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COURT WILL SET ASIDE MOTION EX PARTE MADE ON SUPPRESSED FACT – ISSUE OF FAIR HEARING DOES NOT ARISE

Dictum

Further, the Appellant alleged lack of fair hearing, to this I would say that the allegation was not substantiated. It is not enough to waive the flag of lack of fair hearing and nothing more. Fair hearing is a two way traffic which both parties ought to enjoy or entitled to. The Respondent in the present case was entitled to be heard before an order that affects him should be made and having been made ex – parte, the Respondent was entitled to have it reviewed by the trial court after other facts with exhibits in support were made known to the lower court as deposed in the affidavit in support of the application to set aside the ex – parte order before the expiration of the 120 days granted. See, MFA & ORS VS. INONGHA (2014) (supra). If the Appellant had laid down the facts of the case as they were at the time the lower court granted the application, the lower court would not have been misled to have granted the ex – parte order which the court set aside, that led to the present appeal, had the facts not been suppressed the lower court would have arrived at a different decision.

— C.N. Uwa, JCA. FRN v Ozekhome (2021) – CA/L/174/19

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SHOULD NOT RECEIVE EVIDENCE FROM ONE SIDE BEHIND THE BACK OF ANOTHER

Lord Denning in KANDA V GOVERNMENT OF MALAYA [1962] AC 322, stated thus: “If the right to be heard is to be real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right of the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statement had been made affecting him, and then must be given an opportunity to correct or contradict them. This appears in all the cases from the celebrated judgments of Lord Loreburn, L.G in The Board of Education v Rice down to the decision of their Lordships’ Board in Ceylon University v Fernando. It follows therefore that the judge or whoever has to adjudicate must not hear evidence or receive representation from one side behind the back of the other. The Court will not inquire whether the evidence did work his prejudice. The risk of it is enough. No one who has lost a case will believe he has been fairly treated if the other side has had access to the judge without his knowing.”

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FAIR HEARING NOT BREACHED WHEN A DOCUMENT IS EXPUNGED BY TRIAL JUDGE

I have seen in recent times counsel forcing into cases the principles of fair hearing even when they are so distant from the case. The principles of fair hearing will not be invoked in favour of a party where the trial Judge correctly expunges an exhibit earlier admitted. It is only when the document is wrongly or wrongfully expunged from the record that a party can be heard to canvass to an appellate court that he was denied fair hearing. – Niki Tobi, JSC. Brossette v. Ilemobola (2007)

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IF THE MATTER IS NOT URGENT, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE GRANT OF EX PARTE INJUNCTION

The basis therefore for granting an ex-parte order of injunction is the existence of special circumstances, invariably, all pervading real urgency, which requires that the order must be made, otherwise an irretrievable harm or injury would be occasioned to the prejudice of the applicant. This simply means that, if the matter is not shown to be urgent there is no reason why ex-parte order should be made at all. The existence of real urgency is a sine qua-non for a proper ex-parte order of injunction … The duration of its potency is always limited to a short period. See Order 8 Rule 11. Courts must ensure that an ex-parte order of injunction is not allowed to over stay. Delay or inaction is not tolerated by the court and the counsel to the party that obtained an interim order should act very fast to see that all that needs to be done in order not to make it as if getting the ex-parte injunction was all that concerned him. Based on the foregoing, the learned trial Judge ought to have discharged the order of injunction when no urgency was shown in the application and his failure to do so occasioned miscarriage of justice. This issue is also resolved in favour of the appellants. I now move to issue number three, whether the learned trial Judge was right in making an order amending the date of the motion on notice when neither party asked for same.

— Abba Aji, J.C.A. Secondi Bogban & Ors. V. Motor Diwhre & Ors. (CA/B/88/2003, 20 MAY 2005)

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THE NATURE OF EX PARTE INJUNCTIONS

Kotoye v. C.B.N. (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 98) 419: Nnaemeka Agu, JSC stated the distinction between “ex parte” & “injunction”: I think it is correct to say that “ex-parte” in relation to injunctions is properly used in contradistinction to, “on notice” – and both expressions, which are mutually exclusive, more strictly rather refer to the manner in which the application is brought and the order procured. An applicant for a non-permanent injunction may bring the application ex-parte, that is without notice to the other side or with notice to the other side, as is appropriate. By their very nature, injunctions granted on ex-parte applications can only be properly interim in nature. They are made, without notice to the other side, to keep matters in status quo to a named date, usually not more than a few days, or until the respondent can be put on notice. The rationale of an order made on such an application is that delay to be caused by proceeding in the ordinary way by putting the other side on notice would or might cause such an irretrievable or serious mischief. Such injunctions are for cases of real urgency. The emphasis is on “real.”

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ANYONE CHARGED OF A CRIMINAL OFFENCE MUST BE GIVEN FAIR HEARING

Assault is an offence under section 265 of the Penal Code. Stealing or theft is an offence under sections 287 and 288 of the Penal Code. Robbery is an offence under section 298 of the Penal Code. House Trespass is an offence under section 352 of the Penal Code. Arson or mischief by fire is an offence under section 337 of the Penal Code. These are all serious offences, which carry heavy punishment under the Penal Code. Any person found guilty of any of them will have his reputation and name tarnished and stigmatised for life. It is therefore clear why the right to fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or tribunal is given to any person charged.

– Andrews Otutu Obaseki, JSC. Garba & Ors. v. The University Of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 550

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DECISION VOID WHERE NATURAL JUSTICE IS ABSENT

Adigun v. Attorney- General of Oyo State (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 56) 197 where the Supreme Court stated: “If the principles of natural justice are violated in respect of any decision, it is indeed immaterial, whether the same decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the departure from the essential principles of justice. The decision must be declared as no decision.”

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