A mortgage is defined as creation of an interest in a property defeasible, that is, annullable upon performing the condition of paying a given sum of money with interest at a certain time. Thus, the legal consequence of the above is that the owner of the mortgaged property becomes divested of the right to dispose of it until he has secured a release of the property from the mortgagee.
— M.L. Shuaibu, JCA. FBN v Benlion (2021) – CA/C/31/2016
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A dispute as to volume of indebtedness is not a valid ground known to law such as can be relied upon to prohibit a mortgagee from exercising his right of sale. In other words, the mortgagee will not be restrained from exercising his power of sale because the amount due is in dispute. He will be restrained, however, if the mortgagor pays the amount claimed into court, that is the amount which the mortgagee swears to be due to him, unless on the terms of the mortgage the claim is exclusive. [Sabbagh v. Batik of West Africa (1962) 2 All NLR 225]
– L.A. Ayanlere v. Federal Mortgage Bank of Nig. Ltd. (1998) – CA/K/186/96
I have earlier set out the peculiar factors and circumstances not least being that the appellant has paid part of the purchase price of ₦2.3m to the tune of ₦1.8m leaving a balance of ₦500,000.00 and has been put in possession of the disputed property. There is a binding agreement of sale of the 1st respondent’s interest in the said property between the appellant and the 1st respondent. The appellant has thereby acquired an equitable interest to the extent of the 1st respondent’s interest in the equity of redemption and this is the interest which the mortgagor, the 1st respondent has had at all material times. The 1st respondent cannot give what it hasn’t got. And as I intimated earlier any attempt to pass the legal estate in the disputed property to the appellant will be of no effect and void not voidable because the 1st respondent as the mortgagor has bound itself to convey the legal estate to the mortgagee whenever it is called upon to do so until the principal, interest and costs are duly paid on the mortgage. See: Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Ashiru and Anor. (supra) per ldigbe JSC, and Jared v. Clements (1903) 1 Ch. 428. Besides, the appellant is acquainted with notice of the mortgage and so cannot take priority to the 2nd respondent’s equitable mortgage which is first in time. – Chukwuma-Eneh JSC. Yaro v. Arewa CL (2007)
The main attributes of a legal mortgage are:- (a) a covenant to pay the principal debt and interest on a given date; (b) a covenant to pay interest in the event of default in payment of the principal on the day named; (c) the demise or sub-demise of, or the charge by way of legal mortgage on the mortgaged property; (d) the proviso for cesser; and (e) Such variations of the statutory provisions with regard to mortgages, as the arrangement between the parties requires.
– Augie JSC. Bank v. TEE (2003)
In line with the provisions of section 125(1) of the Property and conveyancing Law, a mortgagee shall not exercise his power of sale unless and until a notice requiring payment of the mortgage money has been served on the mortgagor or one of several mortgagors and default has been made in payment of the mortgaged money or of part thereof for three months after such service. See B.O.N. Ltd. v. Aliyu (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt. 612) 622, where this court held that “the requirement of the law is that notice of intention to sell a mortgage property must be sent to the mortgagor as the words “shall not” are mandatory and not advisory. Consequently, any sale of any mortgage without the requisite notice is invalid ab initio and cannot convey any title to a subsequent purchaser”.
– Augie JSC. Bank v. TEE (2003)
This brings us to the subject of the equitable doctrine of “Notice.” It is usually said that a purchaser of the legal estate in any property for value and without notice has an “absolute, unqualified and unanswerable defence” to any claim of a prior equitable owner or person having a prior equitable interest in the same property (see Pilcher Vs Rawlings (1872) 7 Ch. App. 259 at 269 per James L.J.). Where, however, the purchaser, as here, has notice of a prior equitable mortgage in the property in which he seeks to take a legal estate he has a duty, by himself or by his vendor, to get rid of that prior equitable interest otherwise he is taking unnecessary risk.
– Idigbe JSC. Ogundiani v. Araba (1978)
For the purpose of this appeal, it must be emphasized that a building erected on a mortgaged land form part of the mortgaged property by virtue of the maxim quic quid plantatur solo solo cedit – meaning “he who owns the land owns what is on it”. Adepate v. Babatunde (2002) 4 NWLR Pt. 756, Pg. 99
— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Agboola v UBA (2011) – SC.86/2003
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