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CHANGE IN LAW DOES NOT NULLIFY RIGHTS BASED ON THE OLD LAW

Dictum

When the Supreme Court departs from its earlier decision on a point, the departure does not operate to generally overrule and nullify all previous decisions that followed the earlier decision it has departed from. The departure serves to chart a new direction to be followed without affecting the previous status quo. If the new decision is one on procedure including venue, pending and new cases at all levels will now be decided in accordance with the new decision. If the new decision applies the law on the existence of rights, interests and obligations differently, new and pending cases will be decided according to it depending on when the cause action arose or when the right, interest or obligation came into being. The general principle of law is that a change in law does not result in the nullification of rights and interests based on the previous law. That is why amending or repealing legislations provide for the saving of such rights and interests including ongoing situations that originated on the basis of the old law. On the basis of this general principle, it is the law prevailing at the time the right or interest accrued or at the time a situation arose and not the new law that determines its validity. In the light of the foregoing, I hold that the Learned respondent’s counsel reliance on the principle of ex nihilo nihil fit as espoused by the Legendary Lord Denning in MACFOY v. UAC (1962) AC, has no basis here.

– E.A. Agim, JCA. Ogidi v. Okoli [2014] – CA/AK/130/2012

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WHEN IS THERE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE FEDERATION & A STATE

In Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Imo State (1983) 4 NCLR 178, it was held that before the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be invoked under section 212 of the 1979 Constitution, the following criteria must be satisfied:- “(1) There must be a justiciable dispute involving any question of law or fact. (2) The dispute must be:- (a) between the Federation and a State in its capacity as one of constituent units of the Federation; (b) between the Federation and more States than are in their capacities as members of the constituent units of the Federation; or (c) between States in their aforesaid capacities, and the dispute must be one on which the existence or extent of a legal right of a State in its aforesaid capacity is involved.” (Relied on in AG Kano State v AG Federation (2007) – SC 26/2006)

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RIGHT VS PRIVILEGE

I hold that when a claim of right metamorphoses into one of supplication, it ceases to wear the clothe of a right but a mere privilege. In this case the appellant was literally begging the respondent for mercies.

– Pats-Acholonu, JSC. ADECENTRO v. OBAFEMI (2005)

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A GUARANTEED RIGHT COULD BE DEROGATED FROM

Para. 44: “The Court is not unmindful of the fact that a right might be guaranteed but it can be derogated from if provided for by law, and if necessary; in a democratic society.”

— Boley v Liberia & Ors. (2019) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/24/19

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CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

The citizen’s right to remain silent has for long been firmly recognised and established under the common law. In Rice v. Connolly (1966) 2 All E.R. 649 at p.652, the Lord Chief Justice opined: “The whole basis of the common law is the right of the individual to refuse to answer questions put to him by persons in authority and refuse to accompany those in authority to any particular place short of course of arrest.” Today, this right has been expressly preserved under Section 33(11) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. If, therefore, the appellant was not on trial and an irrelevant question was put to him, even by a judicial authority, it would seem to me that the necessity or obligation to answer such question cannot arise. It is trite that relevancy of facts is of paramount importance in our adjectival law. That paramountcy has been given conspicuous expression in Part II, Sections 3, 6 to 13 and 15 to 18 of the Evidence Act.

– Achike JCA. Adeyemi v. Edigin (1990)

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RIGHTS ARE QUALIFIED

IN AMERICAN BANK & TRUST CO. VS. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA (1921) 256 @ 500 US. 350, 358, 41 SC et 499 @ 500, the US Supreme Court aptly held: “[T]he word ‘right’ is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights are qualified.”

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TWO WRONGS DO NOT MAKE A RIGHT – GARBA’S CASE

As the students were wrong in going on a rampage, the University Authorities will on their own part be wrong in using means other than those allowed them by law in dealing with the disturbance. Two wrongs, they say, do not make one right. – Oputa, J.S.C. Garba & Ors. v. The University Of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 550

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