PLAINTIFF MUST RELY ON HIS OWN STRENGTH, NOT WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENCE

THE APPELLANTS COULD NOT SUBSTANTIATE THE NARCOTICS FINE AGAINST THE 2ND RESPONDENT

What matters always in this kind of situation is that there must be proof of such a sentence. A criminal conviction and sentence must be proved by the CTC of the judgment of court delivered or any admissible way of proving same and the said judgment must reflect all the ingredients of a valid judgment to bind the parties concerned. This is unfortunately where the Appellants could not proceed further or substantiate the sentence of fine against the 2nd Respondent. At page 3228 (vol.5) of the record, PW1 and PW12, who gave evidence on the US proceedings did not dispute the fact that the 2nd Respondent was not at any time, charged before any court, caused to make a plea, convicted or sentenced for any offence. Similarly, at page 3464 ( vol.5) of the record, RW2, a US attorney and an associate of the 2nd Respondent, testified that the 2nd Respondent was never convicted or fined for any criminal offence in the United States. In fact, PW1 confirmed that the proceedings in Exhibit PA5 series are civil proceedings, while equally admitting that he never mentioned anything about charge in the proceedings and that he never had one. By virtue of section 135 of the Evidence Act, it is beyond peradventure that the proof of this allegation ought to be beyond reasonable doubt. Section 249 of the Evidence Act clearly prescribes the manner of discharging this proof, by the provision of “certificate purporting to be given under the hand of a police officer” from the US, “containing a copy of the sentence or order and the finger prints of the 2nd Respondent or photographs of the finger prints of the said 2nd Respondent, together with evidence that the finger prints of the person so convicted are those of the 2nd Respondent. See PML (NIG.) LTD. V. F.R.N. (2018) 7 NWLR (PT. 1619) 448 AT 493.

— Uwani Abba Aji JSC. Peter Obi & Anor. v. INEC & Ors. (SC/CV/937/2023, Thursday the 26th day of October 2023)

HOW COURT ARRIVES IN DETERMINING PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE

In determining either the preponderance of evidence or the balance of probabilities in the evidence, the court is involved in some weighing by resorting to the imaginary scale of justice in its evaluation exercise. Accordingly, proof by preponderance of evidence simply means that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff,(in our context the petitioner or appellant) should be put on one side of the imaginary scale mentioned in Mogaji v Odofin (1978) 3 SC 91 and the evidence adduced by the defendant (in our context, all the respondents) put on the other side of that scale and weighed together to see which side preponderates. In arriving at the preponderance of evidence, the Court of Appeal in its capacity as a court (tribunal) of first instance need not search for an exact mathematics figure in the imaginary “weighing machine” because there is in fact and in law no such machine and therefore no figures, talk less of mathematical exactness. On the contrary, the Court of Appeal, in its capacity as a court (tribunal) of first instance, should rely on its judicial and judicious mind to arrive at when the imaginary scale preponderates; and that is the standard, though oscillatory and at times nervous. I will be guided by the above principles on burden and standard of proof when considering Issues 2 and 4 of the appellant’s Brief which I will take anon.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

THE TWO DISTINCT MEANINGS OF BURDEN OF PROOF

This position reminds one of the decision of this Court in Elemo v Omolade (1968) NMLR 359, where it was held that burden of proof has two distinct and frequently confusing meanings. It means: (a) the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleadings; the burden as it has been called of establishing a case whether by preponderance of evidence or beyond reasonable doubt; and (b) the burden of proof in the sense of introducing evidence. As regards the first meaning attached to the term, “burden of proof”, this rests upon the party whether plaintiff or defendant who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. It is fixed at the beginning of the trial by the state of the pleadings and it is settled as a question of law, remaining unchanged throughout the trial exactly where the pleadings place it and never shifting in any circumstances whatever. In deciding what party asserts the affirmative, regard must be had to the substance of the issue, and not merely to its grammatical form which later the pleader can frequently vary at will. A negative allegation must not be confounded with the mere traverse of an affirmative one. The true meaning of the rule is that where a given allegation whether affirmative or negative forms an essential part of a party’s case, the proof of such allegation rests on him. While the burden in the first sense is always stable, the burden of proof in the second sense may shift consistently more as one scale of evidence or the other preponderates. In this sense, the onus probandi rests upon the parties who would fail if no evidence at all or no more evidence is gone into upon the party asserting the affirmative or the party against whom the tribunal at the time the question arises would give judgment if no further evidence were adduced. The test as to who is to begin is determined by asking how judgment would be entered on the pleadings if no evidence at all were given on either side. The party against whom judgment would in that event be given is entitled to begin.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

STANDARD OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

It was not for the appellant to prove that the stick he held did not and could not cause the injuries. It is for the prosecution to prove that its use caused the injuries. The burden does not shift. The standard of proof required is very high. On this point, Lord Diplock says – In criminal proceedings, by an exception to the general rule founded upon considerations of public policy. If the consequence of a finding that a particular fact is proved will be the conviction of the defendant the degree of probability must be so high as to exclude any reasonable doubt that that fact exists. Generally speaking, no onus lies upon a defendant in criminal proceedings to prove or disprove any fact; it is sufficient for his acquittal if any of the acts, which, if they existed, would constitute the offence with which he is charged are ‘not proved’ Per Lord Diplock in Public Prosecutor v. Yuvavaj (1970) A.C. 913 at 921.

— Obaseki, JSC. Adie v. State (1980) – SC24/1978

WHERE ACCUSED PLEADS GUILTY PROSECUTION BURDEN BECOMES LIGHT

OMOJU v. FRN (2008) LPELR – 2647 (SC), Tobi JSC (of blessed memory), considered the effect of an accused person’s plea of guilt on the burden placed on the prosecution where my noble Lord held thus: “The law is elementary that if an accused person pleads guilty, the burden of proof placed on the prosecution becomes light, like a feather of an ostrich. It no longer remains the superlative and compelling burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. After all, the guilty plea has considerably shortened the distance and brought in some proximity the offence and mens rea or actus reus of the accused as the case may be. That makes it easier to locate causation or causa sine qua non.”