It is settled law that issues for trial by the Court are joined in the pleadings and that parties and indeed the Court are bound by the pleadings of the parties. The Petitioners’ case stands to collapse if no evidence is called on the issue. See ORUWARI V. OSLER (2012) LPELR-19764 (SC) and KUBOR & ANOR V. DICKSON & ORS (2012) LPELR-9817 (SC).
— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Atiku v PDP (CA/PEPC/05/2023, 6th of September, 2023)
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I concede that it is not necessary to plead law before reliance can be placed on it. It is sufficient to plead material facts which will lead to a certain legal result, and once sufficient material facts have been pleaded, the inference to be drawn from such pleaded facts and the particulars of the law to be relied upon for such an inference need not be pleaded. See Vandervell’s Trust (No.2), White v. Vandervell Trustees Ltd. (1974) 3 All E.R. 205 at 213; Anyanwu v. Mhara (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 242) 386 at 398 etc.
— Iguh, JSC. Onamade v ACB (1997) – SC.199/1990
Anah v. Nnacho (1965) NMLR 28 at 31 the Supreme Court in considering a general traverse stated thus: “Now it seems clear that the cumulative effect of these two paragraphs is that the appellants joined issue with respondents in respect of all the lands described in the pink area of Exhibit 2. By common practice a general traverse in the form of paragraph 15 of the statement of defence has always been accepted and when employed it puts the opponent to proof of the facts stated or alleged.”
In the case of Osondu Co Ltd. and Anor v. Akhigbe (1999) LPELR – 1433 (SC), the Supreme Court per Uwaifo, JSC, held as follows: “It must be realized that pleadings is a statement of candour as to what a party to a case relies on to prove or defend a cause. It ought to be made as clear as it possibly can, not evasive or misleading or ambiguous. Each party must endeavor to place and must be presumed to have placed, all necessary pleadable acts on record the best way it can in order to achieve the best of its case. It must put the other party and the Court on a firm understanding of what the issues joined or denied, or issues admitted or not admitted. Pleadings are the guiding light by which all concerned trace the path to the justice of a case. That path should not be hampered by and littered with stumbling blocks of uncertainties, misrepresentations and ambushes embedded in the averments. That will be an effort to spring surprises and will not be proper pleadings. As was said by Phillimore J., in The Why Not (1888) LR 2A and E. 265 and quoted with approval in Enwezor v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1976) 3 SC 45 at 56 Per Madarikan, JSC, pleadings “…are not to be considered as constituting a game of skill between the advocates. They ought to be so framed as not only to assist the party in the statement of his case but the Court in its investigation of the truth between the litigants.”
A general traverse is not an effective denial of essential or material averments in the opposing party’s pleading. – Kekere-Ekun, J.S.C. Union Bank v. Chimaeze (2014)
While I come to the conclusion that the appellants did not plead co-ownership, I should not be taken as making the point that they should have included in their pleadings, the legal word of co-ownership or its synonym joint-ownership. That is not what I mean. As a matter of law, a party cannot plead law in his pleadings. Although there are exceptions here and there to this general principle of law, particularly as it relates to the plea of some specific defences to certain actions, the matter before me, does not extend to that. All that the appellants were expected to do was to plead enough facts upon which the law of co-ownership can stand and keep its shoulders high, awaiting the lawyer to replenish it with either statutory authorities or decided case. But that was not done here, and the trial Judge, could not have supplied it. .
— Tobi, JCA. Abraham v Olorunfunmi (1990) – CA/L/83/89
The position of the Appellant’s learned Counsel that the Appellant did not need to plead the provisions of p.4 of the Chinese Regulation concerning the transport of hazardous goods stems from the stated position that pleadings need no longer be technical and that it is no longer necessary to plead statutes and sections of statutes but that it is sufficient if the material facts only are pleaded.
– O. Daniel-Kalio, JCA. Egypt v. Abdoulaye (2017) – CA/K/540/2014
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