It must be realised that the aim of filing written addresses in court, is primarily to save time and obviate unnecessary delay in the administration of justice. The reverse certainly is the end result if an order to file addresses is made and it is insisted that after filing it learned counsel will have to appear to present it viva voce. That obviously cannot be a measure meant to save time and enhance speedy trial.
– GWAR v. ADOLE (2002) JELR 44626 (CA)
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In Obodo v. Olomu (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.59) 111 at page 121, Belgore, JSC, observed as follows: “Addresses of counsel form part of the case and failure to hear the address of one party, however overwhelming the evidence on the one side, vitiates the trial because in many cases, it is after the addresses that one finds the law on the issue fought not in favour of the evidence adduced … By holding that the decision could not have been different if all the address were before the trial court, the Court of Appeal was attempting to read the mind of the trial Judge. He heard the evidence and saw the witnesses, the addresses might have thrown a new light on his view on the evidence. For a totality of a case heard entails not only the evidence but also the addresses.” At pages 123 and124, Obaseki, JSC, stated:- “The hearing of addresses by every court established by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is recognised by the constitution. It is to be given before judgment. See section 258 (1) – “Its beneficial effect and impact on the merit of the case is enormous and unquantifiable. The value is immense and its assistance to the Judge in arriving at just and proper decision though dependent on the quality of the address cannot be denied … until the learned trial Judge’s mind is exposed to an address, no one can say what effect it will have on his mind. It cannot be said that in the light of the above, the failure to hear the address of counsel for the plaintiff has not occasioned a miscarriage of justice. It certainly has not served the interest of justice. Miscarriage of justice vitiates a judgment and renders it a nullity.”
An invitation by the court to address it on points raised by the court during the deliberation or consideration of the judgment does not, in my view, come within the contemplation of evidence and final addresses in section 258(1) of the 1979 Constitution.
— Obaseki, JSC. Odi v Osafile (1985) – SC.144/1983
Learned counsel for the respondent had argued that a trial Judge can in certain circumstances dispense with final addresses and that one of such circumstances is where, as in this case, the facts are straightforward and in the main not in dispute. Reference was made to: Niger Construction Company Ltd. v. Okugbeni (1987) 11/12 SCNJ 135 at 139; Donatus Ndu v. The State (1990) 12 SCNJ 50 at 60. Nemi and Ors. v. The State (1994) 10 SCNJ 1. He submitted that in the present case, the facts are straightforward and that the evidence of the plaintiff is undisputed and that addresses in the circumstances would have been a mere formality and that there is nothing to show that the appellantsuffered a miscarriage of justice as a result of the counsel not addressing the court. I have read the cases cited by the respondent’s counsel and it appears to me that those cases are not in line with the current decisions of the Supreme Court and this court as well. This case is not straightforward as the respondent’s counsel had submitted. I must observe that a trial court does not call for addresses just for a fun or as a matter of course. An address is a part and parcel of the trial and its immense and enormous value is unquantifiable and its absence can tilt the balance of the trial court’s judgment as much as the delivery of an address after the conclusion of evidence can. It will be therefore erroneous on the part of the court to hold that a case is straightforward, that an address is not necessary or that even if an address was delivered, that the decision could not be different as this is nothing more than a mere speculation.
— Opene JCA. United Bank for Africa (UBA) v. Samuel Igelle Ujor (CA/C/134/99, 20 FEB 2001)
It was in this light that Supreme Court per Oputa, J.S.C., in Niger Construction limited vs. Okugbeni (1987) 4 NWLR Part 67 pages 787 at page 792; “Addresses are designed to assist the Court. When, as in this case, the facts are straightforward and in the main not in dispute, the trial Judge would be free to dispense with final addresses. Cases are normally not decided on addresses but on credible evidence. No amount of brilliance in a final speech can make up for the lack of evidence to prove and establish or else disprove and demolish points in issue.”
That counsel in the guise of final address or brief of argument cannot lead evidence to fill any lacuna in his client’s case. He is not permitted to do so … Final addresses, no matter how brilliantly they are couched cannot constitute evidence and they are not intended to be so: NWADAIRO v. SPDC (1990) 5 NWLR (pt.150) 322 at 339; ODUBEKO v. FOWLER (1993) 1 NWLR (pt. 308) 637; ISHOLA v. AJIBOYE (1998) 1 NWLR (pt. 532) 71 at 93 ARO v. ARO (2000) 14 WRN 51 at 56.
— E. Eko, JSC. Lawali v State (2019) – SC.272/2017
In the case of Ndu v. State (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 164) 550 at 560, it was held that the hearing of address from counsel before delivery of judgment is an important exercise in the judicial proceedings in our courts and the denial of that right to a party may render the entire proceedings a nullity if a miscarriage of justice occurs. It is my very view that the judgment entered in favour of the respondent against the appellant without the latter closing its case and presenting through its counsel its final address is a serious violation of the appellant’s right to fair hearing, which renders the entire proceedings a nullity. This being the position, it is not necessary to consider whether the damages awarded can be justified.
— Opene JCA. United Bank for Africa (UBA) v. Samuel Igelle Ujor (CA/C/134/99, 20 FEB 2001)
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