the very judicial officer in whose presence the offence was committed and where the offence should be dealt with summarily such a hearing must be conducted in accordance with the cardinal principle of fair process. It was also held that the case of criminal contempt capable of being punished summarily must be one in which the facts surrounding the alleged contempt are so notorious as to be virtually incontestable. This means that scrupulous care must be brought to bear on the facts and circumstances making sure that the case is very clear and beyond reasonable doubt.
It is trite that contempt of Court is an office sui generis. An application for committal for any disobedience of an order of Court is a very serious matter as it involves in most cases an exceptional interference with the liberty of a subject and therefore when any antecedent process has to be put in motion every prescribed step and rule however technical should be carefully taken, observed and insisted upon. Any irregularity in the procedure for committed is a fundamental vice which vitiates the entire application.
– P.O. Elechi, JCA. Mofunanya v. Nwadiogbu (2017) – CA/E/282/2009
A superior Court of record has the inherent jurisdiction to deal with contempt in facie curiae and punish for the offence summarily.
– Chima Centus Nweze, J.S.C. Independent National Electoral Commission & Anor v. Ejike Oguebego & Ors (2017)
Above all, the case must be one the facts surrounding the alleged contempt are so notorious as to be virtually incontestable, where the Judge would have to rely on evidence or testimony of witnesses to events occurring outside his view and outside of his presence in Court, he should not try the case himself. The matter must be placed before another judge where the usual procedure for the arrest, charge and prosecution of the offender must be followed, Oku v. The State. In other words, in the trial of criminal contempt ex facie curiae, an offender is entitled to the benefit of a full process of a criminal trial.
– Chima Centus Nweze, J.S.C. Independent National Electoral Commission & Anor v. Ejike Oguebego & Ors (2017)
In First African Trust Bank Limited and Anor v. Basil O. Ezegbu and Anor (supra) at 151 Karibi Whyte, JSC, spoke so incisively, about these exceptions thus: “In my respectful opinion, the rule precluding hearing a contemnor before the Court is founded on principle. To every rule there are always exceptions. The exceptions to the general rule that a party in contempt may not be heard as distilled from the authorities referred to (supra) are:
(1) Where the party is seeking for leave to appeal against the order of which he is in contempt;
(2) Where the opposition to the order is one on the ground of lack of jurisdiction;
(3) Where the contemnor is seeking to be heard in defence of the Order and
(4) Where it can be shown that there were certain procedural irregularities in making of the orders which irregularities make the order unsustainable.
– Chima Centus Nweze, J.S.C. Independent National Electoral Commission & Anor v. Ejike Oguebego & Ors (2017)
Committal for contempt in the face of the Court is by way of a brevi manu procedure. This allows the Judge to be the accuser, prosecutor, jury and Judge all rolled into one. It is a negation of some of the very well-known principles upon which our common law oriented adjudicatory mechanism are founded upon. Of great and utmost concern is the total derogation of one of the pillars of the principles of natural justice; where it is not allowed for one to be a Judge in his own case- Nemo judex in causa sua, in the brevi manu procedure.
– A.A.B. Gumel, JCA. Alechenu v. AG Benue (2011) – CA/J/220/2002
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