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EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE IS THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF A TRIAL COURT

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“Courts of trial are expected to carry out their sacred duties of review, evaluation and appraisal, as ascription of probative values, when determining cases presented before them, so that as much as possible, cases are decided on admissible and credible evidence. The receipt of relevant evidence is an act of perception, while the evaluation of evidence and findings of facts by a trial Court involves both perception and evaluation. A trial Court that fails in this duty, fails in its duty of being an impartial arbiter in the adversarial system of the administration of justice – Guardian Newspaper V Ajeh (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1256) 574, 582. Thus the evaluation of relevant and material evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence, both oral and documentary, are the primary functions and within the domain of the trial Court which saw, heard and assessed the witnesses.”

— J.H. Sankey, JCA. Ibrahim Muli v Sali Akwai (2021) – CA/G/423/2019

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A TRIAL BY A COURT IS THE ONLY PERMITTED WAY TO PROVE GUILT – EXCLUSIVE TO THE COURT

ACTION CONGRESS v INEC (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 220 at 259 – 260, as follows: “The disqualification in Section 137(1) clearly involves a deprivation of right and a presumption of guilt for embezzlement or fraud in derogation of the safeguards in Section 36(1) and (5) of the Constitution. The trial and conviction by a Court is the only constitutionally permitted way to prove guilt and therefore the only ground for the imposition of criminal punishment or penalty for the criminal offences of embezzlement or fraud. Clearly, imposition of the penalty of disqualification for embezzlement or fraud solely on the basis of an indictment for those offences by an Administrative Panel of Enquiry implies a presumption of guilt, contrary to Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria, 1999, whereas, conviction for offences and imposition of penalties and punishments are matters appertaining exclusively to judicial power.” See also on this: AMAECHI v INEC & ORS (2008) LPELR-446(SC) at pages 49-51, paras. E F; OMOWAIYE v A.G. OF EKITI STATE & ANOR (2010) LPELR-4779(CA) at pages 28 – 28, paras. A F, per Nweze, JCA (as he then was); and ABDULKARIM & ORS v SHINKAFI & ORS (2008) LPELR 3555(CA) at pages 24 32, paras. A C.

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ASSESSMENT OF WITNESS IS WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE TRIAL COURT

In the case of Afolalu v. The State (2012) vol. 10 LRCNCC 30 at 40, ratio 13; (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1220) 584, when this court held, inter alia, that: “The assessment of credibility of a witness is a matter within the province of the trial court as it is the only court that has the advantage of seeing, watching and observing the witness in the witness box. The court also has the liberty and privilege of believing him and accepting his evidence in preference to the evidence adduced by the defence. On the issue of credibility of witnesses, the appraisal of evidence and the confidence to be reposed in the testimony of any witness, an appellate court cannot on printed evidence usurp the essential function of the trial court which saw, heard and watched the witnesses testify.”

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IT IS THE PRIMARY DUTY OF TRIAL COURT TO ASSESS WITNESSES

I fully subscribe to the well settled position of the law that an appellate Court which had not seen the witnesses testify and observe their demeanour in the witness stand, should respect the views of a trial Court and should not readily substitute its own views except where it is shown that the conclusion reached by the Court below was perverse. An appellate Court must always bear it in mind that the primary function of assessing the quality of evidence and ascribing probative value thereto is that of the trial Court, which heard and saw the witnesses testify. Thus, it is only when the findings of the trial Court have been demonstrated to be perverse as not flowing from the established and proved evidence or hinged on extraneous matters or for whatsoever other reasons not correct that an appellate Court would intervene to disturb such findings of fact and re-evaluate the evidence on the printed record, if so called upon by the Appellant to make proper findings in accordance with the dictates of justice. See Saeed v. Yakowa (2013) All FWLR (P. 692) 1650 @ p. 1681. See also Layinka v. Makinde (2002) FWLR (Pt. 109) 1557 @ p. 1570; Martins v. COP (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 666) 446 @ p. 460; Obajimi v. Adeobi (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1075) 1 @ p. 19. See also Owor v. Christopher (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 511) 962 @ p. 992; Sogbamu v. Odunaiya (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 700) 1247 @ p. 1307.

— B.A. Georgewill JCA. Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc V. Longterm Global Capital Limited & Ors. (CA/L/427/2016, 9 Mar 2018)

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A RETRIAL WILL NOT BE MADE WHERE THE PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PROVE HIS CASE

There are two options open to this court. 1. to remit the case to the trial court to be heard de novo by another judge, or 2. for this court to put itself in the shoes of the trial court and do what that court ought to have done after hearing arguments on the admissibility of both letters. It would be wrong to make an order of retrial if such an order would give the party that lost an opportunity a second time to prove what he failed to prove. A retrial should not be made where the plaintiff fails to prove his case and there is no substantial irregularity apparent on the record. See Thompson v. Arowolo (2003) 7 NWLR Pt.818 P.163 Solomon v. Magaji (1982) 11 SC. P.1. Wassah & Ors. v. Kara & Ors. (2014) – SC.309/2001

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HE IS NOT ON TRIAL FOR THAT

The Appellant himself testified that he was a narcotics dealer, but he is not on trial for that. – Ogunwumiju JCA. Okeke v. State (2016)

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VARIATIONS IN LPDC PANEL MEMBERS AFFECTS ITS’ FINAL DECISION

In Adeigbe & Anor v. Salami Kusimo & Ors (1965) LPELR -25226 (SC) this issue was properly explained by Ademola JSC (as he then was) as follows: “The complaint against a hearing that was not always before the same bench does not pertain to any matter that goes to the jurisdiction of the Court. It is at bottom a complaint that the judgment cannot be satisfactory on the ground that as the persons who gave it had not seen and heard all the witnesses, they could not appraise the evidence as a whole and decide the facts properly. Thus, it is a complaint on the soundness of the judgment itself, and not a complaint that is extrinsic to the adjudication, which is the test to apply when considering a submission on jurisdiction. We are therefore of the opinion that variations in the bench do not make the judgment a nullity; they may make it unsatisfactory, and it may have to be set aside for this reason, but whether they do or not depends on the particular circumstances of the case.”

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