The law regarding master and servant is not in doubt. There is also no doubt that the contract of master and servant is subject to both statutory and common law rules. By and large, the master can terminate the contract with his servant at any time and for any reason or for no reason at all. But if he does so in a manner not warranted by the particular contract under review, he must pay damages for breach.
— A. Oputa, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985
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Where an officer holds his office “at pleasure,” like was the case in Brown v. Dagenham Urban District Council (1929) 1 K.B. 737 at p.742 he can be dismissed at will in complete disregard of any purported contract whether verbal, or written or even under seal, because such contract will be incompatible with his status and therefore destitute of legal value. Thus Servants of the Crown, civil as well as military, except in special cases, where it is otherwise provided by law, hold their office only during the pleasure of the Crown and can be dismissed at any time in spite of a contract for a period of Service:- Dunn v. Reginam (1896)1 Q.B. 116. In fact the employing authority will lack the power, the vires to “enter into a contract” inconsistent with the wording of the Statute which gave it power in the public interest to remove the Servant at its pleasure:- Nicholson v. Whitstable Urban District Council (1925) 89 J. P. Newsp 480 at p.508. An officer holding his office at pleasure has also no right to be heard before he is removed because there need not be anything against him to warrant his removal. If there is nothing against him, no reason need be given for there is nothing to defend since he held his office durante bene placito: See Reg v. Dartington School Governors (1844) 6 Q.B.682.
— A. Oputa, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985
As can be seen, the definition of worker under section 91(1) is restrictive given the persons exempted in terms of paragraphs (a) to (f) of the definition. The point is that section 91(1) defines a worker only for the purposes of the Labour Act; as such, not all employees are workers for purposes of the Labour Act. The category of persons under paragraphs (a) to (f) of the definition of a worker may thus be employees but not workers for purposes of the Labour Act. Section 91(1) of the Labour Act defines a worker by reference to an employer i.e. as one who entered into or works under a contract with an employer. So, who is an employer? The same section 91(1) defines an “employer” to mean “any person who has entered into a contract of employment to employ any other person as a worker either for himself or for the service of any other person, and includes the agent, manager or factor of the first-mentioned person and the personal representatives of a deceased employer”. The common denominator in the definition of a worker and an employer is the contract of employment. A “contract of employment” is thus defined by same section 91(1) to mean “any agreement, whether oral or written, express or implied, whereby one person agrees to employ another as a worker and that other personagrees to serve the employer as a worker”.
— B.B. Kanyip, J. Olatunji v UBER (2018) – NICN/LA/546/2017
The ILO Termination of Employment Convention 1982 (No 158) is yet to be ratified by Nigeria. It is however evidence of international labour standards, and international best practice in termination of employment which this Court is obligated to apply; and its recommendations that an employee is entitled to be informed of the reason for the termination of his employment. Section 7 (6) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 empowers the Court to have due regard to good or international best practices in labour or industrial relations, and what amounts to good or international best practices in labour is a question of fact. Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) has empowered this Court to determine whether the Claimant was terminated for a valid reason or for no reason. It is not globally acceptable in industrial relations and practice to terminate the employee’s employment without adducing any reason for doing so, see Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria v Schlumberger Anadrill Nig Ltd [2008] 11 NLLR (Pt 29) 164, Aloysius v Diamond Bank Plc [2015] 58 NLLR 52, Uzo Ejekwumadu v Blue Arrow TSW Ltd (unreported) Suit No: NICN/LA/242/2016 judgement delivered March 18, 2021. It is contrary to international labour standards and international best practices for an employer to terminate the employment of its employee without any reason or justifiable reason that is connected with the performance of the employee’s work. This is also contrary to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) decent work agenda with the four strategic objectives of the promotion of rights at work, employment, social protection, and social dialogue.
— O.A. Obaseki-Osaghae, J. Ejiro Peter Amratefa v. Access Bank (NICN/ABJ/106/2022, November 2, 2023)
A statutory employment is as a matter of course governed by statute and so also is the procedure for employment and discipline provided for in the statute. See Nigeria Institute of International Affairs v Mrs. T.O. Ayanfalu (SUPRA). — Adewemimo J. Afariogun v FUTA (2020) – NICN/AK/41/2017
I will hasten to say that it will be a contradiction in terms for a citizen of a Republic, such as Nigeria, to hold his office at the pleasure of the Crown. Which Crown We have no Crown here and public Servants in the established and pensionable cadre of the Federal Government Service are not regarded as employed at the pleasure of the Federal Government. This point was first made in Bashir Alade Shitta-Bey v. The Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC. 40 at pp. 57/58.
— A. Oputa, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985
What is a triangular employment relationship? A triangular employment relationship is a situation where the employer arranges for an employee’s placement or assignment with a third party.
— S.J. Adah, JCA. Luck Guard v. Adariku (2022) – CA/A/1061/2020
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