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MURDER AND BAIL; IT MAY NOT BE PROPER TO KEEP ACCUSED IN CUSTODY JUST BECAUSE MURDER IS ALLEGED AGAINST HIM

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In the case of Christian Diogu v. The Commissioner of Police (2000) 1 K.L.R. (Pt. 94) 195 the appellant was charged for conspiracy and murder before the Chief Magistrate’s Court, Onitsha. The Chief Magistrate remanded the appellant in custody. He applied to the High Court for a bail. The High Court dismissed his application on the ground that it would not be in public interest to admit the applicant to bail. The applicant then appealed to the Court of Appeal, Enugu Division. The Court of Appeal in granting bail was of the view that it would be dangerous to merely arrest citizens of this country on allegation of murder without substantial facts in support and keep them in custody merely because they are being accused of murder. From the facts of that case the prosecution did not even provide the court with proof of evidence to show that there was a prima facie case of murder against the appellant.

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bail, murder

INGREDIENTS FOR A CONVICTION OF MURDER

The law has been long established in a legion of judicial authorities that before an Accused person can be convicted for the offence of murder, the prosecution is duty bound to prove the following ingredients beyond reasonable doubt: a) That the deceased died; b) That it was the unlawful act or omission of the Appellant which caused the death of the deceased; and c) That the act or omission of the accused which caused the death of the deceased was intentional with the knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence.

– Adamu Jauro, JSC. Enabeli v. State (2021)

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APPLICANT FOR FORFEITURE OF BAIL BOND MUST DO SO TIMEOUSLY

It is a settled principle of law and in a community reading of the provisions of Sections 137, 141 and 143 of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA), that when an accused person/defendant is granted bail and he jumps it, the trial Court may, upon noticing such a breach by the accused/defendant may: i. revoke the bail, ii. issue a bench warrant for his arrest, iii. order the forfeiture of the bail bond, and iv. upon forfeiture of the bail bond, order the surety (sureties) to (each) pay the sum stated in the bond into the Court’s Registry. My lords, from the analysis given above from the decisions of the two lower Courts, it is clear that the two Courts are in concurrence on the finding that the appellant adopted wrong procedure in its application. Certainly, the law has its set out procedures in pursuance of applications relating to bail and perfection of bail bond and or its forfeiture as envisaged by Sections 137, 141 and 143 of the CPA or their similar provisions in other enactments. Therefore, an applicant for forfeiture of bail bond, such as in this matter, must do so timeously and should commence the procedure the moment the accused fails to appear in Court to attend to his trial.

— I.T. Muhammad, JSC. FRN v Maishanu (2019) – SC.51/2015

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INGREDIENTS TO PROVE MURDER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

It ought to have been established and is a well settled law too, that in a case of murder under Section 316 of the Criminal Code, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the underlisted ingredients of the offence; namely: (a) That death of a human being has been caused (b) That it was the act of the accused that caused or led to the death of the deceased. (c) That the act or acts were done with the intention of causing death; or (d) The accused knew that death would be the probable consequence of his act or acts See Omini Vs The State (1999) 12 NWLR (pt.630) 168 or (1999) 9 SC 1; Abogede V The State (1996); Ogba v The State (1992) 2 NWLR (pt.222) 164.

— Amiru Sanusi, JSC. Ogunleye Tobi v The State (2019) – SC.714/2017

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MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED BEFORE BAIL IS GRANTED NEED NOT BE NECESSARILY ADMISSIBLE DURING TRIAL

There are paragraphs 10, 11, 18, 19 and 20 which also tend to implicate the appellant as to the procurement of weapons used for committing some of the crimes, the foreboding in the sudden killing in suspicious circumstances of the armourer who was a vital witness, and how proposed witnesses are now afraid of their safety. These are not matters that should be glossed over. Some of them may not be admissible as evidence in the main trial but they are certainly worthy to be taken into account in an application for bail pending trial. That does not necessarily prejudice the presumed innocence of the appellant of the charge brought against him until the contrary is proved, but it at least tries to ensure avoidable interruptions of the trial.

— Uwaifo, JSC. Bamaiyi v State (SC 292/2000, Supreme Court, 6th April 2001)

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AN ACCUSED PERSON PRESUMED GUILTY SHOULD NOT BE UNNECESSARILY REMANDED IN CUSTODY

An accused person is not in jurisprudence a person presumed guilty but is given the benefit of being innocent until the contrary is proved. This pre-supposes that he is not to be bounded or be punished or remanded in custody for an unnecessarily long time without a reasonable cause to defeat the course of justice. In other words, he has to be treated humanely and given all the constitutional rights that are allowed to a citizen.

— Pats-Acholonu JCA. Vincent Ogueri v. The State (12th July 2000)

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CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE A PERSON IS DEEMED TO UNLAWFULLY KILL ANOTHER

A person who unlawfully kills another under any of the following circumstances is guilty of murder: (1) If the offender intends to cause the death of the person killed or that of some other person. Under this heading, the prosecution is bound to prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) that the deceased died; (b) that the death of the deceased resulted from the act of the accused; (c) that the act of the accused was intentional with the knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence. See Section 316(1) of the Criminal Code Cap 30 Vol. II Laws of Eastern Nigeria 1963 as applicable in Imo State of Nigeria under which the appellant was charged, tried, convicted and sentenced to death. See also Offorlete v. The State (2000) 80 LRCN 26 20; Effiong v. The State (1998) 59 LRCN 39 61; Richard Igago v. The State (1999) 73 LRCN 3502 at 3535. (2) If the offender intends to do to the deceased or to some other person some grievous harm. See Section 316(2) of the Criminal Code (supra); R v. Dim (1952) 14 WACA 154; R v. Adi (1955) 15 WACA 6. (3) If death is caused by means of an act done in the prosecution of an unlawful purpose, which act is of such a nature as to be likely to endanger human life. The unlawful act need not be a felony so long as it is likely to endanger human life. See Section 316 of the Criminal Code (supra); Obayi Asa v. The State (1976) 7 SC 173; Idowu v. The State (2000) LRCN 2788; R v. Attah (1961) 1 All NLR 590. (4) If the offender intends to do grievous harm to some person for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence which is such that the offender may be arrested without a warrant, or for purpose of facilitating the flight of an offender who has committed or attempted to commit any such offence. (5) If death is caused by administering any stupefying or overpowering things for either of the purposes in (4) above. (6) If death is caused by willfully stopping the breath of any person for either of such purpose. See Section 316(6) of the Criminal Code (supra).

— N.S. Ngwuta, JSC. Henry Nwokearu V. The State (SC.227/2011, 24 MAY 2013)

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