In law, a decision or finding or conclusion reached is perverse amongst other grounds if it does not flow from the established facts from the evidence before the Court or it takes into consideration matters extraneous to the issues placed before the Court in evidence by the parties.
– B.A. Georgewill, JCA. Ganiyu v. Oshoakpemhe & Ors. (2021) – CA/B/12A/2021
SHARE ON
This court in the case of Odofin v. Oni (2001) 1 SCNJ 130 handed down the principles to be adopted in interpreting the records of proceedings of a Native or Customary Courts. At page 149 of the report Achike JSC of blessed memory stated the principles thus:- “In order to appreciate the real effect of the lower courts strong criticism of the statement of the customary court that the respondent “failed to prove ownership of the land in dispute” it is important to stress that greater latitude and broader interpretation must be accorded to decision of customary courts as it is trite that the proceedings in the customary courts are not subject to the application of the Evidence Act. It is important that superior appellant courts in relation to matters relating to customary courts should focus their attention to the substance of the judgments or decisions in those courts rather than the forms. This is so because customary courts be they Area Courts or whatever name they are christened in our judicial jurisdiction are generally presided over by laymen without even rudimentary exposure to legal principles. An Appellate Court should in all circumstances strive to get the bottom of the decision of a customary court. This can only be achieved by considering the input of a decision of a customary court not in fragments or in isolation of excerpts thereof but must be read harmoniously as a whole in order to capture its imports. In other-words when greater latitude is accorded to the interpretation of the decisions of customary court it will be sufficient if such decisions are seen to accord with the view of person of good common sense and reason completely devoid of legalistic encrustments”.
In Clement C. Ebokam vs. Ekwenibe & Sons Trading Company Ltd. (1999) 7 SCNJ 77, Kalgo, JSC held at page 87 that: “…Where the decisions of the Court under consideration clearly and wholly disposes of all the rights of the parties in the case, that decision is final. But where the decision only disposes of an issue or issues in the case, leaving the parties to go back to claim other rights in the Court, then that decision is interlocutory. And in order to determine whether the decision is final or interlocutory, the decision must relate to the subject matter in dispute between the parties and not the function of the Court making the order.”
In sum, I hold firmly that where a judgment of this court or an order thereof is adjudged a nullity, a party affected thereby is entitled to have it set aside ex debito justitiae. The court has inherent jurisdiction or power to set aside its own order or decision made without jurisdiction if such order or decision is in fact a nullity or was obtained by fraud or if the court was misled into granting same by concealing some vital information or facts. See Igwe v. Kalu (supra), Vulcan Gases Ltd v. G.F. Ind. AC (2001) 9 NWLR (pt.719) 610 at 644 – 645 paras H – A.
— J.I. Okoro JSC. Citec v. Francis (SC.116/2011, 21 February 2014)
The tribunal or court must base its conclusion on the facts before it and nothing but the facts. The tribunal or court cannot introduce facts not before it. The tribunal or court must confine itself to the facts before it. It has no jurisdiction to read into the Record facts not presented by the parties. It cannot also read out of the record facts presented by the parties. It seems I am repeating myself. Repetition is, at times, useful for emphasis and so be it.
— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008
This makes one remind himself that what an appellate Court is concerned with should at all times be the rightness or wrongness of the decision and not necessarily the reasons for the conclusion or decision. This is so because, once the decision is right it would be upheld at the higher level irrespective of the fact that a wrong reason was given for that decision. See Dickson Arisa v The State (1988) 7 SCNJ 760 at 84; Akpene v Barclays Bank (1977) 1 SC 57; Osakwe v Governor of Imo State (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt.191) 318 at 333-334; Anekwe v Nweke (2014) All FWLR (Pt.739) 1154 at 1175; Amadi v Nwosu (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 241) 275;Nitel Ltd v Ikpi (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt.1035) 96 at 109 -110.
— M.U. Peter-Odili, JSC. MTN v. Corporate (2019) – SC.674/2014
It is apposite to state here that it has been established by sufficient authority that an appellate Court is only interested in the correctness of a judgment/ruling or conclusion reached and not with the correctness of the reason by which the Court arrived at its decision, unless it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice, Taiwo and Ors v Sowemimo [1982] 5 SC 60, 74-75; Ibuluya v Dikibo [2011] 3 WRN 1, 23; Agbeje v Ajibola [2002] 2 NWLR (pt. 750) 127; Hillary Farms Ltd. v MV Mahtra[2007] 14 NWLR (pt. 1054) 210.
— C.C. Nweze, JSC. Uzoho v NCP (SC.141/2007, Friday, May 13, 2022)
Click the icons to like, follow, and join JPoetry