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EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE IS THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF A TRIAL COURT

Dictum

“Courts of trial are expected to carry out their sacred duties of review, evaluation and appraisal, as ascription of probative values, when determining cases presented before them, so that as much as possible, cases are decided on admissible and credible evidence. The receipt of relevant evidence is an act of perception, while the evaluation of evidence and findings of facts by a trial Court involves both perception and evaluation. A trial Court that fails in this duty, fails in its duty of being an impartial arbiter in the adversarial system of the administration of justice – Guardian Newspaper V Ajeh (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1256) 574, 582. Thus the evaluation of relevant and material evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence, both oral and documentary, are the primary functions and within the domain of the trial Court which saw, heard and assessed the witnesses.”

— J.H. Sankey, JCA. Ibrahim Muli v Sali Akwai (2021) – CA/G/423/2019

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WHERE ORAL EVIDENCE IN PRIOR TRIAL MAY BE USED

Ariku v. Ajiwogbo (1962) All NLR (Pt. 4) 630, Ademola CJF (of blessed memory) delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court stated the law as follows:- “This court has frequently directed attention to the practice, now not uncommon of making use of evidence of a witness in another case as if it were evidence in the case on trial. As was pointed out in Alade v. Aborishade (1960) 5 FSC 167 at 171, this is only permissible under section 33 or 34 of the Evidence Act. Where a witness in a former case is giving evidence in a case in hand, his former evidence may be brought up in cross-examination to discredit him if he was lying, but evidence used for this purpose does not become evidence in the case in hand for any other purpose. There are also prerequisites to the making use of the former testimony of a witness; for example his attention must be called to the former case where such evidence was given and he would be reminded of what he had said on the occasion.”

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VARIATIONS IN LPDC PANEL MEMBERS AFFECTS ITS’ FINAL DECISION

In Adeigbe & Anor v. Salami Kusimo & Ors (1965) LPELR -25226 (SC) this issue was properly explained by Ademola JSC (as he then was) as follows: “The complaint against a hearing that was not always before the same bench does not pertain to any matter that goes to the jurisdiction of the Court. It is at bottom a complaint that the judgment cannot be satisfactory on the ground that as the persons who gave it had not seen and heard all the witnesses, they could not appraise the evidence as a whole and decide the facts properly. Thus, it is a complaint on the soundness of the judgment itself, and not a complaint that is extrinsic to the adjudication, which is the test to apply when considering a submission on jurisdiction. We are therefore of the opinion that variations in the bench do not make the judgment a nullity; they may make it unsatisfactory, and it may have to be set aside for this reason, but whether they do or not depends on the particular circumstances of the case.”

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HE IS NOT ON TRIAL FOR THAT

The Appellant himself testified that he was a narcotics dealer, but he is not on trial for that. – Ogunwumiju JCA. Okeke v. State (2016)

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ALL MEMBERS OF PANEL MUST PARTICIPATE IN TRIAL

The LPDC is not an appellate body but an adjudicator of first instance, all the members who delivered the Directions must have participated in the full trial after utilizing the opportunity of seeing the demeanor of witnesses, etc.

– Ogunwumiju JSC. Gbenoba v. LPDC (2021)

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IT IS THE PRIMARY DUTY OF TRIAL COURT TO ASSESS WITNESSES

I fully subscribe to the well settled position of the law that an appellate Court which had not seen the witnesses testify and observe their demeanour in the witness stand, should respect the views of a trial Court and should not readily substitute its own views except where it is shown that the conclusion reached by the Court below was perverse. An appellate Court must always bear it in mind that the primary function of assessing the quality of evidence and ascribing probative value thereto is that of the trial Court, which heard and saw the witnesses testify. Thus, it is only when the findings of the trial Court have been demonstrated to be perverse as not flowing from the established and proved evidence or hinged on extraneous matters or for whatsoever other reasons not correct that an appellate Court would intervene to disturb such findings of fact and re-evaluate the evidence on the printed record, if so called upon by the Appellant to make proper findings in accordance with the dictates of justice. See Saeed v. Yakowa (2013) All FWLR (P. 692) 1650 @ p. 1681. See also Layinka v. Makinde (2002) FWLR (Pt. 109) 1557 @ p. 1570; Martins v. COP (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 666) 446 @ p. 460; Obajimi v. Adeobi (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1075) 1 @ p. 19. See also Owor v. Christopher (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 511) 962 @ p. 992; Sogbamu v. Odunaiya (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 700) 1247 @ p. 1307.

— B.A. Georgewill JCA. Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc V. Longterm Global Capital Limited & Ors. (CA/L/427/2016, 9 Mar 2018)

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A TRIAL BY A COURT IS THE ONLY PERMITTED WAY TO PROVE GUILT – EXCLUSIVE TO THE COURT

ACTION CONGRESS v INEC (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 220 at 259 – 260, as follows: “The disqualification in Section 137(1) clearly involves a deprivation of right and a presumption of guilt for embezzlement or fraud in derogation of the safeguards in Section 36(1) and (5) of the Constitution. The trial and conviction by a Court is the only constitutionally permitted way to prove guilt and therefore the only ground for the imposition of criminal punishment or penalty for the criminal offences of embezzlement or fraud. Clearly, imposition of the penalty of disqualification for embezzlement or fraud solely on the basis of an indictment for those offences by an Administrative Panel of Enquiry implies a presumption of guilt, contrary to Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria, 1999, whereas, conviction for offences and imposition of penalties and punishments are matters appertaining exclusively to judicial power.” See also on this: AMAECHI v INEC & ORS (2008) LPELR-446(SC) at pages 49-51, paras. E F; OMOWAIYE v A.G. OF EKITI STATE & ANOR (2010) LPELR-4779(CA) at pages 28 – 28, paras. A F, per Nweze, JCA (as he then was); and ABDULKARIM & ORS v SHINKAFI & ORS (2008) LPELR 3555(CA) at pages 24 32, paras. A C.

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