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JUDGEMENT NOT APPEALED IS BINDING

Dictum

The learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents objected to the brief filed by the 1st defendant/respondent on the ground that she did not file an appeal against the judgment of the lower court and she cannot be heard in her brief to support the appellant.
In reply the learned counsel for the 1st defendant/respondent submitted that he was at liberty to argue the appeal as long as he does not go outside the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant.
It should be noted that the 1st defendant/respondent did not defend the suit in the lower court. She also did not appeal against the judgment of the lower court. It will therefore be outrageous to allow her to argue her brief in favour of the appellant before this court. The whole case revolved on her in the lower court. She chose to do nothing before that court and did not appeal against the judgment of the lower court. The implication is that she is satisfied with the judgment of the lower court and cannot be allowed to argue the contrary in this court. The brief filed on her behalf is hereby discountenanced and struck out.

– Ogebe JCA. Ohiaeri v. Yusuf (2003)

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AN APPEAL DOES NOT ACT AS AN AUTOMATIC STAY OF EXECUTION

In Agba v. Okogbue (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.91) 747, I observed at page 753 G-H as follows:- “It must be clearly borne in mind that a stay of execution is never granted as a matter of course because section 18 of the Court of Appeal Act, 1976, enacts that an appeal under part 2 of the Act shall not operate as a stay of execution. The grounds of appeal filed against the judgment must therefore be tested under a microscopic mirror if the application is not a ruse to delay the enjoyment of the fruits of the judgment by the respondent. In so doing, it is wrong to suggest that a court is acting as if it is hearing an appeal because it has pointed out the absurdity of a ground of appeal in considering whether it is prima facie an arguable ground”.

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APPEAL AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE

Mogaji and Ors. v. Odofin and Ors. (1978) 4 S.C. 91 at 93, Fatayi-Williams J.S.C. (as he then was) said: “When an appellant complains that a judgment is against the weight of evidence, all he means is that when the evidence adduced by him is balanced against that adduced by the respondent, the judgment given in favour of the respondent is against the weight which should have been given to the totality of the evidence before him. In other words, the totality of the evidence should be considered in order to determine which has weight and which has no weight at all.”

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WHEN AN APPEAL IS ENTERED, THE APPEAL COURT IS SEISED OF THE WHOLE PROCEEDING

As observed earlier, there is a finding by the court below that there was a pending appeal before it as Appeal No. CA/L/133/93 which was entered on May 2, 1995. Now, in accordance with the provisions of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1981 (as amended) an appeal is said to be entered in the court when the record of proceedings in the trial court has been received in the Registry of the court. See: Order 1 Rule 22, Court of Appeal Rules (1981) (as amended); Order 4 Rule 10, Court of Appeal Rules, 2007 (as amended). Once it is so entered, an appeal is then said to be pending. The Rule governing the control of proceedings during pendency of an appeal is that after an appeal has been entered and until it has been finally disposed of, the court shall be seised of the whole of the proceedings as between the parties thereto and except as may be otherwise provided in the Rules, every application therein shall be made to the court and not to the court below (i.e. the trial), but any application may be filed in the trial court for transmission to the court below. See Order 4, Rule 11. Thus, in pursuance of the above provisions of the Court of Appeal Rules, the trial court will have no competence or jurisdiction to decide on any application whether on notice or ex-parte in relation to an appeal which the trial court has become FUNCTUS OFFICIO. If the trial court takes any step thereon, except for the purposes of transmitting the processes so filed to the Court of Appeal, that step taken will be declared a nullity.

— T. Muhammad, JSC. VAB Petroleum v. Momah (2013) – SC.99/2004

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ONLY FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WHICH ARE INCIDENTAL TO THE MAIN CLAIM CAN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE SUPREME COURT

✓ It is this clear that the jurisdiction to entertain any suit which seeks to enforce the observance of a fundamental right under chapter 4 of the Constitution, including the right of any person not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment guaranteed under section 31(1)(a), of the 1979 Constitution, ties only with the High Court of a State or a Federal High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is appellate and not original. See Attorney-General of Anambra State and others v. Attorney-General of the Federation and others (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.302) 692. However, constitutional issues which pertain only to the breach of a fundamental right in the course of trial or hearing before the lower courts may be raised in an appeal to the Supreme Court. Such issues are those that relate mainly to breach of the right to fair hearing and the right to personal liberty under sections 32 and 33 of the Constitution. Other rights such as right to life and those to private and family life, peaceful assembly and association and freedom of the press can only be enforced through a substantive action in the appropriate High Court and cannot be raised in an appellate court, including the Supreme Court, as being incidental to the proceedings in the lower courts. The appellate courts, inclusive of the Supreme Court, have no original jurisdiction to entertain, determine or pronounce on questions relating to an alleged breach of fundamental rights, especially where the issue involved or the redress invoked is not directly relevant or intrinsic to the determination, on the merit, of the appeal before them. — Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996

✓ The death row phenomenon was only raised obliquely and clearly extrinsically by the appellant in this appeal. The issue raised is whether the appellant’s confinement under sentence of death for an alleged unnecessarily prolonged length of time from the date of his conviction amounts to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to section 31(1)(a) of the Constitution thereby warranting the quashing of his death sentence and substituting the same with life imprisonment. This issue, in my view, is not properly before this court. The jurisdiction of this court to entertain and determine such constitutional question will only arise on appeal after both the High Court and the Court of Appeal have considered and adjudicated on the issue. This is exactly the procedure adopted in the foreign cases that were cited before us. — Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996

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APPEAL AGAINST A NONEXISTENT DECISION

I need only add that an appeal against a phantom or non-existent decision is an abuse of the Court’s process.

– Ejembi Eko, J.S.C. Mekwunye v. Emirates (2018) – SC.488/2014

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THERE IS NO RIGHT OF APPEAL ON AWARD OF COSTS

Generally there is no right of appeal against an award of costs except with leave of the High Court or of this court by virtue of section 241(2)(c) of the 1999 constitution. The exception to this provision of the constitution is where in addition to appeal as to costs, there is appeal on other issues or issue. See Anyaso v. Anyaso (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt 564) page 157. Ayanboye v. Balogun (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt 151) page 410.

— Abdu Aboki JCA. ACB v Ajugwo (2011) – CA/E/66/2006

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