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NATURE OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Dictum

The definition of false imprisonment from the learned authors of Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 14th Edition at page 681 is found quite apt in the resolution of this head of claim. The tort of false imprisonment is defined as follows:- “A false imprisonment is complete deprivation of liberty for anytime however short without lawful cause, imprisonment is no other thing but the restraint of a man’s liberty whether it be in the open field, or in the stocks or in the cage in the street, or in a man’s own house, as well as in the common goalie; and in all the places the party so restrained is said to be a prisoner so long as he hath not his liberty freely to go at all times to all places whither he will without bait or main praise or otherwise. The prisoner may be confined within a definite space by being put under lock and key or his movements may simply be constrained by the will of another”. The law will support a person who had good reasons to make a report to the police on an offence so long as he wants them to use their own discretion in taking further steps. An action for false imprisonment will not lie against an individual who merely gave information to the police, on their initiative to arrest a suspect. However a party to an action for false imprisonment may succeed, if he can prove that it was the other party that was actively responsible in setting the law in motion against him.

— S.D. Bage JCA. Arab Contractors (O.A.O.) Nigeria Ltd. V. Gillian Umanah (CA/L/445M/09, 26 April 2012)

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DETENTION OF PERSONS ON DISPUTE OVER COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IS NOT GOOD

Detention of persons on disputes over purely commercial transactions will have the effect of scaring away investors and this will ultimately affect negatively the economy of our country. Security Agencies should be circumspect in making detention orders and extracting money from parties in civil contract.

— P.A. Galinje JSC. Diamond Bank Plc V. H.R.H. Eze (Dr) Peter Opara & Ors. (SC.375/2012, 9 March 2018)

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TO PROVE FALSE IMPRISONMENT, PARTY MUST SHOW THAT THE OTHER WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN SETTING THE LAW AGAINST HIM

It is therefore apparent that the detention of the Respondent and the seizure of the vehicle by the police were illegal acts. Now the question that calls for determination is: Can the Appellant be held responsible for these acts? Every private individual has the right to report a crime or a suspected crime to the police. This on its own cannot ground an action for false imprisonment against the private individual. The Supreme Court in Isheno v. Julius Berger (Nig.) Plc.  (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1084) 582 at 597 held that: “The position of the law is that an action for false imprisonment will not lie against a private individual who merely gave information which led the police on their initiative to arrest a suspect.” In Okonkwo v. Ogbogu (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 449) 420 at 433, the Supreme Court per Ogwuegbu JSC held as follows: “To succeed in an action for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must show that it was the defendant who was actively instrumental in setting the law in motion against him.” Thus, for a party to succeed in an action for false imprisonment, the party must prove that it was the other party that was actively responsible in setting the law in motion against him.

— M. Ogunwumiju JCA. Arab Contractors (O.A.O.) Nigeria Ltd. V. Gillian Umanah (CA/L/445M/09, 26 April 2012)

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WHAT COURT WILL CONSIDER IN FALSE IMPRISONMENT; MALICE

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the determination of whether the Appellant was actively responsible for the arrest of the Respondent and the illegal detention of the vehicle is a matter of fact. The court must consider several things. For instance whether there was reasonable and probable cause which led the Appellant to lodge a complaint to the police. Also, the court has to consider the presence or absence of malice in the act of the Appellant. It should be noted here that malice in this form of action is not to be considered in the sense of spite or hatred against the Respondent but of malus animus and as denoting that the appellant was actuated by improper and indirect motives. See ODUWOLE and ORS v. WEST (2010); AGUOMBA v. UWAIS (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 346) 440 at 467; BAKARE v. IBRAHIM (1973) 6 S.C. 147. It is my humble opinion then, that there are two things this court must consider in the determination of this issue. Was there probable cause on the part of the Appellant which led it to report the matter to the police? Did the Appellant act maliciously?

— M. Ogunwumiju JCA. Arab Contractors (O.A.O.) Nigeria Ltd. V. Gillian Umanah (CA/L/445M/09, 26 April 2012)

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